"Direct threats require decisive action": An investigation on how levels of political conservatism change in the face of economic, natural and social threats by Cantal, Clara
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Direct threats require decisive action”: An investigation on how levels of 
political conservatism change in the face of economic, natural and social threats. 
 
 
 
By 
Clara Brasiliana Ribeiro Cantal 
 
 
 
A thesis 
Submitted to the Victoria University of Wellington in fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
in Psychology 
 
 
 
 
 
Victoria University of Wellington 
2015
ii 
 
 
 
 
iii 
 
 
The extant literature has suggested that threatening time periods and situations can enhance 
people’s political conservatism levels. This thesis provides a systematic examination of the 
impact of societal threat on political conservatism, and whether distinct types of threat 
(economic, natural, and social) differentially impact political conservatism. In particular, the 
present research examines two main competing hypotheses. The conservative shift hypothesis 
(Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b) postulates that people become more politically 
conservative during/after threatening periods. The cultural worldview enhancement 
hypothesis (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003) postulates that people tend to cling 
more strongly to what they believe when their death is made salient, be it a more conservative 
or liberal political belief – we assume that societal threat could also make mortality salient, 
enhancing a held political worldview. Additionally, the present research also examines in 
more depth how societal threat impacts political conservatism. The dual-process mediation 
hypothesis suggests that the impact of societal threat on political conservatism happens via 
variables in the dual-process motivational (DPM; Duckitt, 2001) model, being differentially 
mediated by world beliefs (dangerous and competitive) and socio-political attitudes (right-
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation). Finally and because the direct 
impact of threat on authoritarianism has been questioned (Feldman & Stenner, 1997), the 
activation of authoritarianism by social threat hypothesis suggests an interaction between 
social threat and previous levels of right-wing authoritarianism in predicting political 
conservatism and variables in the DPM model. Seven empirical studies were carried out to 
test these hypotheses using different methodological designs. The correlational findings of 
Study 1 showed that the DPM model was useful in predicting political conservatism. The 
mix-method findings of Study 2A showed that economic, natural, and social threats have 
distinct psychological meanings. Based on these initial findings, two mix-method studies 
were conducted to develop textual (Study 2B) and pictorial (Study 2C) experimental stimuli 
depicting economic, natural and social threat scenarios plus a control scenario. Three 
experiments were then conducted to test the complete set of hypotheses: Study 3A was 
completed online with textual stimuli, Study 3B was completed in a lab with textual stimuli, 
and Study 3C was completed in a lab with pictorial stimuli. Overall, the experimental findings 
provided more support for the conservative shift hypothesis with participants showing greater 
conservative political orientation after the threat manipulation (compared to the control 
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condition) in Study 3C. However, this effect did not generalise to other measures of political 
conservatism (right-wing political orientation, conservative voting intention and preference 
for political discourses of conservative parties). Additionally, some distinctions between 
threat types were observed. The dual-process mediation hypothesis was partially supported in 
Studies 3A and 3C. The threat manipulation impacted political conservatism indirectly via an 
increase in competitive world beliefs and an increase in RWA in Study 3A, while it impacted 
political conservatism via an increase in dangerous world beliefs and increases in right-wing 
authoritarianism and/or social dominance orientation in Study 3C. No empirical support was 
observed for both the cultural worldview enhancement and the activation of authoritarianism 
by social threat hypotheses. Overall, the present research suggests that it is possible to 
experimentally modify people’s political conservatism using threat manipulation, that threat 
enhances (at least to some extent) political conservatism, and that this impact may be 
differentially mediated by variables in the DPM model. These conclusions are discussed in 
more depth along with limitations and future directions in the general discussion of the thesis. 
 
 
v 
 
  
In the mystery of the endless 
balances a planet. 
And on the planet, a garden, 
and on the garden, a flowerbed; 
on the flowerbed, a violet 
and upon her, the whole day, 
between the planet and the endless, 
the wing of a butterfly… 
Cecília Meireles, 1938 
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Archival data and anecdotal evidence suggest that threatening situations lead to 
change in individual responses (Perrin, 2005; Sales, 1973). In particular, when exposed to 
threatening situations, individuals tend to preserve the in-group and denigrate and 
discriminate out-group members (Fritsche, Jonas, & Kessler, 2011). Although functional for 
the short-term survival of the in-group, this process can lead to significant crises and 
intergroup conflicts (Hsiang, Burke, Miguel, 2013; Kessler & Cohrs, 2008; Pratto, Sidanius, 
& Levin, 2006).  
Some theories and models have tried to explain (to a greater or lesser extent) the 
interplay between feeling personally threatened, in-group processes triggering and out-group 
reactions. For example, Fritsche et al. (2011) considered in their review how personal and 
group factors interplayed and led to ethnocentric tendencies. In their model, group 
membership was a factor that granted the threatened individual some sense of reassurance. 
More specifically, they hypothesized that threat to one’s sense of global control led to 
ethnocentric tendencies and that this relationship was moderated by salience and relevance of 
the group membership and by perceived in-group agency. As a result, the boundaries between 
the in-group and the out-group became more defined and fixed. 
Besides influencing intergroup behaviour, threatening situations have also been shown 
to influence individual behaviours such as support for conservative candidates (Doty, 
Peterson, & Winter, 1991). The impact of threatening situations on political party support and 
voting might perhaps be a result of the activated psychological processes of higher 
conservatism, authoritarianism and support for hierarchical group relations (Wilson & Sibley, 
2013). This hypothesis is, however, not unanimously accepted. Research has suggested that 
this apparent conservative shift might only be a result of people’s reinforcement of their 
cultural worldviews or a result of other external variables such as the leadership style of 
conservative politicians (Anson, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2009). 
Despite the recognition that threat might lead to individuals behaving in more 
protective ways toward the in-group, as well as influencing voting behaviour, so far no 
previous research has provided a systematic examination of the impact of different societal 
threats (but see Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). Moreover, past research on threat has mainly 
focused on the difference between the impact of collective, social and national threats versus 
the impact of personal threat on people’s attitudes and behaviours (Fritsche et al., 2011; 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
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Harvey & Belt, 1995; Huddy, Feldman, Capelos, & Provost, 2002). This distinction has been 
empirically supported more recently in the study by Onraet, Van Hiel, Dhont and Pattyn 
(2013). These authors also found that external threat (originating from society; e.g. 
ideological danger) was more strongly associated with authoritarianism than internal threat 
(originating from one’s private life; e.g. mental distress). Based on this empirical distinction, 
the present research focuses on external threat, both in terms of situational change or societal 
threat (e.g. period of economic instability in New Zealand) and in terms of subjective 
perceptions of external threat (e.g. individuals’ perception that this economic instability might 
change New Zealand society). 
Obviously, people do not stop voting or making decisions about whom to vote for 
during or after threatening periods. Citizens remain part of the political process and opt for the 
best political option available at a specific historical moment according to their worldviews 
and needs (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003b). As pointed out by Jonathan Haidt 
(2012) in his recent book Righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and 
religion, people who vote for conservative political parties vote based on their beliefs about 
the country they want just as liberals do. According to the author, people in general and 
researchers studying conservative politics should stop attributing conservative voting to “bad 
childhoods” or “ugly personality traits”. 
At the same time, in a world where change is commonplace and uncertainty is a 
common experience, feeling threatened and having logical and affective reactions toward 
threat which might impact one’s political behaviour is not so unusual (Pyszczynski, Solomon, 
& Greenberg, 2003; Slovic & Peters, 2006). Systematic research investigating the impact of 
economic, natural and social threats on political orientation and behaviour would clarify the 
direct (and indirect) consequences of feeling threatened on these variables. More importantly, 
the study of the impact of different types of threat on voting, an important feature of 
democratic political systems, would help to determine which policy changes to expect after 
threatening periods.  
Thesis Aims and Outline 
The main purpose of this thesis was therefore to evaluate the impact of societal threat 
on political conservatism. Along with this main goal, the thesis also had the peripheral goal of 
verifying whether economic, natural and social threats impact differentially political 
conservatism. 
In order to outline the research area, Chapter 2 presents a literature review of 
theoretical and empirical work examining the impact of threat on political conservatism. This 
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chapter presents the main theories which enclose threat, how societal threat and political 
conservatism have been studied, and possible mediators of the impact of societal threat on 
political conservatism. It also discusses further the controversial relationship between threat 
and authoritarianism and delimits the types of societal threat we will focus on. 
Chapter 3 then presents the first empirical study which includes secondary quantitative 
data collected just before New Zealand’s 2011 general election. This study tested the 
predictive power of Duckitt’s (2001) dual-process motivational (DPM) model in explaining 
political conservatism, determining whether or not it was plausible to adopt its variables as 
mediators of the impact of societal threat on political conservatism. 
Chapter 4 then presents three empirical studies which had the general goal of 
designing stimuli for subsequent experimental studies. The first study evaluated the 
psychological meanings attributed to social, economic, and natural threats. Following results 
from the first study, the second and third studies sought to validate textual and pictorial 
stimuli, respectively. 
Based on findings from previous chapters, Chapter 5 then describes three experimental 
studies which had the overall goal of verifying how societal threat impacts political 
conservatism. More specifically, these studies sought to investigate whether economic, 
natural and social threats impact directly political conservatism, and whether this predicted 
impact could also be differentially mediated by variables included in the DPM model. The 
first experiment was completed online at any time during the data collection period. Building 
on results from the first experiment and trying to address possible methodological issues, the 
second and third experiments were completed at labs during scheduled time slots and 
included extra measures evaluating dangerous and competitive world beliefs and political 
conservatism. While the first and second studies included experimental textual stimuli, the 
third included pictorial experimental stimuli. 
Finally, Chapter 6 presents the overall discussion for the seven empirical studies, 
merging experimental findings with previous empirical and theoretical work. It also addresses 
limitations and further directions for this research area. An overview of the empirical studies 
is depicted in Table 1.1.
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Table 1.1 
Overview of the empirical studies in the thesis 
Study Main Goal 
 
Methodology 
(main analyses) 
Sample 
Study 1 
 
Test the predictive power of 
Duckitt’s (2001) DPM 
model in explaining political 
conservatism 
 
Quantitative survey-based study 
with secondary data  
(Structural Equation Modeling) 
New Zealand-born members of 
the general population 
(N = 2,884) 
Study 2A 
 
Examine the psychological 
meanings attributed to 
economic, natural and social 
threats 
Mix-method study with an open-
ended questionnaire 
(Pearson’s chi-square test and 
Semantic Network Technique) 
 
New Zealand-born Pākehā 
(European) members of the 
general population 
(N = 78) 
Study 2B 
 
Validate textual 
experimental stimulus for 
further studies 
 
Quantitative survey-based study 
with textual scenarios 
(MANOVA and MANCOVA) 
 
New Zealand-born Pākehā 
members of the general 
population 
(N = 181) 
Study 2C 
 
Validate pictorial 
experimental stimulus for 
further studies 
 
Quantitative survey-based study 
with images 
(% of agreement and means) 
New Zealand-born Pākehā 
undergraduate students 
(N = 40) 
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Study Main Goal 
 
Methodology 
(main analyses) 
Sample 
Study 3A 
Verify how societal threat impacts 
political conservatism and 
whether or not different types of 
societal threat impact 
differentially political 
conservatism 
Quantitative experimental studies 
with textual and pictorial 
scenarios 
(MANOVAs, ANOVAs, 
Pearson’s chi-square tests and 
Structural Equation Modeling) 
 
New Zealand-born Pākehā 
undergraduate students 
(N = 142) 
Study 3B 
 
New Zealand-born Pākehā 
undergraduate students 
(N = 121) 
 
Study 3C 
 
New Zealand-born Pākehā 
undergraduate students  
(N = 99) 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
Threat: 1. A statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other hostile 
action on someone in retribution for something done or not done; 2. A menace of 
bodily harm, such as may restrain a person’s freedom of action; 3. A person or thing 
likely to cause damage or danger; and 4. The possibility of trouble, danger, or ruin.  
Oxford dictionary, 2014 
 
It is sometimes unfortunate that social science research depends on natural language 
definitions of key concepts. “Threat” is a perfect example of this problem. In normal 
speech it wouldn’t be uncommon to say that a person is ‘‘threatened’’ by the sight of a 
large spider; or by the loss of their job; or by the thought of an airplane crashing; or 
by the prospect of being killed in a terrorist attack; or by increasing cultural diversity 
in their country. All of these things and more could be negative outcomes that people 
fear might occur. 
Feldman, 2013 
 
The definition and quote reported above show that the most used definition of threat 
arises from natural language and could enclose hundreds, thousands, or even millions of 
occurrences that could be threatening depending on people’s context. Indeed, the extant 
literature has defined threat mostly as the perception or feeling of imminent aversive 
outcomes, consequences, and/or situations. Although this conceptualisation of threat has been 
widely used, Fritsche et al. (2011) highlight the importance of other definitions that also 
consider the perception of control over situations that otherwise would be perceived as 
threatening (see also Blascovich & Tomaka, 1996). Below, we present some of the models 
that have, to a greater or lesser extent, focused on how threat to people’s integrity (in the 
broad sense) affects attitudes and behaviours relating to the group level.  
Models Including Threat as Part of the Understanding of Intergroup Behaviour 
In their model of group-based control restoration, Fritsche et al. (2011) assigned a 
central role to the perception of control over situations when conceptualising threat. More 
specifically, these authors posited that threat to people’s sense of global control – and not 
threat per se – impacted ethnocentric attitudes. Similarly to Fritsche and colleagues, some 
other researchers and theories have tried to explain the impact of threat on ethnocentric 
tendencies, focusing to a greater or lesser extent on the group level.  
The integrated threat theory, for example, posits that when groups interact, threat in 
the form of intergroup anxiety, realistic threat, symbolic threat and negative stereotypes result 
in extreme and negative responses toward out-group members (Stephan, Stephan, & 
Gudykunst, 1999). This theory has been supported by previous empirical work suggesting that 
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these four variables are related and lead to negative attitudes toward immigrants (Gonzalez, 
Verkuyten, Weesie, & Poppe, 2008; Stephan, 2014; Stephan, Ybarra, Martnez, Schwarzwald, 
& Tur-Kaspa, 1998; Ward & Masgoret, 2008). According to this theory, if, for instance, 
members from a nationality that had not previously immigrated to New Zealand started 
coming to this country and dominating the available jobs in the labour market, New 
Zealanders could perceive realistic threat or, more specifically, threat to New Zealanders’ 
economic integrity. This perception could in turn generate negative attitudes, behaviours, and 
regulations toward the new nationality group such as nationality targeting in selection 
processes.  
Another theoretical model that has focused on threat and considers the group level to 
some extent is the terror management theory (Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, 
& Lyon, 1989). This theory posits that people, different from other animals, are continuously 
conscious of the imminence of death and, as a way to dissipate or control the fear (and threat) 
related to death, attain to and defend their own cultural worldviews, derogate different cultural 
worldviews, and seek self-esteem (Anson et al., 2009; Harmon-Jones, Simon, Solomon, 
Pyszczynski, & McGregor, 1997; Rosenblatt, et al., 1989). In derogating other worldviews, 
people also tend to present ethnocentric tendencies.  
Empirical work has confirmed the role of people’s cultural worldview defence and 
high self-esteem as buffers of the anxiety provoked by the imminence of death. Burke, 
Martens and Faucher (2010), for instance, investigated the relationship between mortality 
salience with cultural worldview enhancement and self-esteem. The authors found in their 
meta-analysis, which included 164 articles, that the effect of mortality salience on cultural 
worldview and self-esteem was significant and moderate, varying in size depending on the 
nature of the particular worldview/self-esteem factor [r (276) = .35, p < .001.] . Additionally, 
threatening events such as the 2001’s 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States have also been 
explained in a new light using terror management theory (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). More 
specifically related to the content of this thesis, political speeches that sustained the view of 
American culture as “good” have been interpreted as a way to reinforce Americans’ set of 
beliefs in the face of death salience (triggered by the terrorist attack) and gain astonishing 
rates of approval in return.  
Another relevant theory that includes threat in the explanation of intergroup behaviour 
is system justification theory. According to this theory, individuals sustain external ideologies 
that confirm the existing social system when threatened as a way to seek for certainty and 
consistence (Anson et al., 2009). More specifically, system justification theory considers 
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threat as a booster of the social system defence and justification, recognizing it more as a 
prior enhancer of the way groups relate to each other than as a consequence of groups’ 
interaction (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). According to this theory, there are three 
justification tendencies that pervade individuals: the ego justification tendency, the group 
justification tendency, and the system justification tendency (Jost & Banaji, 1994). The ego 
justification tendency relates to one’s need to keep a positive self-image and feel as a valuable 
individual actor. The group justification tendency relates to the desire to keep a positive 
image of the in-group, defending and explaining in-group members’ behaviours. Finally, 
system justification tendency relates to the need to provide meaning to the status quo, seeing 
it as natural, good, desirable, inevitable and fair. This need is motivated by epistemic and 
cognitive demands for certainty and consistence.  
In particular, and according to system justification theory, the three justification 
tendencies can be either in consonance or in dissonance. The theory argues that the defence 
and justification of the status quo along with increasing the legitimacy of the existing social 
order is a general tendency as strong as the ego and group justification tendencies, which, 
many times, may even overshadow both. In their review of ten years of research connected to 
system justification theory, Jost et al. (2004) noted that substantial evidence has been found 
for the theory in empirical studies. Overall, the review showed empirical evidence for 20 
hypotheses derived from system justification theory. Among those hypotheses, evidence was 
reported for people’s defence and justification of the existing social system and greater group 
differentiation when threatened. 
When comparing terror management theory to system justification theory in relation to 
the explanation of stability and change in ideology, Anson and colleagues (2009) focused on 
the internal versus external location of the ideologies that were sustained versus those that 
were defended. In contrast to system justification theory, terror management theory posits that 
individuals defend internal ideologies (i.e. their own cultural worldviews) based on external 
aspects of the world when confronted with death anxiety as a way to protect themselves 
against the fear of death. Anson and colleagues (2009) further argued that while the need for 
consistence and certainty is an assumption of system justification theory, terror management 
theory seeks to explain why people have these needs. It posits that people need consistency 
and certainty in order to protect themselves from death anxiety, which is reached through 
defence of one’s cultural worldview and increased self-esteem.  
Another important distinction between both theories is that the importance of self-
esteem seems restricted to the concept of ego justification tendency in system justification 
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theory, which can be easily overshadowed by one’s system justification tendency (Jost et al., 
2004). By contrast, in terror management theory the concept of self-esteem boost is central, 
serving as a way to reduce death anxiety. 
Terror management theory has also been compared to uncertainty management 
theories in the literature, and has been argued as fitting within this broader context of theories 
(Van Den Bos, 2009). Uncertainty management theories emphasize the role of uncertainty, 
and not death, as an undesirable state that should be managed by adherence to one’s 
worldviews and by derogation of opposing worldviews. Trying to verify this hypothesis, Van 
Den Bos (2009) conducted five experiments contrasting a mortality salience condition with an 
uncertainty salience condition, and having as dependent variables participants’ reactions to 
worldviews which threatened or confirmed their own.  
Van Den Bos found that both experimental conditions enhanced participants’ reactions 
to worldviews different and similar from theirs. Further, the effect of uncertainty salience was 
larger than the effect of mortality salience, and the effects for support or derogation of 
worldviews were larger in four of the studies when participants in the mortality salience 
condition reported words related to uncertainty after the manipulation. According to Van Den 
Bos (2009), the results suggested that at least to some extent uncertainty and terror 
management theories address the same issues. 
Overall, the models and theories presented above reaffirm the importance assigned to 
threat (also in the form of uncertainty and death salience) on the explanation of intergroup 
behaviour and, more specifically, ethnocentric behaviour. Putting their differences in 
theoretical focus and argumentation aside, these theoretical models propose an impact of 
threatening situations on intergroup behaviour. Furthermore, these theories also enable the 
explanation of the association between threat and political conservatism. Given that people 
categorize themselves in political groups according to their level of political conservatism, the 
impact of threat on political conservatism could be, for instance, either understood in terms of 
previous levels of political conservatism (terror management theory) or in terms of a political 
option that would maintain society’s order (system justification theory).  
Societal Threat and Political Conservatism 
In trying to elaborate specifically on the different theories and aspects related to 
political conservatism in the literature, Jost et al. (2003b) introduced the idea of political 
conservatism as motivated social cognition. Through several meta-analyses enclosing the 
empirical production between 1958 and 2002, the authors confirmed the relationship between 
political conservatism and a number of important psychological constructs, including 
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dogmatism/intolerance to ambiguity, integrative complexity, openness to experience, 
uncertainty tolerance, need for order/structure/closure, self-esteem, fear of threat/loss 
(perceived threat), mortality salience and system instability (societal threat). Supporting the 
motivated social cognition account, the results suggested that variables of personality, 
epistemic and existential needs, and ideological rationalisation do explain political 
conservatism understood in terms of higher resistance to change and support for inequality 
(see Jost, 2006; Jost, Federico, & Napier, 2009). 
More particularly related to the present thesis, this review and subsequent studies 
enclosing societal threat have shown that societal threat (and not calmer periods of time) 
increases political conservatism, leading to a conservative shift. However, a major limitation 
of the studies included in this review and produced after it appears to be that the relationship 
between societal threat and political conservatism has been mainly studied using proxy 
measures of political conservatism such as city budget for police departments versus fire 
departments instead of direct measures such as voting or political orientation (Perrin, 2005; 
Peterson & Gerstein, 2005). Even so, two studies reviewed by Jost and colleagues (Doty et 
al., 1991; McCann, 1997) have shown that greater societal threat increased a more direct 
measure of political conservatism understood in terms of voting for a right-wing party. 
Although Jost and colleagues managed to synthesize the relationship between 
variables investigated in different niches of the political conservatism literature, there have 
still been criticisms made of their model. The most important criticisms related to their model 
and relevant to the present thesis revolve around two main points (Anson et al., 2009; Burke, 
Kosloff, & Landau, 2013; Greenberg & Jonas, 2003): (1) their definition of the core 
components of conservatism (defined as resistance to change and tolerance for inequality); 
and (2) their findings implying a conservative shift.  
Regarding the first criticism, some researchers have argued that the structure of 
political conservatism varies across countries. Greenberg and Jonas (2003), for instance, 
pointed out in their reply to Jost and colleagues’ article that while resistance to change and 
support for inequality characterize conservative political regimes in the West, they 
characterize liberal regimes in countries with a history of communist regimes. Discussing the 
topic further, Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski and Sulloway (2003a) argued that there are two options 
when communist regimes are mature (older). The first one includes resistance to change and 
the desire to keep the power and ruling to those in power, maintaining the status-quo. The 
second one connects to the desire for change in the system, moving the system toward 
characteristics connected to conservative regimes in the West (e.g. free market). Going 
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further, in their review about political ideology, Jost et al. (2009) even acknowledged the 
importance of studying the relationship between resistance to change and support for 
inequality in countries with a history of communist or socialist regimes. Still, the authors 
pointed out that research has shown that one should expect political conservatism to be 
characterized in most countries by higher resistance to change and higher support for 
inequality. 
Regarding the second criticism, Anson et al. (2009) observed that a long tradition in 
the literature has described conservative ideologies as reassuring and based on a desire to 
reduce uncertainty. In that sense, people would be stimulated to adopt conservative ideologies 
when threatened, shifting their beliefs toward conservatism. The understanding of 
conservatism as reassuring and as based on the desire to solve uncertainty has even granted to 
it the character of a system justifying ideology in system justification theory.  
However, this idea is not unanimously agreed on. It is possible that when faced with 
societal threat, people could be reminded of their own mortality, defending their own political 
worldviews as a way to dissipate or control the fear (and threat) related to it. In this sense, 
some have defended the idea of cultural worldview enhancement when people are faced with 
mortality saliency instead of the idea of conservative shift proposed by Jost et al. (2003b).  
Adding to this understanding, Burke et al. (2013) evaluated both the hypothesis of 
conservative shift and the hypothesis of cultural worldview enhancement as a result of 
mortality salience in two different meta-analyses. The authors found that the weighted effect 
size for the effect of mortality salience on political conservatism for studies confirming the 
conservative shift hypothesis was small [r (25) = .22, p < .02], while the weighted effect size 
for the effect of mortality salience on political conservatism for studies confirming the 
cultural worldview hypothesis was moderate [r (13) = .35, p < .01]. However and despite the 
apparent difference in effect sizes, this difference was not statistically significant.  
These results add more mixed evidence for the impact of threat on political 
conservatism given the intrinsic relationship between threat and harm to one’s integrity. More 
specifically, they show that there are two contrasting views in the literature regarding 
mortality salience – one that stands for the direct impact of mortality salience on political 
conservatism (conservative shift hypothesis) and another that stands for the moderated impact 
of mortality salience on political conservatism depending on people’s previous political 
worldviews (cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis). 
Overall, the assumptions and results suggest that there are different ways of thinking 
about the impact of societal threat or system instability on political conservatism. One way of 
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examining the threat–conservatism link refers to the conservative shift hypothesis, suggesting 
that people become more conservative when faced with threat or mortality salience triggered 
by threat. A second way of examining the threat–conservatism link refers to the cultural 
worldview enhancement hypothesis, suggesting that people may or may not become more 
conservative when faced with threat (and reminded about their own deaths) depending on 
their previous political beliefs. Thus, two competing hypotheses will be evaluated in this 
research: 
  
Hypothesis 1 (conservative shift). The hypothesis of conservative shift in the face of 
societal threat (Jost et al., 2003b) postulates that individuals will become more 
politically conservative during/after threatening periods 
 
Hypothesis 2 (cultural worldview enhancement). The hypothesis of cultural worldview 
enhancement elicited by societal threat (Burke et al., 2013) postulates that threat will 
enhance individuals’ held political worldview during/after threatening periods 
 
Mediators of the Impact of Societal Threat on Political Conservatism 
The extant literature, and in particular the conservative shift (Jost et al., 2003b) 
hypothesis, suggests a direct influence of societal threat on political conservatism. But it is 
also possible that the societal threat-conservatism link might be mediated by important 
psychological constructs. In particular, authoritarianism and social dominance orientation 
could be possible mediators as both constructs have been widely recognized as variables that 
tackle the political conservatism dimensions of resistance to change and acceptance of 
inequality (Jost et al., 2009). Authoritarianism and social dominance orientation have been 
already shown to explain additively and interactively political conservatism (Wilson & Sibley, 
2013).  
Studies examining the relationship of threat with authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation have to a large extent focused on the prediction of prejudice (Matthews 
& Levin, 2012; Thomsen, Green, & Sidanius, 2008), with both authoritarianism and social 
dominance orientation predicting higher levels of prejudice. However, some studies have also 
focused on the relationship between threat and both authoritarianism and social dominance 
orientation in the prediction of attitudes toward political issues such as support for military 
attack and restriction of human rights (Kossowska et al., 2011; McFarland, 2005).  
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A model described in more detail below provides a framework for understanding the 
theoretical relations between authoritarianism and social dominance orientation and why 
their association with threat and political conservatism should be considered jointly. 
Duckitt’s (2001) dual-process motivational model. The study of conservative 
orientation goes back to the 1950s with the publication of The Authoritarian Personality 
(Adorno, Frenkel-Bruswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950). At that time, conservative 
orientation was conceived as a single dimension construct ranging from a liberal orientation at 
the low end to a conservative orientation at the high end (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). Only years 
after, with the publication of the right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981) and the 
social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994) scales, the 
unidimensionality of political conservatism was questioned.  
The RWA scale was created in 1981 to measure authoritarianism, considering three 
different components: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism 
(Altemeyer, 1981). An authoritarian individual would thus be submissive to authorities, 
aggressive when authorities approved aggression, and conventional (Altemeyer, 2004). The 
SDO scale was created in 1994 to measure to what extent individuals desired and supported 
hierarchy, inequality between social groups and domination of “inferior” groups by “superior” 
groups (Pratto, et al., 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Nowadays, RWA and SDO are 
recognized to index resistance to change and support for inequality, the underlying 
dimensions of political conservatism (Jost et al., 2009).  
In this sense, comprehensive empirical evidence has shown that high levels of RWA 
and SDO express complementarily prejudice (Altemeyer, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996) 
and also conservative political beliefs (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). 
Additionally, Wilson and Sibley (2013) have shown an interactive effect between these 
variables on explaining political conservatism, but this effect was only small.  
Trying to explain prejudice, Duckitt (2001) proposed a dual-process motivational 
(DPM) model that accounted for the roles of RWA and SDO. According to the DPM model, 
and as depicted in Figure 2.1, RWA and SDO result from distinct socialisation practices, 
personality traits and worldviews. RWA reflects a punitive socialisation, social conformity 
and the perception of the world as a dangerous place. In contrast, SDO reflects an 
unaffectionate socialisation, tough-mindedness and the perception of the world as 
competitive. The DPM model thus proposes a dual mediational model with socialisation 
practices influencing the development of RWA and SDO via particular personality traits and 
worldviews.  
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Figure 2.1. Duckitt’s (2001) dual-process motivational model (adapted from Duckitt, 2001). 
 
Overall, support for the whole model or particular portions of it has been shown in a 
number of studies (for reviews and meta-analyses see Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Perry, Sibley, 
& Duckitt, 2013; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). Under the DPM model framework, RWA and SDO 
have been heavily used to explain prejudice (Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010; 
Thomsen e al., 2008).  
In considering the relationship between political issues and RWA and SDO, a wide 
range of topics have been studied. For example, RWA has been shown to be positively related 
to support for military aggression (Crowson, 2009; Henderson-King, Henderson-King, Bolea, 
Koches, & Kauffman, 2004), tough government actions (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 
2010), and harsh and punitive political positions (Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993). Similarly, 
SDO has been shown to be positively related to support for greater violence in war (Henry, 
Sidanius, Levin & Pratto, 2005), lack of support for environmental/pro-egalitarian policies 
(Milfont, Richter, Sibley, Wilson, & Fischer, 2013; Milfont & Sibley, 2014; Pratto et al., 
1994), and conservative social policy (Jost & Thompson, 2000). Other studies have also 
shown that both RWA and SDO are positively related to restriction of human rights (Cohrs, 
Maes, Moschner, & Kielmann, 2007; Crowson, 2007) and conservative voting (Duckitt et al., 
2010; Ho, et al., 2012).  
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To our knowledge, only two articles have focused on the impact of both RWA and 
SDO on the orientation toward different political parties. Examining preference for political 
parties as measured through ratings given by participants to the program of the six major 
parties in Flanders (Belgium), Van Hiel and Mervielde (2002) found that RWA was more 
positively correlated to the preference for a more religious and traditional party, while SDO 
was more positively correlated to the preference for a more anti-immigration party (an 
extreme right-wing party). The researchers also observed that RWA and SDO independently 
explained conservative beliefs.  
Wilson and Sibley (2013) evaluated how RWA and SDO explained political 
conservatism across 14 samples from New Zealand. The way conservatism was measured 
across the samples varied from attitudes toward political issues to support for political parties 
and answers in response to a version of the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale. Overall, the 
authors found that RWA and SDO explained additively and interactively political 
conservatism, and both the additive and interactive effects were only small. More specifically, 
they found that RWA and SDO complementarily increased political conservatism, but that in 
order for participants to be extremely liberal, they had to show low scores in both RWA and 
SDO. This interactive effect was not observed for participants who were extremely 
conservative. When considering only support for political parties as the dependent variable, 
just the additive effect of RWA and SDO was observed and the interactive effect did not 
significantly explain unique variance in support for political parties. Together, these findings 
support the widespread influence of RWA and SDO on political issues, and also lend support 
for their differential influence as proposed by the DPM model. 
Threat research including variables described in the DPM model. Duckitt and 
Fisher (2003) were perhaps the first to test a model which included threat under the DPM 
model frame. The authors hypothesised that threatening social situations and the personality 
trait of social conformity would lead to dangerous world beliefs and to RWA. On the other 
hand, the authors hypothesised that competitive-jungle social situations and the personality 
trait of tough-mindedness would lead to competitive-jungle world beliefs and to SDO. The 
authors tested part of this model experimentally in a between-subjects design with 
introductory psychology students. Participants were presented with one of three scenarios 
describing the situation in their country ten years into the future as threatening, safe or 
unchanged. After reading one of the scenarios, the participants answered measures of 
dangerous world beliefs, RWA and SDO. The authors found that societal threat (when 
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compared to the control condition) led to dangerous world beliefs which in turn led to two of 
the RWA measure factors – conservative attitudes and authoritarian attitudes (Figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Duckitt and Fisher’s (2003) path model of the associations between societal 
threat, dangerous world beliefs, RWA dimensions and SDO (adapted from Duckitt & Fisher, 
2003). 
 
In addition, authoritarian attitudes impacted conservative attitudes and SDO, which 
was only marginally and indirectly impacted by societal threat. Overall, the empirical findings 
supported the hypothesized paths. This model was further supported in another New Zealand 
study conducted by Jugert and Duckitt (2009).  
Reviewing the literature around the DPM model, Duckitt and Sibley (2010) endorsed 
the model proposed by Duckitt and Fisher (2003) by highlighting that enduring and drastic 
changes in the social environment could impact DPM model variables (also see Duckitt, 2006; 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). The new version of the model focused on social or group context 
instead of socialisation practices and substituted the personality traits of social conformity and 
tough-mindedness for three (agreeableness, conscientiousness and openness) of the big-five 
personality traits (Figure 2.3).  
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Figure 2.3. Duckitt and Sibley’s (2010) dual-process motivational model including context 
and three of the big-five personality traits (adapted from Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). 
 
Differently from the original model, RWA and SDO were hypothesized to impact 
right-wing politics, nationalism, ethnocentrism and prejudice only indirectly via perceived 
threat to collective security (for RWA) and competitiveness over group dominance (for SDO). 
According to this model, worldviews could change in accordance with changes in the social 
environment, especially if the change in the social environment was enduring and 
considerable.  
Overall, Duckitt and Sibley’s (2010) new version of the model made it reasonable to 
assume that enduring and considerable threat could impact worldviews, RWA, SDO and the 
resulting political and ethnocentric behaviours. Moreover, the model also made it possible to 
assume that social contexts characterized by danger and threat would impact world beliefs 
differently when compared to social contexts characterized by merciless competition for 
resources. 
Although to our knowledge no study has tested the full model presented by Duckitt 
and Sibley (2010), some studies have tested the stability of the DPM model or parts of the 
model in relation to systemic threat. In a recent study, Sibley and Duckitt (2013) evaluated the 
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relationship between the big-five personality traits, competitive and dangerous worldviews, 
and both RWA and SDO using a cross-lagged design. In this study, data were collected before 
(time 1) and during (time 2) a global financial crisis. Confirming the DPM model, the authors 
found that low openness in time 1 predicted dangerous worldview in time 2, and that 
dangerous worldview in time 1 predicted RWA in time 2 (i.e. low openness  dangerous 
worldview  RWA). On the other hand, low agreeableness and low openness to experience 
in time 1 predicted competitive worldview in time 2, and competitive worldview in time 1 
predicted SDO in time 2 (i.e. low agreeableness/openness  competitive worldview  
SDO), only partially supporting the model.  
Unexpectedly, RWA and SDO in time 1 predicted dangerous and competitive 
worldviews, respectively, in time 2. Also unexpectedly, competitive worldview and SDO in 
time 1 predicted agreeableness in time 2. Overall, the empirical model obtained in this study 
provided evidence of the causal links hypothesized by Duckitt (2001) even when considering 
a time of global financial crisis in comparison to a relatively safer time period. Importantly for 
the context of the present research, Sibley and Duckitt (2013) also pointed out that the 
connection between the variables in the DPM model was more readily observed in times of 
systemic instability or societal threat.  
Also contributing to the literature on threat and the DPM model, Sibley et al. (2013) 
studied how characteristics of the social context interacted with world beliefs on explaining 
prejudice using a dataset with 6,489 members of the general population. The authors 
confirmed that competitive and dangerous worldviews interacted with characteristics of the 
residential area – the proportion of immigrants in the area and economic deprivation of the 
area – in the prediction of attitudes toward immigrants. More specifically, those high in 
dangerous worldview who lived in areas with a higher proportion of immigrants presented 
more negative attitudes toward immigrants, while those high in competitive worldview who 
lived in non-economically deprived areas presented more negative attitudes toward 
immigrants. 
Also adding to the literature on threat and variables included in the DPM model, but 
also associating these with political conservatism, Sibley, Osborne and Duckitt (2012) focused 
on the moderation of the impact of personality on political conservatism by systemic threat 
(societal threat). More specifically, the studies considered in their meta-analysis focused on 
the impact of the big-five personality traits on political orientation measured on a self-
placement single-item measure (liberal versus conservative). The indices of systemic threat 
considered by the authors were the national-level measures of intentional homicides per 
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100,000 people (systemic danger) and of unemployment percentage on the labour force 
(systemic instability). The authors found that the strength of the relationship between 
openness to experience and political orientation decreased when systemic danger was higher. 
For systemic instability the authors found that as systemic instability increased, the impact of 
openness to experience on political orientation became slightly less negative. The prediction 
of political orientation by the other big-five factors was not moderated by systemic threat.  
Together, the literature reviewed above concerning the association of threat and 
variables in the DPM model shows that different types of social contexts including external 
danger or competition for resources can differently impact political conservatism and related 
variables. Moreover, the limited empirical literature suggests that the relationship between 
variables in the DPM model is more readily observable during threatening situations or 
periods of systemic instability, and also that the association between types of social context 
(dangerous versus competitive) and some of the DPM model variables impact differentially 
prejudice and political conservatism.  
Drawing upon the literature reviewed above, we will also evaluate the following 
hypothesis in this research: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (dual-process mediation). The hypothesis of dual-process mediation 
(Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) postulates that world beliefs (competitive and dangerous) and 
socio-political attitudes (RWA and SDO) will differentially mediate the impact of 
societal threat on political conservatism 
 
More specifically, this hypothesis will evaluate whether or not economic and social 
threats (in comparison to a control condition) will impact differentially political conservatism 
via different DPM model pathways. In order to evaluate this differential mediation 
hypothesis, we will evaluate first whether or not there are differences in world beliefs and 
socio-political attitudes across conditions. In order to test this dual-process mediation 
hypothesis accurately, we hypothesize that: 
  
Hypothesis 3A. Individuals facing social threat will perceive the world as more 
dangerous and will be more authoritarian than individuals facing economic threat or 
the absence of threat 
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Hypothesis 3B. Individuals facing economic threat will perceive the world as more 
competitive and will be more social dominance oriented than individuals facing social 
threat or the absence of threat 
 
Below, we explore further how threat has been studied along with RWA outside the 
DPM model, describing an alternative hypothesis for this association. The relationship 
between threat and authoritarianism has been questioned in the literature, deserving even a 
special issue in the International Journal of Psychology (Duckitt, 2013). 
Threat research including RWA. Considering the variables included in the DPM 
model, right-wing authoritarianism has been the most studied along with threat. However, the 
nature of the relationship between these two variables has been questioned. Overall and 
outside the DPM model, the relationship between threat and RWA in the prediction of 
political conservatism has been mainly conducted considering perceived 
(internal/psychological) and not societal threat. Among these studies, perceived threat has 
been studied either as the mediator of the impact of RWA on political conservatism 
(McFarland, 2005) or as a moderator of the impact of RWA on political conservatism 
(Kossowska et al., 2011).  
Among the studies which have considered perceived threat as a mediator of the impact 
of RWA on political conservatism, McFarland (2005) examined the different ways in which 
RWA and SDO led to support for military attacks on Iraq. He found that only RWA led to the 
perception of Iraq as a threat which in turn led to support for military attacks (i.e. RWA  
Iraq as a threat  military support).  
Among the studies which have considered threat as a moderator of the impact of RWA 
on political conservatism, Kossowska et al. (2011) investigated in four different countries how 
RWA, support for limitation of civil liberties and perceived terrorism threat related to each 
other. The authors hypothesized that in a country in which threat was situational (and not 
chronic), threat would enhance the relationship between RWA and support for limitation of 
civil rights. The authors confirmed their hypothesis, finding that only high-RWAs were 
impacted by terrorism threat in this country (i.e. high-RWA × terrorism threat  limitation of 
civil rights). Importantly, this article included predictions per country context, considering to 
some extent the interplay between societal context of the country, RWA and perceived threat. 
Also focusing on the role of threat as a moderator, Hastings and Shaffer (2005) 
investigated how RWA predicted support for military aggression and support for democratic 
values. Participants in this study answered the RWA scale and then were assigned to a 
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condition in which they read a threatening scenario about the war on terrorism or a safe 
scenario enclosing the same topic. After reading the scenario, the participants answered the 
other attitudinal measures. The authors found that the extent to which RWA impacted the 
support for democratic values depended on the condition the participant was allocated. More 
specifically, the authors found support for the RWA activation by threat hypothesis which 
posits that only high authoritarians are affected by threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997; Feldman, 
2013). However, they did not find support for the same relationship between threat and RWA 
when support for military aggression was considered.  
Additionally, some literature has already been focusing on the nature of the 
relationship between RWA and threat. Onraet, Dhont, and Van Hiel (2014), for instance, used 
a cross-lagged design to test the relationship between RWA with internal threat 
(conceptualized as the perception of threat in the personal life of oneself) and external threat 
(conceptualized as the perception of threat to the society) in a tree-wave longitudinal study. 
The authors found that external threat was impacted by previous levels of RWA but also 
impacted posterior levels of RWA. 
Given that the nature of the relationship between threat and RWA is uncertain and that 
the interaction between authoritarianism and perceived threat has been acknowledged in the 
literature (Feldman, 2013), we will also test the effect of the interaction between previous 
levels of RWA and social threat on variables included in the DPM model. More specifically, 
and based on the DPM model, we will also evaluate the following fourth and final hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (activation of authoritarianism by social threat). The hypothesis of 
activation of authoritarianism by social threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997) postulates 
that authoritarians will be more sensitive to social threat, and this interaction will 
increase dangerous world beliefs (i.e. authoritarianism × social threat  dangerous 
world beliefs). 
 
Along with these main predictions, it also will be investigated whether or not different 
types of societal threat differentially impact political conservatism. Below, the literature 
examining the association between economic, social, and natural threats with political 
conservatism is presented.  
Societal Dimensions of Threat and the Prediction of Political Conservatism 
The studies presented in this thesis will also try to evaluate the differential impact of 
economic, natural and social threats on political conservatism throughout the four hypotheses 
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presented previously. While the relationship of economic and social threats with political 
conservatism has at least been considered in the literature (but often without clear distinction 
between these types of threat), the relationship between natural threat and political 
conservatism has been conducted entirely based on specific types of natural threat and not on 
natural threat as an umbrella term. Below, the literature enclosing the relationship between 
political conservatism and economic and social threats is introduced, followed by the 
literature enclosing the relationship between political conservatism and natural threat. 
Economic and social threats. Studies examining the influence of threat on social 
behaviour, and in particular on socio-political attitudes and voting, have to some extent 
examined the impact of economic and social threats on political conservatism. In their meta-
analytical review of the relationship between societal threat and political conservatism, Jost et 
al. (2003b) found only four articles focusing on economic and social threats along with 
political threat. The studies were based on archival data and their authors mainly categorized 
periods as high or low in threat. The impact of these periods on several indices connected to 
political conservatism was then evaluated. Supporting the conservative shift hypothesis, these 
studies indicated that threatening economic, social and political periods are associated with an 
increase in political conservatism. Some of the articles based their threatening period 
definition on the evaluation of experts, but none verified within samples of the population 
what was specifically perceived as economic, social and political threats (McCann & Stewin, 
1990).  
Overall, the articles evaluated in Jost et al.’s (2003b) meta-analysis had the limitation 
of not basing their threatening period categorisation on what the population perceived as 
threatening, a matter of fundamental importance (Slovic, 1987). They also did not 
differentiate the impact of economic and social threats on political conservatism. These 
limitations were mostly due to the type of studies enclosed in the meta-analysis – archival 
data studies. 
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, various studies have investigated the impact of threat 
on political conservatism using terrorist attacks as markers or antecedent variables. These 
events have been connected to higher prejudice, authoritarianism, conservative values, 
conservative shift and support for harsher policies regarding terrorism in the literature 
(Bonanno & Jost, 2006; Echebarria-Echabe & Fernandez-Guede, 2006; Huddy & Feldman, 
2011; Henderson-King et al. 2004). Some authors have also used the framework of terror 
management theory to try to explain why people reacted the way they did after the 9/11 
attacks (Pyszczynski et al., 2003). The use of a theory that includes death salience to explain 
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the effects of a threatening event on people’s behaviours shows how death salience and threat 
can be intrinsically related concepts. 
To our knowledge, no previous study has examined systematically the impact of social 
and economic threats, as perceived by the population, on political conservatism. These types 
of threat are clearly related, but we argue that they can be conceptually distinguished with 
possible independent influence on behaviour. Also to our knowledge, no study has considered 
the relationship between these types of threat and voting using New Zealand samples, 
although some studies have considered the relationship between variables in Duckitt’s (2001) 
DPM model, threat, and/or political orientation (Sibley & Duckitt, 2013; Sibley et al., 2012). 
Natural threat. Dunlap, Gallup and Gallup (1993) using samples from 12 
industrializing and 12 developing countries found with open-ended questions that at least 
21.0% of the respondents in each country perceived environmental problems as very serious. 
In the same report the authors described that with the exception of three countries, more than 
50.0% of the respondents were “a great deal” or “a fair amount” personally concerned with 
environmental problems. Despite the acknowledgement of environmental problems as a 
source of concern and possibly threat, the impact of natural threat on political conservatism 
has not been systematically explored.  
Threatening situations related to natural threat could include events such as floods, 
hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, volcano eruptions, tsunamis, and sea level rise depending 
on the geographic circumstances of the given location and also on the meaning of these 
hazards to the population. Díaz, Tapia, Estrada and Leiva-Bianchi (2012), for instance, 
studied the psychological meaning of earthquakes and tsunamis among Chileans affected 
directly or indirectly by them. They found that negative sentiments, feelings and 
consequences were intrinsically linked to the meaning of both natural disasters, with words 
such as “fear”, “suffering”, “disaster”, and “destruction” central to the meaning of these 
hazards. These results suggest that earthquakes and tsunamis could possibly be perceived as 
threat, at least in regions affected by them. 
McClure, Johnston, Henrich, Milfont, and Becker (2015) illustrated this point in a 
study conducted in New Zealand evaluating how much participants expected that earthquakes 
would happen, how real the risk of an earthquake was, how much participants were prepared 
for an earthquake and the perception of damage after a major earthquake in cities affected and 
not affected by earthquakes. Overall, they found that participants expected more earthquakes 
in New Zealand after a major earthquake than before it and that the number of participants 
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who said the earthquake was more real after the major earthquake was higher in the city 
affected by it than in a city where earthquakes do not usually happen. 
In general, research including the consequences of these natural disasters is incipient, 
but has shown continuous growth, especially when considering the threat of climate change 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 2014). Some countries, as well as some 
studies, have started to recognize the role of climate change in fostering internal instability 
and international conflict (Broder, 2012). At least one study has summarized research 
addressing climate variation and its impact on conflict. In the meta-analysis by Hsiang et al. 
(2013), the impact of climate variation on conflict was evaluated using variations in 
temperature, rain, flood, storm, drought and a drought severity index as independent 
variables, and interpersonal and intergroup conflict as dependent variables. The authors found 
that climate variation had a positive association with interpersonal and intergroup conflict, 
meaning that climate variation might lead to an increase in conflict. 
Despite this meaningful relationship, to our knowledge, no study has evaluated the 
impact of natural threat as an umbrella term on political conservatism. Instead, studies have 
mainly focused on the impact of specific types of natural threat (similarly to the general 
literature) on variables associated to political conservatism. Fritsche, Cohrs, Kessler and 
Bauer (2012), for instance, evaluated the impact of climate change on authoritarianism, which 
has been identified in the literature as a key predictor of political conservatism (Jost et al., 
2009). The authors observed that participants’ authoritarian attitudes and derogation toward 
threatening groups increased after having been exposed to priming making salient the 
negative consequences of climate change.  
Focusing on religious conversion, a variable that has been associated to higher 
authoritarianism, Sibley and Bulbulia (2012) found that the number of people who became 
religious between 2009 and 2011 living around the region of the destructive 2011 
Christchurch earthquake in New Zealand was higher than the number of people who became 
religious living in other parts of the country. The rate of conversion was also higher among 
people directly affected by the earthquake than among people not directly affected by it. 
Religiosity has been related in the literature to higher traditionalism, one of the key 
components of authoritarianism (Duckitt et al., 2010).  
Overall, the studies reviewed above suggest that specific types of natural threat might 
influence political conservatism. However, so far no study has examined this prediction 
systematically and explicitly using natural threat as an umbrella term. Adding to the literature, 
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the experimental studies reported in this thesis will try to provide a systematic investigation of 
the differential effects of economic, social, and natural threats on political conservatism.  
Conclusion 
Overall the literature review suggests that (1) in the presence of societal threat, people 
may or may not shift their political orientation towards political conservatism; (2) the impact 
of societal threat on political conservatism has not been studied in a systematic way; (3) the 
variables included in Duckitt’s (2001) DPM model could mediate the impact of societal threat 
on political conservatism; and (4) the relationship between threat and authoritarianism is 
controversial in the literature.  
Based on these conclusions, the empirical studies presented in the present research test 
whether or not: (1) societal threat always enhances political conservatism (conservative shift 
hypothesis, H1); (2) societal threat enhances political conservatism only in people who were 
already conservative before experiencing threat (cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis, 
H2); (3) the impact of societal threat on political conservatism is differentially mediated by 
variables in the DPM model (dual-process mediation hypothesis, H3); (4) social and economic 
threats differentially impact specific DPM model variables (dangerous world beliefs and 
RWA, H3A; and competitive world beliefs and SDO, H3B); and (5) only people high in 
authoritarianism are impacted by social threat (activation of authoritarianism by social threat 
hypothesis, H4). Additionally, we also explore the differential impact of economic, social and 
natural threats on political conservatism. The next chapters describe the seven empirical 
studies conducted in order to test the set of hypotheses indicated above. 
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Chapter 3: Study 1 
Duckitt’s DPM Model and the Prediction of Political Conservatism 
 
Despite the recognition that societal threat might lead to more conservative political 
behaviour, so far only a limited number of studies have systematically focused on variables 
which could mediate this impact. In this sense, before turning to a formal test of the 
hypotheses presented in the previous chapter, it is important to establish whether or not the 
proposed mediators for the impact of societal threat on political conservatism (dangerous and 
competitive world beliefs, RWA and SDO) systematically predict political conservatism. The 
present study tests the prediction of voting intention and political orientation by the DPM 
model (Duckitt, 2001), firstly by confirming the DPM model structure observed in Sibley and 
Duckitt’s (2009) study and secondly by verifying the prediction of voting intention and 
political orientation by this model. 
Although the predictive and explanatory validity of variables in the DPM model has 
been tested in a number of studies (e.g. Perry & Sibley, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2010), only 
three previous studies (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009; Sibley & Duckitt, 2013; Van Hiel, Cornelis, 
& Roets, 2007) have examined the extent to which the big-five model of personality could be 
used to index the specific personality traits in the development of RWA and SDO through 
social worldviews. Moreover, while variables of the DPM model have been extensively used 
in the prediction of intergroup prejudice and related prejudiced attitudes and behaviours (e.g. 
Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; McFarland, 2010), to the best of our knowledge the full model has 
never been used in the prediction of conservative voting intention and related conservative 
political orientations. The present study expands extant research by testing the DPM model 
with the big-five personality traits and testing its usefulness in predicting conservative 
political variables.  
The DPM Model 
The DPM model outlines two pathways underlying the development of RWA and 
SDO, which are the core socio-political attitudes explaining intergroup prejudice (Duckitt, 
2001). According to this model, RWA and SDO result from particular socialisation practices, 
personality traits and worldviews. RWA reflects a punitive socialisation, social conformity 
and the perception of the world as a dangerous place. In contrast, SDO reflects an 
unaffectionate socialisation, tough-mindedness and the perception of the world as 
competitive. The DPM model thus proposes a dual mediational model with personality traits 
influencing the development of RWA and SDO via particular worldviews. Support for the 
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DPM model (or portions of the model) has been shown in a number of studies (e.g. Perry & 
Sibley, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2009, 2010; Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007) and meta-
analyses (Perry et al., 2013; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).  
Nowadays, studies focusing on the model include mostly the big-five personality traits 
instead of the personality traits of social conformity and tough-mindedness. Sibley and 
Duckitt’s (2009) results, for instance, supported the inclusion of the big-five personality traits 
in the DPM model based on a New Zealand undergraduate sample. The authors found that 
overall the big-five personality traits impacted RWA and SDO indirectly through dangerous 
and competitive worldviews. Specifically, they found that low openness to experience led to 
high dangerous worldview, while low agreeableness led to high competitive worldview. Also 
in line with the DPM model, dangerous worldview predicted RWA and competitive 
worldview predicted SDO.  
Most of the effect from personality to RWA/SDO was mediated by the worldviews, 
but some direct paths between personality and socio-political attitudes were observed. In 
particular, high conscientiousness and low openness to experience led to high RWA, while 
low agreeableness led to high SDO. These results confirm findings reported by Van Hiel et al. 
(2007) with student and voter samples from Belgium. These authors showed that neuroticism 
and openness impacted RWA directly and indirectly through dangerous worldview, and that 
agreeableness impacted SDO only indirectly through competitive worldview.  
Supporting and extending the DPM model, the findings of these two studies (Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2009; Van Hiel et al., 2007) have shown that the big-five model of personality could 
be used and that the relationships between the personality dimensions and RWA/SDO are by 
and large mediated by social worldviews. In particular, the two distinct pathways suggest the 
following pattern: conscientiousness/openness  dangerous worldview  RWA, and 
agreeableness  competitive worldview  SDO. The present study explores these 
associations in the context of voting intention and political orientation. 
Socio-Political Attitudes and Political Conservatism 
Despite its enormous popularity in explaining intergroup prejudice, the DPM model 
has not been widely used in the context of voting intention and political orientation. 
Nevertheless, a number of studies have started to show the extent to which RWA and/or SDO 
can also predict political conservatism. For example, RWA has been shown to be positively 
related to support for military aggression (Crowson, 2009; Henderson-King et al., 2004), 
tough government actions (Duckitt et al., 2010), and harsh and punitive political positions 
(Peterson et al.1993). Similarly, SDO has been shown to be positively related to support for 
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greater violence in war (Henry et al., 2005), lack of support for environmental or pro-
egalitarian policies (Pratto et al., 1994; Milfont et al., 2013) and conservative social policy 
(Jost & Thompson, 2000). Other studies have also shown that both high RWA and high SDO 
are positively related to restriction of human rights (Cohrs et al., 2007; Crowson, 2007) and 
conservative voting (Duckitt et al., 2010; Ho et al., 2012).  
To our knowledge, only two articles have focused on the impact of both RWA and 
SDO on voting and support for different parties (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002; Wilson & 
Sibley, 2013). The study of Van Hiel and Mervielde (2002) with members of the general 
population investigated the predictive validity of RWA and SDO in explaining political party 
preferences - measured by participants’ agreements toward the program of the six major 
political parties in Flanders. Results showed that RWA was more positively correlated to the 
preference for a more religious and traditional party, while SDO was more positively 
correlated to the preference for a more anti-immigrant party (an extreme right-wing party).  
Wilson and Sibley (2013) examined how RWA and SDO explained political 
conservatism across 14 samples from New Zealand. Political conservatism was 
operationalised in a variety of ways, including attitudes toward political issues, scores in a 
version of the Wilson-Patterson Conservatism scale, and support for New Zealand political 
parties. Overall, they observed that high levels of both RWA and SDO were associated with 
high levels of political conservatism, and RWA and SDO predicted political conservatism 
both in additive and interactive fashion. More important for the context of the present study, 
these authors showed that both RWA and SDO predicted support for conservative parties in 
New Zealand. 
The Present Study 
The studies reviewed above provide empirical support for using the DPM model to 
predict political conservatism. Building on the theoretical and empirical considerations 
presented previously, the goals of the present study are twofold. First, the study tries to 
replicate the latest model by Sibley and Duckitt (2009) proposing a causal flow based on the 
DPM model, with personality traits predicting RWA and SDO via worldviews. Expanding the 
work by Sibley and Duckitt (2009), the study also examines whether the DPM model could be 
used to predict political conservatism, including voting intention as well as left/right and 
liberal/conservative orientations. 
Although RWA and SDO were linked to social conformity and tough-mindedness 
respectively in the original conceptualisation of the DPM model (Duckitt, 2001), most recent 
work has considered the big-five personality traits (e.g. Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Sibley & 
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Duckitt, 2009, 2013). From this perspective, social conformity would be indexed by low-
openness and high-conscientiousness in predicting RWA, while tough-mindedness would be 
indexed by low-agreeableness in predicting SDO. This study thus examines whether the big-
five personality traits could be used in exchange of the traits originally proposed in the model, 
and whether this modified model can predict voting intention and political orientation. 
 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Data used in this study came from an online survey conducted in September of 2011 
investigating New Zealanders’ political and social attitudes (Wilson, 2011), solicited through 
the Sunday Star Times, a national New Zealand newspaper. A total of 5,744 individuals 
completed the online survey (via SurveyMonkey), but participants with more than 5% of their 
responses missing were excluded from the dataset in order to safeguard the effectiveness of 
the missing data imputation procedure (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Outliers and normality 
analyses were also undertaken but no other participant was discarded. A total of 2,884 
participants who intended to vote for one of the four political parties in which participants 
mostly reported intention to vote for remained for use in the main analyses. All participants 
were New Zealand-born and 61.6% were females. The mean age was 50.90 years (SD = 
14.97). 
Apparatus and Materials 
Personality traits. The ten-item personality inventory was used to measure the big-
five personality traits (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003). Each sub-scale included two 
items rated on a 7-point scale varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Competitive and Dangerous Worldviews. Two balanced items based on previous 
research (Duckitt, 2001) were used by Wilson (2011) to measure competitive (e.g. “It’s a dog-
eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times”) and dangerous worldviews (e.g. 
“There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure 
meanness, for no reason at all”). Items were rated on a 7-point scale varying from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
RWA. Six items were randomly sampled from the original RWA scale (Altemeyer, 
1996) so as to have an equal number of pro-trait  (e.g. “Once our government leaders give us 
the “go ahead”, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is 
poisoning our country from within”) and con-trait (e.g. “Everyone should have their own 
lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexuality, even if it makes them different from everyone else”) 
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items. Items were also carefully selected to include features of the three RWA factors found 
by Mavor, Louis and Sibley (2010). Items were rated on a 7-point scale varying from 1 
(strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
SDO. Six items were randomly sampled from the original SDO scale (Sidanius & 
Pratto, 1999) so as to have an equal number of dominance items (e.g. “To get ahead in life, it 
is sometimes okay to step on other groups.”) and equality items (e.g. “It would be good if 
groups could be equal”). The items were the same as those used in the New Zealand Attitudes 
and Values Survey (NZAVS; Sibley & Greaves, 2014). Items were rated on a 7-point scale 
varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
Political conservatism. Three questions were used to measure political conservatism. 
Participants were asked which political party they would vote for in the upcoming general 
election. Besides voting intention, participants were also asked to indicate their left/right and 
liberal/conservative orientations on single-item scales varying from 1 (left or liberal) to 7 
(right or conservative). 
Extra questions also evaluated participants’ sentiments toward New Zealand political 
parties on a 7-point scale varying from 1 (strongly negative) to 7 (strongly positive). These 
questions were used to investigate the viability of a dummy voting intention variable. 
Data analysis 
Multiple imputation technique with Expectation Maximization (Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007) was used to substitute missing data. Structural equation modeling was performed with 
maximum likelihood estimation procedures in AMOS 20. Due to the mediational nature of the 
DPM, bootstrapping procedures were implemented (with 1000 re-samplings) to calculate the 
indirect effects. Before running the models, item parcels were created for the RWA and SDO 
scales. Each parcel included one pro-trait and one con-trait item randomly assigned to it 
(Little, Cunningham, Shahar, & Widaman, 2002).  
Four indicators of model fit were considered when evaluating the models: The ratio 
χ2∕df (chi-square over degree of freedom), the comparative fit index (CFI), the standardized 
root mean square residual (sRMR), and the root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA). Values of χ2∕df smaller than two indicate good fit and values between two and 
three indicate acceptable fit (Bollen & Long, 1993). Models with CFI values close to .95 
indicate an acceptable fit; while SRMR and RMSEA having values close to .08 and .06, 
respectively, or lower indicate an acceptable fit (Byrne, 2001; Hu & Bentler, 1999). The 
consistent Akaike information criterion (CAIC), the expected cross-validation index (ECVI), 
and the chi-square difference test (χ2d.ff ) were used to evaluate improvements over competing 
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models. Lower values in the first two indices reflect better fit, while a significant chi-square 
difference test reflects model improvement (Byrne, 2010). When initially fitting the models to 
the data, the error variance for one extraversion item (“I am extraverted, enthusiastic”) was 
negative and non-significant, resulting in a non-identified model. This error variance was then 
fixed to a small and positive value (Gerbing & Anderson, 1987) in all subsequent models. 
 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
Appendix A presents descriptive statistics, reliability estimates and correlations 
between all variables considered in this study. Besides focusing on these basic statistics, the 
preliminary analysis focused on the voting intention variable detailed below. 
Voting intention. The variable measuring voting intention was created by grouping 
intention to vote for liberal versus conservative parties. Before creating this variable, a 
correlational analysis was run to evaluate the relationship between sentiments toward five of 
the New Zealand political parties (from 1 = strongly negative to 7 = strongly positive). The 
dataset for this analysis included the participants described in this study (2,884 participants 
who reported intention to vote for the ACT, the Green, the Labour or the National parties) 
plus 62 participants who reported intention to vote for the New Zealand First party. 
Sentiments toward the remaining New Zealand political parties were not considered given the 
limited voting intention for these parties (2.0%). 
We predicted that sentiments toward liberal parties (Green and Labour parties) should 
be positively correlated, sentiments toward conservative parties (ACT and National parties) 
should be positively correlated, and sentiments toward liberal and conservative parties should 
be negatively correlated in order to group intention to vote for liberal or conservative parties. 
The correlational analysis suggested the expected pattern (Table 3.1). As a centre-party, 
sentiments toward New Zealand First correlated weakly and positively with almost all the 
remaining political parties. 
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Table 3.1 
Correlations between sentiments toward five of New Zealand’s political parties in Study 1 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. ACT  -  -.36**  -.40** .48** .11** 
2. Green  -  -  .56**  -.45**  .03 
3. Labour  -  -  -  -.59**  .15**  
4. National  -  -  -  -  -.06**  
5. NZ First  -  -  -  -  -  
Note. ** p < .01. 
 
As expected, the newly created variable was positively correlated to left/right (r = .68) 
and liberal/conservative (r = .54) orientations, and these political orientations were also highly 
correlated (r = .64). 
Testing the Big-Five Personality Model under the DPM Model Frame 
 The model proposed by Sibley and Duckitt (2009) showed only marginal fit to the 
data: χ2(146, N = 2,884) = 1507.29; χ2∕df = 10.32; CFI = .90; sRMR = .045; RMSEA = .057; 
90% CI RMSEA = .054–.059; CAIC = 2081.178; ECVI = .567. Modification indices 
suggested the omission of three causal paths and the inclusion of three other causal paths. 
Figure 3.1 depicts this modified model, which was better fitting than the proposed model: 
χ2(146, N = 2,884) = 1426.08; χ2∕df = 9.77; CFI = .91; sRMR = .043; RMSEA = .055; 90% CI 
RMSEA = .053–.058; CAIC = 1999.966; ECVI = .539. 
 As can be seen in Figure 3.1, and consistent with Sibley and Duckitt’s (2009) findings, 
overall the big-five personality dimensions predicted dangerous and competitive worldviews, 
which in turn predicted RWA and SDO. In contrast to their findings, the direct paths between 
extraversion  dangerous worldview, agreeableness  SDO and emotional stability  
RWA were not statistically significant in our sample. At the same time, both emotional 
stability and dangerous worldview had a direct effect on SDO, while extraversion had a direct 
impact on RWA.
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Figure 3.1. Structural equation model of the associations between personality traits, world beliefs and socio-political attitudes. Solid arrows 
represent significant causal paths (p < .01). Long-dashed arrows represent significant causal paths (p < .05) in Sibley and Duckitt (2009), but 
not in the present study. Short-dashed arrows represent significant causal paths in this study (p < .01), but not in Sibley and Duckitt (2009). For 
simplicity, manifest indicators and paths from latent to manifest indicators are not shown. 
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The Association between the DPM Model and Political Conservatism 
We expanded the model in Figure 3.1 to predict political conservatism with direct 
paths from RWA/SDO to the three political orientation variables. The model predicting 
voting intention was satisfactory: χ2(164, N = 2884) = 1540.68; χ 2∕df = 9.39; CFI = .91; 
sRMR = .044; RMSEA = .054; 90% CI RMSEA = .052–.056; CAIC = 2141.462; ECVI = 
.581. 
 However, modification indices suggested the inclusion of a direct path from 
emotional stability to voting intention. This modified model was statistically better fitting 
than the initial model, χ2d.ff (1) = 37.43, p < .001, and provided an adequate fit to the observed 
data: χ2(163, N = 2884) = 1503.25; χ2∕df = 9.22; CFI = .91; sRMR = .042; RMSEA = .053; 
90% CI RMSEA = .051–.056; CAIC = 2113.004; ECVI = .569. As can be seen in Figure 3.2, 
the personality traits impacted voting intention mainly indirectly via worldview beliefs and 
socio-political attitudes. Indeed, all variables in the model that did not impact voting intention 
directly, impacted it indirectly.1 Importantly, SDO impacted voting intention more strongly 
than RWA.2 
                                                          
1 The statistically significant (p < .005) indirect effects on voting intention were as follows: 
openness to experience (βindirect effect = -.19), agreeableness (βindirect effect = -.19), emotional stability 
(βindirect effect =.13), extraversion (βindirect effect = .12), conscientiousness (βindirect effect = .08), 
competitive worldview (βindirect effect = .43), dangerous worldview (βindirect effect = .18) and RWA 
(βindirect effect = .23). 
2 To test whether the associations between RWA and SDO with voting intention were statistically different, a 
similar model was run by fixing the unstandardized relations to be equal. However, the iteration limit for this 
model was reached even when the limit was fixed to 1,000 iterations. Thus, a correlation difference test based on 
Fisher r-z transformation was used instead to compare the correlations between RWA and voting intention [rab.c 
(2,868) = .31, p < .001] and SDO and voting intention [rab.c (2,868) = .36, p < .001]. The test confirmed that SDO 
correlated more strongly to voting intention than RWA (z = 2.314, p = .02). 
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Figure 3.2. Structural equation model of the associations between personality traits, world beliefs, socio-political attitudes and voting intention. 
All paths were significant at p < .01. For simplicity, manifest indicators and paths from latent to manifest indicators are not shown. 
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The same modified model was then used to predict the other two political orientation 
variables. The model for left/right orientation presented good fit to the data: χ2 (163, N = 
2884) = 1486.64; χ2∕df = 9.12; CFI = .91; sRMR = .042; RMSEA = .053; 90% CI RMSEA = 
.051–.056; CAIC = 2096.396; ECVI = .563. Again, SDO was a much stronger predictor (β = 
.47) of right political orientation than RWA (β = .23), χ2d.ff (2) = 367.21, p < .001. The model 
for liberal/conservative orientation also presented good fit to the data: χ2 (163, N = 2884) = 
1512.55; χ2∕df = 9.28; CFI = .91; sRMR = .042; RMSEA = .054; 90% CI RMSEA = .051–
.056; CAIC = 2122.298; ECVI = .572.3 Surprisingly, RWA was a much stronger predictor (β 
= .51) of being conservative than SDO (β = .15), χ2d.ff (2) = 436.43, p < .001. In combination, 
these results provide strong empirical evidence for the use of the DPM model in predicting 
political conservatism. The results also indicate that RWA and SDO have differential 
predictive power, which will be elaborated below. 
 
General Discussion for Study 1 
Despite its widespread use in predicting intergroup prejudice, the DPM model 
proposed by Duckitt (2001) has not been extensively used for predicting political 
conservatism. Moreover, only a few studies (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009, 2013; Van Hiel et al., 
2007) have examined whether the big-five personality traits could replace the specific 
personality traits of social conformity and tough-mindedness in the DPM model. The present 
study contributed to the literature by examining the usefulness of the inclusion of the big-five 
personality traits in the DPM model, and by examining whether this model had predictive 
validity regarding political conservatism. 
Overall, the present study replicated the findings reported by Sibley and Duckitt 
(2009) that the big-five personality traits impact RWA and SDO indirectly through dangerous 
and competitive worldviews. However, discrepancies were also observed. First, three direct 
paths were non-significant in the present study (i.e. extraversion  dangerous worldview, 
agreeableness  SDO, and emotional stability  RWA). Additionally, three extra significant 
paths were observed in the present study but not in Sibley and Duckitt’s (2009) study: 
extraversion  RWA (β = .11), emotional stability  SDO (β = .07), and dangerous 
worldview  SDO (β = -.39). Importantly, we found that the modified predictive model 
appropriately explained voting intention and left/right and liberal/conservative orientations. 
These results will be further discussed below. 
                                                          
3 Modification indices suggested the inclusion of a new path from extraversion to 
liberal/conservative orientation (β = -.06). 
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The DPM and the Big-Five Personality Models 
One modification of the DPM model as originally proposed by Duckitt (2001) is the 
use of the big-five personality traits instead of social conformity and tough-mindedness 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). The present study provides independent support for this 
modification. All paths in the final model depicted in Figure 3.1 are in the same direction as 
the paths reported by Sibley and Duckitt (2009), and are also in consonance with other 
empirical findings (Perry & Sibley, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2013). It is also worth noting that 
all significant paths (with the exception of extraversion  competitive worldview and 
openness  RWA) observed in the present study were stronger in terms of effect size than 
the paths reported by Sibley and Duckitt (2009). Considering that Sibley and Duckitt used 
student data collected farther away from elections, it is likely that the general population 
sample considered in the present study and the proximity of the general election may have 
enhanced these relationships. 
The only significant path observed in Sibley and Duckitt’s (2009) model that was 
theoretically predicted but not replicated in the present study was the direct path between 
agreeableness and SDO. Nevertheless, the indirect effect of agreeableness on SDO was 
significant and in the expected direction (βindirect effect = -.56), while the indirect effect of 
agreeableness on RWA was statistically non-significant (βindirect effect = .08). An indirect effect 
of agreeableness on SDO was also observed by Van Hiel et al. (2007). In line with empirical 
findings from other studies (for a review, see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), these findings indicate 
that conscientiousness and openness impact more strongly RWA than SDO, and 
agreeableness only impacts SDO (even if only indirectly). 
A strong negative path between dangerous worldview and SDO was also observed in 
the present study, but not in Sibley and Duckitt’s (2009) study. Perry et al. (2013) also 
reported in their meta-analysis a correlation between dangerous worldview and SDO, but they 
reported a positive association in contrast to our study (r = .17). Perhaps the negative 
association between dangerous worldview and SDO observed in the present study could be a 
result of the indirect impact of competitive worldview on SDO through dangerous worldview. 
The impact of competitive worldview on dangerous worldview in our sample (β = .86) was 
much stronger than that observed by Sibley and Duckitt (β = .36). It is possible that this 
enhanced effect could lead to the observed negative impact of dangerous worldview on SDO. 
In fact, additional analyses focusing on the impact of competitive worldview on SDO through 
dangerous worldview showed that this indirect effect explained most of the impact of 
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dangerous worldview on SDO (βindirect effect = -.36). The indirect prediction of SDO by 
competitive worldview via other DPM model variables could be explored in future studies.  
The DPM Model and Political Conservatism 
We also found that the modified model appropriately explained voting intention. In 
line with previous findings (Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002; Wilson & Sibley, 2013), both 
RWA and SDO were able to explain conservative voting intention (see Figure 3.2). 
Consistent with the findings reported by Van Hiel and Mervielde (2002), SDO explained 
more of the variance of conservative voting intention than RWA. In their study, SDO was 
more related to the preference for a more anti-immigrant party, while RWA was more related 
to the preference for a more religious party. Among the four main political parties included in 
the present study to create the liberal (the Green and Labour parties) and conservative (the 
ACT and National parties) categories, none specifically focuses on policies clearly driven by 
religious beliefs. In this sense, the voting intention of the participants was probably based on 
the parties’ economic and social policies rather than on religious standpoints. It is worth 
noting that one direct path from personality to voting intention was observed (from emotional 
stability) but was only weakly associated with voting intention. 
The model explaining voting intention was also adequate in explaining right-wing and 
conservative orientations. SDO impacted left/right orientation more strongly than RWA, 
while RWA impacted liberal/conservative orientation more strongly than SDO. These 
contrasting results suggest that the dimensions of political conservatism enclosed by left/right 
and liberal/conservative orientations are not equivalent (albeit highly correlated). The Van 
Hiel and Mervielde (2002) findings linking SDO to the preference for a more anti-
immigrant/right-wing party and RWA to the preference for a more religious/traditional party 
could help to explain these findings.  
It is likely that participants in the present study thought about economic and social 
policies when indicating their left/right orientation, while thinking about tradition and social 
norms when indicating their liberal/conservative orientation. This would explain the stronger 
impact of SDO on left/right orientation and the stronger impact of RWA on 
liberal/conservative orientation. Further studies evaluating the meaning of these dimensions to 
New Zealand’s general population could confirm or refute this speculation. 
Taken as a whole, the final model suggests that the view of the world as a dangerous 
or competitive place leads to higher scores on RWA and SDO, which in turn lead to 
conservative voting intention and political orientation. These findings imply that conservative 
voting intention and political orientation might become a more common trend if inhabitants 
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perceive the world as more dangerous and competitive. Clearly this has implications for the 
political landscape and can help to explain increases in the number of conservative 
governments all around the world. Future studies should consider experimentally 
manipulating different types of societal threat (see Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) and evaluating 
their effect on conservative voting and political orientation in order to link more strongly 
political conservatism to reality.  
Following this approach, we present next a set of three studies with the main goal of 
validating experimental stimuli for the last three experimental studies focusing on the impact 
of societal threat on political conservatism.
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Chapter 4: Study 2 
Threat Manipulation Design 
 
Despite the recognition that threat might lead to individuals behaving in more 
protective ways toward the in-group and influence political attitudes and behaviour, past 
research has not attempted to systematically distinguish types of societal threat, and to 
evaluate whether these different types of societal threat differentially impact political attitudes 
and behaviours. Moreover, past research on societal threat has focused mainly on the impact 
of collective, social or national threat versus personal threat on people’s attitudes and 
behaviours (Fritsche et al., 2011; Harvey & Belt, 1995; Huddy, et al., 2002). 
To be clear, it is not that the impact of different societal threats on behaviour has not 
been studied; it is the impact of different types of societal threat on behaviour that has not 
been systematically studied. Fritsche et al. (2011), for example, presented three specific 
complex societal threats in order to exemplify the importance of group level variables on the 
explanation of collective reactions to threat in their model. In doing so, they presented studies 
including the societal threats of economic crisis/unemployment, terrorism and climate change. 
The studies described in the article provided a comprehensive summary about the impact of 
different societal threats on behaviour, but did not address, however, the three distinct societal 
treats at the same time.  
Other authors, focusing on the structure of collective and personal threats, have 
provided empirical evidence for the distinction between different types of societal threat. 
Onraet and Van Hiel (2013), for instance, found four factors for their measure enclosing 
collective and personal threats. The four factors displayed four clusters of items enclosing 
perceived personal economic threat, perceived collective economic threat, perceived personal 
terroristic threat, and perceived collective terroristic threat. Their result suggests that societal 
threat, and more specifically economic and terroristic threats, can be perceived differentially 
according to the type of threat and unit of society they enclose. 
Studies examining more particularly the influence of societal threat on political 
conservatism have focused mainly on economic, social and political threats (Jost et al., 
2003b). Similarly to the general literature on the topic, however, the impact of these societal 
threats on political conservatism has not been systematically distinguished. Most research has 
focused on generally threatening periods of time or one specific threatening event (e.g. 
terrorist attack). 
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The number of studies considering the impact of natural threat on political 
conservatism has been far more limited than the ones focusing on economic, social and 
political threats. Moreover, only specific types of natural threat, and not natural threat as an 
umbrella term including different natural disasters, have been examined (Fritsche et al., 
2012). Since the shared meaning by some natural threats has already been observed in the 
literature (Díaz et al., 2012), the study of different natural disasters under a natural threat 
umbrella term seems more parsimonious than the study of different types of natural disasters. 
The literature provided above and in Chapter 2 suggests that the impact of economic 
and social threats on political conservatism has been generally studied without distinction and 
that natural threat has not been used as an umbrella term for the study of the impact of 
different natural disasters on political conservatism. Yet, in order to provide a broad 
theoretical account of the influence of societal threat on political conservatism, it is important 
to understand the extent to which individuals in a particular society perceive particular types 
of societal threat. 
Detail of Studies 
Given the limited literature on the differential impact of different types of societal 
threat on political conservatism, the present chapter describes three empirical studies 
addressing this issue. Study 2A evaluates the psychological meaning of economic, natural, 
and social threats among European New Zealanders (Pākehā). Studies 2B and 2C build on 
results from Study 2A to validate experimental stimuli including economic threat, natural 
threat, social threat and a control scenario. While Study 2B validates textual stimuli, Study 2C 
validates pictorial stimuli. If successfully validated, these stimuli will be used in further 
experimental studies focusing on the impact of societal threat on political conservatism. In the 
following, method, results and discussion sections are presented for each of the studies. These 
sections are followed by a brief general discussion for Study 2. 
 
Study 2A 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 97 participants completed the paper-based study, but only 78 who were New 
Zealand-born, at least 18 years old and described themselves as European (Pākehā) were 
included in the analyses. The mean age of the sample was 32.73 (SD = 17.73) and 55.13% of 
the participants were female, while 52.56% had college or university degree. Participants 
were randomly recruited at Victoria University’s Kelburn campus and at the Central Library 
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of Wellington between February and May of 2013. Individuals who were passing by or seated 
in a shared study space were recruited for the study at Kelburn campus, while participants 
who were looking for books or seated reading or studying were recruited inside the library. 
The Central Library of Wellington formally granted permission to collect data inside the 
library. The study was approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee 
under delegated authority of the Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee 
(Reference number: RM019658). 
Apparatus and Materials 
A questionnaire with three open-ended questions was used to gather data on types of 
societal threat (Appendix B). Brief descriptions of social, economic and natural threats were 
first presented to participants in order to elicit words or expressions associated to each type of 
threat. Participants were then asked to list five words or expressions associated with each of 
the types of societal threat (in this order: social, economic and natural), following procedure 
from the natural semantic network literature (Figueroa, González, & Solís, 1976, 1981; 
Reyes-Lagunes, 1993). Sociodemographic data were also gathered. 
The description of social and economic threats was based on the description of 
dangerous and competitive worldviews, respectively, as provided by Perry and Sibley (2010). 
This decision was based on previous theoretical and empirical studies suggesting that 
dangerous worldview and RWA could be associated with social threat, while competitive 
worldview and SDO could be associated with group dominance, competition and inequality 
(Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010).  
Since worldviews can be described as “descriptive beliefs of the world as it is” (Perry 
& Sibley, 2010, p. 984), the description of economic and social threats based on the 
description of competitive and dangerous worldviews tried to capture the societal aspects 
related to these two different ways to see the world. A description eliciting situations and 
elements perceived as environmental hazards or disasters was specially created for this study 
given that there is no worldview connected to natural threat in Duckitt’s (2001) DPM model. 
Data Analysis 
A mixed method approach for data analysis was used. The mixed method approach 
had the goal of investigating whether different types of societal threat elicited significantly 
different frequencies of words/expressions (chi-square) and also to evaluate the relevance of 
the concepts linked to the meaning of each type of societal threat (semantic network 
technique). The difference in word/expression frequency per type of threat was calculated by 
entering in a chi-square analysis the network size or the total number of words/expressions 
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elicited by participants and the number of words that could be elicited but were not per type 
of threat. The relevance or meaningfulness of the concepts to social, economic and natural 
threats was assessed using the semantic weight and distance for each word/expression per 
type of threat (Figueroa et al., 1981; Reyes-Lagunes, 1993). Affective loading was not 
calculated given that threat is a negative construct per se (see Milfont, 2010).  
Semantic weight was calculated by assigning a number between five and one to each 
word or expression written by each of the participants. This number was based on the order 
the participant wrote the word or expression in response to the description of each of the types 
of societal threat. Words or expressions written first were granted five points, while words or 
expressions written last were granted one point. The scores for similar words or expressions 
were then summed up generating the semantic weight for each of the words or expressions. 
The semantic distance was calculated by attributing the value of 100% to the semantic 
distance of the word or expression with the highest semantic weight for a specific type of 
societal threat. A rule of three was then used to calculate the semantic distance for each of the 
semantic weights of the other words or expressions evoked by this specific type of societal 
threat. Greater semantic weights and semantic distances for a word or expression implied 
greater representation of a specific type of societal threat by the word/expression. 
 Scree plots with the semantic weights for the words/expressions per each type of 
threat were used to define the cut-off point for the relevance of the words/expressions to the 
meaning of social, economic and natural threats (see Reyes-Lagunes, 1993). The scree plot 
technique determined the most meaningful words per type of threat or the core of each of the 
types of societal threat. This core encloses the words/expressions with higher semantic 
weights and therefore the core psychological meaning of the different types of societal threat 
(Milfont, 2010). 
 
Results 
Number of Words/Expressions Evoked by Each Societal Threat 
A total of 390 words/expressions for each type of threat could be expected based on 78 
participants and five requested words/expressions. Considering the number of actual 
words/expressions evoked for each threat, social threat elicited 371 words, economic threat 
elicited 349 words and natural threat elicited 362 words. The chi-square test showed that 
participants wrote more words for social and natural threats than for economic threat, χ²(2, N 
= 1170) = 9.019, p = .011, Cramér’s V = .09. 
Meaningful Words/Expressions for Each Societal Threat 
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Scree plots suggested 12 meaningful words/expressions for social threat, 18 for 
economic threat, and five for natural threat (Figures 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, respectively).
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Figure 4.1. Scree plot for social threat. 
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Figure 4.2. Scree plot for economic threat. 
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Figure 4.3. Scree plot for natural threat.  
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Among these meaningful words/expressions, only “war” was evoked by more than one 
type of societal threat (Table 4.1). Additionally, some of the words/expressions characterizing 
natural threat presented far higher semantic weights than the words/expressions characterizing 
economic and social threats. This indicates that there are fewer meaningful words associated 
with natural threat because participants tend to attribute the same words to it (i.e. earthquakes 
and tsunamis). 
50 
 
Table 4.1 
 Meaningful words/expressions with semantic weight and semantic distance for social, economic and natural threats  
Social threat Economic threat Natural threat 
Words N SW SD (%) Words N SW SD (%) Words N SW SD (%) 
Gangs 12 49 100.00 Asset sales 6 26 100.00 Earthquakes 55 255 100.00 
Racism 12 44 89.80 Recession 6 26 100.00 Tsunamis 31 105 41.18 
Bullying 9 35 71.43 Greed 6 23 88.46 Floods 22 74 29.02 
Violence 7 28 57.14 Inequality 6 21 80.77 Fires 11 32 12.55 
Terrorists/terrorism 7 28 57.14 Unemployment 6 20 76.92 Global warming 8 30 11.76 
War 6 23 46.94 War 7 19 73.08     
Rape 7 21 42.86 Bankruptcy 5 17 65.38     
Religion 6 21 42.86 Politics 4 17 65.38     
Fear 8 17 34.69 Job loss 4 15 57.69     
Intimidation 4 16 32.65 Debt 5 14 53.85     
Guns 5 15 30.61 Corruption 4 13 50.00     
Looting 3 14 28.57 Globalisation 4 13 50.00     
    Depression 3 12 46.15     
    Inflation 3 12 46.15     
    Capitalism 3 11 42.31     
    Economic crisis 2 10 38.46     
    Competition 3 9 34.62     
        Money 2 9 34.62         
Note. N = frequency the words/expressions were evoked; SW = Semantic Weight; SD = Semantic Distance.
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Discussion 
The goal of Study 2A was to examine the psychological meaning of social, economic, 
and natural threats. The results suggest that social, economic and natural threats have different 
psychological meanings for European New Zealanders (Pākehā) living in New Zealand. In 
fact, only one meaningful word (i.e. war) was part of the meaning of both social and 
economic threats. 
Considering the number of words/expressions evoked by each type of threat, 
participants evoked less elements connected to economic threat than elements connected to 
natural and social threats. In addition, the number of meaningful words for economic threat 
was larger than the number of meaningful words for social and natural threats. In conjunction, 
these results suggest that the strength of the association between economic threat and its 
definers is weaker than the strength of the association between natural threat and social threat 
with their definers. In other words, it seems that participants had more difficulty on attributing 
meaning to economic threat and that this threat type includes a broad range of concepts not so 
tightly related to its meaning.  
Additionally, some of the words/expressions connected to natural threat presented far 
higher semantic weights than the words/expressions connected to economic and social threats. 
New Zealand is a country highly affected by earthquakes and constantly under threat of 
tsunamis (GeoNet, 2015).This probably explains the relevance of the words “earthquakes” 
and “tsunamis” for the participants and their high semantic weights. Earthquakes and 
tsunamis have been known to be highly characterized by negative sentiments, feelings and 
consequences in a country also affected by earthquakes and under the threat of tsunamis (Díaz 
et al., 2012).  
A limitation of this study is that participants were always asked to provide 
words/expressions for social, economic and natural threats in this order. Additionally, the 
definitions for economic and social threats used to facilitate participants responding were 
based on theoretical considerations (Perry & Sibley, 2010). However, both of these issues 
seem to have not adversely impacted the main results of the study. It is clear through the 
results that different types of threat elicited distinct words/expressions (only ‘war’ overlapped 
for social and economic threats) and that the number of words/expressions clearly varied 
across threats (see Table 4.1).  
Overall, this study succeeded in establishing that social, economic and natural threats 
enclose different meaningful words/expressions, and that these types of threat can be 
empirically distinguished. In Studies 2B and 2C, these meaningful words/expressions are used 
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to design and select stimuli for experiments focusing on the impact of societal threat on 
political conservatism. Study 2B validates experimental textual scenarios, while Study 2C 
validates images to be included in experimental pictorial scenarios. 
 
Study 2B 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
Written experimental stimuli based on Duckitt and Fisher’s (2003) textual scenarios 
were designed. These stimuli included the meaningful words described in Study 2A for each 
type of societal threat (social, economic, and natural). Differently from Duckitt and Fisher’s 
(2003) study, the control stimulus was modified to include a brief description of New 
Zealand’s geography (and not a description of New Zealand as it was during data collection). 
This modification was based on findings that some of the actual threats described by 
participants in Study 2A had been already occurring. “Asset sales”, for instance, had been a 
recurrent theme in New Zealand news already (The New Zealand Herald, 2014) and was 
perceived as an economic threat in Study 2A.  
In Study 2A, 12 words/expressions were meaningful to social threat, 18 were 
meaningful to economic threat, and five were meaningful to natural threat (see Table 4.1). Of 
these meaningful words/expressions, only “war” was evoked by more than one type of 
societal threat (i.e. economic and social threats) and was not included in the threat stimuli.  
In order to design textual stimuli with the same size and to match the number of 
words/expressions to be included in the scenarios, six extra words/expressions evoked by 
social threat and 12 extra words/expressions evoked by natural threat were included in the 
scenarios. These extra words/expressions were the ones with the highest semantic weights in 
each type of threat after the meaningful words/expressions observed in Study 2A. The final 
threat stimuli included 17 words/expressions and 89 words per type of threat (Table 4.2). 
After the scenarios’ design, two independent English-speaking referees evaluated the 
scenarios, suggesting grammatical changes. The scenarios kept the same number of words 
after their evaluation.
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 Table 4.2 
 Frequency and semantic weight for the words/expressions included in the social, economic, and natural threat scenarios  
Social threat Economic threat  Natural threat  
Words N SW Words N SW Words N SW 
Gangs 12 49 Asset sales 6 26 Earthquakes 55 255 
Racism 12 44 Recession 6 26 Tsunamis 31 105 
Bullying 9 35 Greed 6 23 Floods 22 74 
Violence 7 28 Inequality 6 21 Fires 11 32 
Terrorists/terrorism 7 28 Unemployment 6 20 Global warming 8 30 
Rape 7 21 Bankruptcy 5 17 Drought 8 18 
Religion 6 21 Politics 4 17 Volcanic activity 4 14 
Fear 8 17 Job loss 4 15 Disease 4 12 
Intimidation 4 16 Debt 5 14 Climate change 5 11 
Guns 5 15 Corruption 4 13 Hurricanes 4 11 
Looting 3 14 Globalisation 4 13 Tornados 4 11 
Drug abuse 3 10 Depression 3 12 Destruction 4 10 
Rude 2 10 Inflation 3 12 Helplessness 2 9 
Assault 2 9 Capitalism 3 11 Meteorites 3 9 
Bomb 3 9 Economic crisis 2 10 Devastation 2 8 
Drugs 2 9 Competition 3 9 Forest fires 2 8 
Power 2 9 Money 2 9 Volcanic eruptions 2 8 
Note. N = frequency of words/expressions; SW = Semantic Weight. Meaningful words/expressions in Study 2A are presented in boldface. 
54 
 
After the content validation phase, one of four scenarios (social threat, economic 
threat, natural threat or control) and related questions were presented randomly to individuals 
who were passing by or seated in a shared study space at Victoria University’s Kelburn 
campus. A total of 188 participants completed the paper-based study, but only 181 who were 
New Zealand-born, at least 18 years old and who described themselves as European New 
Zealanders (Pākehā) were included in the analyses. Overall, the mean age of the sample was 
21.23 years (SD = 4.54), 55.8% were female, 63.1% had a high school degree, and 8.3% of 
the participants also described themselves as Māori or Pacific Islander.  
Among the 181 participants, 45 read the control scenario, 45 read the economic threat 
scenario, 45 read the natural threat scenario and 46 read the social threat scenario. 
Questionnaires were applied between the 8th and the 15th of August of 2013. The study was 
approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of 
the Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee (Reference number: 
RM019658). 
Apparatus and Materials 
Experimental manipulation. One of four scenarios was presented to each participant. 
The control scenario included a description of New Zealand’s natural geography, while the 
three threat scenarios presented words associated to the different types of threat in Study 2A.  
To begin, participants in the threat conditions read the following text implying 
changes in New Zealand:  
(Introduction) Imagine that this is happening in New Zealand right now. For you 
personally, the situation is basically as you expected or planned it to be. Thus, your 
personal affairs concerning partnering, children, marriage, jobs, career, friends, etc. 
have not changed unexpectedly. However, while your personal affairs are going well, 
there have been dramatic and far-reaching changes in New Zealand at present. 
After reading this introductory paragraph, participants read one of the 
following experimental scenarios: 
(Social threat) Gangs have taken up the streets and racism against various groups is 
high. Drug abuse has increased and there are drugs available everywhere. Violence, in 
the form of bullying, looting, intimidation, assault and rape, is taking place 
everywhere in New Zealand. Terrorist attacks, sometimes even with bombs, are also 
occurring. The possession of guns is legalized and New Zealand citizens have been 
buying them profusely. Religion extremism is visible across the country. People are 
rude and living for power. Fear is stamped on the faces of New Zealand citizens. 
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(Economic threat) State-owned assets have been sold. New Zealand has 
accumulated a large debt and the economy is in recession. Some say the economy is 
even in depression. New Zealand is in an unprecedented economic crisis, with high 
inflation, job losses, unemployment and bankruptcy of various businesses. Politics is 
incomprehensible and corruption cases are broadcasted on the news and television 
almost daily. Inequality between the rich and the poor has risen. Life in New Zealand 
is now about greed, competition, money and capitalism. Globalization is reaching the 
country as never before. 
(Natural threat) Strong earthquakes shook both the North and South 
Islands. Undersea earthquakes are also occurring, and tsunamis around the New 
Zealand coast are highly likely and have triggered tsunami alerts. Global warming and 
climate change are impacting New Zealand and a combination of diseases, drought, 
fires, floods, hurricanes and tornados are affecting many parts of the country. Forest 
fires are common, and volcanic activity is high with frequent volcanic eruptions. The 
possibility of a meteorite hitting New Zealand is also likely. Devastation, destruction 
and helplessness are consuming New Zealand citizens. 
Finally, participants in the control condition read the following text: 
(Introduction) Imagine that this is happening in New Zealand right now. For you 
personally, the situation is basically as you expected or planned it to be. Thus, your 
personal affairs concerning partnering, children, marriage, jobs, career, friends, etc. 
have not changed unexpectedly. Your personal affairs are going well, and there have 
been no dramatic or far-reaching changes in New Zealand at present.  
(Control) New Zealand’s location protects the country from unexpected 
changes. The country is made up of two main islands and some smaller islands, 
located near the centre of the water hemisphere (largest area of water of the Earth’s 
surface), and far away from other big land masses. The country is situated some 1,500 
kilometres east of Australia across the Tasman Sea, and roughly 1,000 kilometres 
south of some Pacific islands. New Zealand is long (over 1,600 kilometres) and 
narrow (with a maximum of 400 kilometres) if considered the main islands.  
Participants were reminded to answer the questions based on the scenario they had just 
read. After reading the scenarios, participants completed three questions asking them to 
indicate the extent to which social, economic and natural threats were depicted on the given 
scenario on an 11-point scale varying from 0 (not present at all) to 10 (extremely present). 
These questions had the purpose of checking if the scenarios were distinguished as expected. 
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Dependent variables. Three related political conservatism variables were used as 
dependent variables to investigate the viability of an experimental study including the textual 
stimulus as independent variable. First, participants were asked to think about an upcoming 
general election in a few days and about the scenario. Participants were then asked to choose 
one of the eight political parties with seats in New Zealand’s Parliament. Besides their voting 
intention, participants were also asked to place themselves on both left/right and 
liberal/conservative continuums. Political orientation was answered on a 7-point scale varying 
from 1 (extremely left or extremely liberal) to 7 (extremely right or extremely conservative).  
Control variables. The impact of the scenario and positive and negative affect were 
measured after the experiment in order to be entered as control variables in the analysis 
evaluating the viability of an experimental study. The impact of the scenario was evaluated 
through a question about the extent to which the scenario would impact the participant’s life 
and result in negative consequences. Participants answered this question on a 5-point scale 
varying from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
Positive and negative affect were measured using the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This measure comprehends two 
factors which enclose positive (α = .85) and negative (α = .88) affect. The measure is 
answered on a 5-point scale varying from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The 
number of factors, as well as their high internal reliability, has been confirmed in previous 
research (Crawford & Henry, 2004). 
Participants were also asked for socio-demographic data. The information sheet, the 
main questionnaire per type of condition and the debriefing sheet are presented in Appendices 
C1, C2 and C3, respectively. Participants answered the questions in the order depicted in the 
main questionnaire.  
Data Analysis  
All participants answered the experimental manipulation questions about the 
perception of social, economic, and natural threats on the scenarios. Therefore, no data was 
imputed or participants were excluded from the dataset. 
 
Results 
The differential perception of the scenarios and the viability of using the scenarios as 
experimental stimuli in further studies were tested. In the following, results for the 
manipulation check and the differential prediction of political conservatism by threat are 
reported. 
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Manipulation Check 
An initial analysis was performed to test whether participants’ evaluations of the 
threatening situations differed across conditions. The 4 (condition: economic threat, natural 
threat, social threat, control) x 3 (perception of threat: social threat, economic threat, natural 
threat) MANOVA was statistically significant, F(9, 531) = 54.48, p < .001, ηp² = .48.  
Given the violation of the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance for the three 
dependent variables, non-parametric tests of Kruskal-Wallis were conducted.4 The Kruskal-
Wallis tests showed that participants identified social, economic and natural threats 
differentially according to the scenario they read (all ps < .001). Mann-Whitney tests pairing 
two out of the four stimuli per analysis confirmed that participants reading the social, 
economic and natural threat scenarios identified more social, economic and natural threat, 
respectively, in the scenario they read (all ps < .05). Means and standard deviations for the 
perception of social, economic and natural threats per condition are depicted in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 
Means and standard deviations for the perception of social, economic and natural threats in 
Study 2B 
Perception of threat Experimental stimuli M SD 
Social 
Control 2.11 1.75 
Economic threat 7.11 1.61 
Natural threat 6.47 2.53 
Social threat 9.04 1.07 
Economic 
Control 4.20 2.47 
Economic threat 8.56 1.34 
Natural threat 7.51 2.31 
Social threat 7.48 1.91 
Natural 
Control 4.42 2.39 
Economic threat 3.09 2.79 
Natural threat 9.69 .63 
Social threat 2.61 2.53 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. The highest means per type of perceived 
threat are presented in boldface. 
 
Differential Effect of Societal Threat on Political Conservatism 
                                                          
4 Before deciding to conduct non-parametric tests, the dependent variables were transformed using square root, 
logarithmic and Box-Cox transformations (Field, 2009; Osborne, 2010). However, Levene’s test of equality of 
error variances continued to be significant when the transformed variables were entered in new analyses. Thus, 
non-parametric tests were implemented. 
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A dummy variable enclosing voting intention was created based on findings from 
Study 1 (0 = intention to vote for liberal parties and 1= intention to vote for conservative 
parties). As only 5.1% of the participants indicated intention to vote for different political 
parties other than ACT, Green, Labour or National, the sample retained almost its original 
size (167 participants). The distribution of participants’ answers on this variable and the 
sample size included in the study safeguarded the inclusion of dummy voting intention in a 
further multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA; Lunney, 1970).  
To investigate whether political orientation and voting intention differed across 
conditions, a 4 (condition: economic threat, natural threat, social threat, control) x 3 (political 
conservatism: left/right orientation, liberal/conservative orientation and dummy voting 
intention) MANCOVA was conducted. Impact of the scenario and positive and negative 
affect were controlled in this analysis although only a marginal univariate effect of negative 
affect on left/right orientation was detected, F(1,153) = 3.05, p = .083, ηp² = .02. Overall, 
these analyses showed that none of the multivariate effects was significant (all ps ≥ .359). 
Associated univariate tests also did not show any significant effect of the experimental 
manipulation on political orientation or voting intention (all ps ≥ .553).5, 6 
 
Discussion 
Overall, the scenarios were perceived according to the type of stimulus they described, 
but there was no significant effect of condition on political conservatism. This absence of 
experimental effect could be explained by the study design (participants were approached in 
shared study spaces). Maybe participants were not able to focus appropriately on the study in 
a space filled with noise and distractions.  
It is important to clarify that participants were not asked to think about the scenario 
while reporting their political orientation (i.e. left/right and liberal/conservative orientations). 
This limitation will be addressed in Studies 3A and 3B by asking participants to base their 
answers to the full questionnaire on the scenario (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003).  
Although the threat scenarios did not impact political conservatism, the results indicate 
that participants were able to distinguish the particular types of threat. That is, participants 
presented with the social threat scenario, for instance, related this particular scenario to social 
                                                          
5 Similar results were obtained when the control variables were not entered in the analysis. 
6 Complementary analyses were performed by grouping all experimental conditions to compare with the control 
condition. The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped 
threat conditions. 
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threat and not to economic or natural threats. This result supports the development and 
validation of pictorial experimental stimuli for further studies. Given that research has shown 
that images are more easily and frequently recalled than words, this feature could enhance the 
effect of the experimental stimulus on political conservatism (McBride & Dosher, 2002; 
Shepard, 1967). 
 
Study 2C 
Method 
Participants and Procedure  
Images were searched online using the internet search engine Google Images. The 17 
words/expressions obtained in Study 2A and used in Study 2B to design the textual scenarios 
were used separately as search terms. The expression “New Zealand territory” was searched 
to obtain images for the control condition. Overall, 340 images – 85 images per type of 
experimental stimulus (social threat, economic threat, natural threat and control condition) – 
were selected, with five images selected per each word/expression. The search terms “rude”, 
“power”, “religion” and “depression” did not provide adequate images. These terms were 
modified to “rudeness”, “power + in + relations, power-hungry, power-thirst”, “religion + 
extremism” and “depression + economic”, respectively. The expression “New Zealand” was 
included along the words/expressions to find images more intrinsically related to New 
Zealand’s reality. 
After the image selection process, 77 participants completed an online survey (using 
Qualtrics) between November and December of 2013. This survey evaluated the 
appropriateness of the images as experimental stimuli depicting social, economic and natural 
threats plus a control scenario. The participants were first-year psychology students at 
Victoria University of Wellington who took part in the study for partial course credit. Among 
the 77 participants, only 40 who were New Zealand-born with at least 18 years old and 
described themselves as European New Zealanders (Pākehā) were considered in the final 
analyses. Overall, the mean age of the sample was 20.73 years (SD = 3.33), 52.5% were 
female, and 17.5% also described themselves as Asian, Māori and/or Pacific Islander in 
addition to European.  
The study was approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under 
delegated authority of the Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee 
(Reference number: RM019658). 
Apparatus and Materials 
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Each participant saw 85 images of the 340 images selected. The 85 images were 
presented in a random order. After the presentation of each image, participants were given 
descriptions for the categories of economic threat, natural threat, social threat and New 
Zealand natural territory (control scenario) in this order. After reading the descriptions, 
participants were asked to indicate which of the four categories best illustrated the image. 
Participants then answered how well the image illustrated the category they selected on an 11-
point scale varying from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very well). They also answered a question on the 
extent to which the image evoked positive and negative emotions (in two separate items) on 
an 11-point scale varying from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). Participants completed these 
three tasks for all 85 images they assessed.7 
The informed consent and debriefing sheets along with the main questionnaire are 
presented in Appendices D1, D2 and D3. As noted above, the first-year students completed 
the study for partial course credit and, given the learning nature of their participation in 
psychology research, they also answered questions about the study after the debriefing section 
(see Appendix D4). These questions were not evaluated in this study.  
Data Analysis  
Overall, five to 17 participants evaluated each of the 340 images selected. Images 
were included in the analysis if at least eight participants had evaluated them. Three criteria 
were then used in a hierarchical fashion to select the images. The first was based on the 
number of participants who assigned each image to the correct threat type. An image with at 
least eight correct answers (80.0% of agreement if there were 10 participants evaluating the 
image) was considered and evaluated in the second criterion. 
The second criterion was based on the emotion valence. A composite measure was 
created for each participant per image by subtracting the positive emotion rating from the 
negative emotion rating. This new composite score served the purpose of evaluating if the 
images were strongly negative or positive valenced, with a 0 (zero) indicating neutral 
emotional charge directed to the given image. Images selected based on the first criterion 
which had a mean score in this emotion valence measure around the middle point (i.e. -8.00 ≤ 
emotional valence ≤ +8.0) were selected for the third and final criterion.  
The ratings on how well each image illustrated the correct threat type were then used 
to select the best image representing each word/expression. The images with the highest 
                                                          
7 This survey also comprised a question asking participants to evaluate four political discourses to be included in 
Studies 3B and 3C. The validation process for these political discourses is described in more detail in Appendix 
L. 
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rating per word/expression were selected to be used as experimental stimuli. The 17 images 
with the highest ratings on how well each image illustrated the overall category of New 
Zealand natural territory were selected to be included as control stimuli. 
 
Results 
The main objective of this study was to select 17 images representing each of the 
threat types and New Zealand’s natural territory following the selection criteria described 
previously. Table E1 in Appendix E shows the values and number of participants for the 
images that fulfilled the first and the second criteria. The selected images are presented in 
boldface (see also Appendix F). 
Following the selection criteria, one image was selected for each of the 17 
words/expressions that represented the psychological meaning of social threat (see Table 4.2). 
The criteria were not respected only for the word “bullying”. The image initially selected for 
this word (“bullying 3”) did not have the definition quality (resolution) required to fit a 
PowerPoint presentation used in the subsequent experimental study. The next image with the 
highest category representation score for this word was thus selected.  
Similarly, one image was selected for each of the 17 words/expressions that 
represented the psychological meaning of economic threat (see Table 4.2). The selection 
criteria were not respected only for “politics” and “asset sales”. The image selected for 
“politics” was chosen to prevent bias given that the other images with eight or more correct 
categorisations depicted specific and identifiable politicians. The image selected to represent 
“asset sales” portrayed a well-known politician in a section of the image. The politician was 
then excluded from the image using Windows Paintbrush and the image was retained. 
Interestingly, “money” was the only word to characterize (economic) threat to have images 
eliciting more positive than negative sentiments. 
One image was also selected for each of the 17 words/expressions that represented the 
psychological meaning of natural threat (see Table 4.2). The criteria were not respected only 
for the word “helplessness”. The images depicting this word were not correctly categorized as 
natural threat by any of the participants. The next image with the highest category 
representation score for natural threat was selected (“tornados4”).  
Finally, 17 images were selected for New Zealand’s natural territory. The criteria were 
not respected only for one image which was similar to another already selected (i.e. both 
images depicted a mountain with snow on top and bushes around it), and also did not have the 
definition required to fit a PowerPoint presentation. The next image with the highest category 
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representation score for New Zealand’s natural territory was selected 
(“NewZealandterritory76”). An excerpt of the selected images is presented in Appendix F. 
 
Discussion 
The validation presented in this study had the aim to select images to design specific 
threat and control stimuli to be used in a subsequent experiment. Given that the aim of the 
study was to provide images to design specific stimuli to New Zealand and New Zealanders 
and the search terms for this material were based on specific findings from Study 2A, images 
validated in previous studies and balanced toward affect were not considered (Lang, Bradley, 
& Cuthbert, 1997). The images connected to words/expressions elicited in Study 2A when 
participants were asked to think about social, economic and natural threats were expected to 
be negative valenced (and not neutral). In this study, only images searched for “money” were 
positive valenced.  
Not all the selected images followed the criteria established before data collection. 
More attention could have been paid to the images during the image search process. Perhaps 
additional consideration during the initial selection could have avoided bias even before 
presenting the images to participants who took part in the study. Additionally, the images 
connected to “helplessness” were not even once categorized correctly as part of natural threat. 
This could have happened because helplessness is a sentiment that can be connected to many 
threatening elements in daily life, not being attached to only one specific type of threat. 
Another limitation of the study is that some of the images were seen by less than 10 
participants. The criteria to choose the images had to be adapted to overcome this issue.  
Despite these limitations, the present study achieved its goal of selecting 17 images for 
each of the social, economic and natural threat scenarios plus a control scenario. The overall 
set of images represent the words/expressions obtained in Study 2A and thus provide a set of 
validated stimuli which can be used in experimental studies (as discussed in Study 3C).  
Next, we present a brief general discussion for Study 2. 
 
General discussion for Study 2 
Overall, the three studies presented in this chapter succeeded in: (1) establishing that 
social, economic and natural threats have different psychological meanings among European 
New Zealanders (Pākehā), (2) validating textual stimuli to be used in subsequent experimental 
studies, and (3) validating images to be included as pictorial stimuli in a subsequent 
experimental study. Some limitations can be noted, including not randomizing questions in 
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Study 2A, approaching participants in shared and loud study spaces in Study 2B, and not 
selecting images with high resolution from the start in Study 2C. However, the present studies 
confirmed that the stimuli designed and selected in this chapter can be used to distinguish 
social, economic and natural threats. In the next chapter, we present three studies testing the 
full set of hypotheses presented in Chapter 2 and using the textual and pictorial stimuli 
described in the present chapter. 
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As noted previously, the literature has shown an association between the amount of 
societal threat in a particular period of time and subsequent political conservatism (Jost et al., 
2003b). However, it is still not clear whether societal threat impacts political conservatism 
irrespective of people’s previous level of political conservatism, or whether societal threat 
impacts political conservatism depending on one’s previous level of political conservatism. 
Moreover, systematic studies verifying the causality of this relationship are scarce. Building 
on results from the previous empirical studies, the set of studies described in this chapter tried 
to fill this gap by evaluating experimentally direct and indirect ways in which societal threat 
impacts political conservatism. Experimental studies testing the impact of societal threat on 
political conservatism could be an optimal strategy to establish a causal chain between these 
variables (see, e.g. Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005).  
Societal Threat and the Prediction of Political Conservatism 
As presented in Chapter 2, there are two main views on the impact of societal threat 
on political conservatism. The first view suggests a direct impact of societal threat on political 
conservatism, and the second suggests that this impact depends on previous levels of political 
conservatism. 
The first view is well portrayed by Jost et al.’s (2003b) seminal meta-analyses 
examining the relationship between political conservatism and several variables. Among the 
results, the authors found a positive and moderate weighted effect size [r(7) = .47, p < .001] 
for the relationship between societal threat (named by the authors as system instability) and 
political conservatism. This effect implies that, as system instability grows, there is a shift 
toward conservatism. The authors also found a positive and moderate weighted effect size 
[r(6) = .50, p < .001] for the relationship between death salience and political conservatism.  
The second view is well portrayed by terror management theory (Rosenblatt et al., 
1989). In our view, death salience evoked by societal threat could lead to a desire to subscribe 
to comforting cultural worldviews, as proposed by terror management theory. In this sense, 
liberal-oriented people would become more liberal when threatened, while conservative-
oriented people would become more conservative when threatened. Based on these theoretical 
views, the following hypotheses were postulated:  
 
Chapter 5: Study 3 
The Impact of Threatening Scenarios on Political Conservatism 
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Hypothesis 1 (conservative shift). The hypothesis of conservative shift in the face of 
societal threat (Jost et al., 2003b) postulates that participants will become more 
politically conservative after the threat manipulation 
 
Hypothesis 2 (cultural worldview enhancement). The hypothesis of cultural worldview 
enhancement elicited by societal threat (Burke et al., 2013) postulates that the threat 
manipulation will enhance participants’ held political orientation  
 
Burke et al. (2013) reported two meta-analyses testing conservative shift and cultural 
worldview enhancement resulting from death salience. In line with the conservative shift 
hypothesis, they observed a small weighted effect size [r(25) = .22, p < .02] for the effect of 
death salience on political conservatism. At the same time, they observed a moderate 
weighted effect size [r(13) = .35, p < .01] for studies that confirmed the cultural worldview 
enhancement hypothesis. Although numerically distinct, the difference in effect sizes was not 
statistically significant. These results suggest that both hypotheses have received some 
empirical support. 
In sum, the empirical literature suggests that there is not an agreement regarding the 
nature of the relationship between threat and political conservatism, especially if considering 
death salience as an underlying aspect of threat. Some studies have suggested that people 
always shift their view toward conservatism when threatened, while other studies have 
suggested that people could shift their view toward conservatism or liberalism depending on 
their previous level of political conservatism. The three studies reported in this chapter 
evaluate these two main competing hypotheses for the effect of societal threat on political 
conservatism. 
Understanding How Societal Threat Impacts Political Conservatism 
Besides the hypotheses examining more direct effects of societal threat on political 
conservatism, the present set of studies also examined two other hypotheses concerning 
possible mediated and moderated effects of societal threat on political conservatism. The 
additional hypotheses are related to the socio-political attitudes of RWA and SDO, variables 
which have been differentially related to political conservatism (Altemeyer, 1981; Pratto, et 
al., 1994; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2002; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). In this sense, political 
conservatism has been recognized as a combination of resistance to change (indexed by 
RWA) and support for inequality (indexed by SDO). 
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As detailed in Chapter 2, Duckitt’s dual-process motivational (DPM) model 
encompasses both RWA and SDO and provides a framework of how these variables explain 
prejudice and political conservatism (Duckitt, 2001). The initial DPM model posited that 
socialisation practices (punitive or unaffectionate socialisation) would impact personality 
traits (social conformity or tough-mindedness), which would impact worldviews (dangerous 
or competitive-jungle world). Worldviews would in turn impact socio-political attitudes 
(RWA or SDO), which would impact out-group and in-group attitudes. There were two main 
paths in this model: (1) Punitive socialisation  social conformity  dangerous worldview 
 RWA  out-group and in-group attitudes; and (2) Unaffectionate socialisation  tough-
mindedness  competitive-jungle worldview  SDO  out-group and in-group attitudes. 
One of the modifications in the DPM model over the years was the replacement of 
socialisation practices by social/group contexts. In this new version of the model including 
context, a dangerous/threatening context (instead of punitive socialisation) would impact 
dangerous worldview and RWA, while an inequality/competition context (instead of 
unaffectionate socialisation) would impact competitive worldview and SDO (Duckitt & 
Fisher, 2003). This modified model suggests that enduring different types of threat could 
impact differentially worldviews, RWA, SDO and the resulting political and ethnocentric 
behaviours (see also Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). In accordance with the modified model, societal 
threat has been positively associated with worldviews and socio-political attitudes in 
empirical studies (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Jugert & Duckitt, 2009). Thus, based on the 
literature review and results from Study 1, the three studies presented in this chapter also 
evaluated the differential impact of societal threat on political conservatism via the DPM 
model variables. More specifically, the three experimental studies aimed to evaluate whether 
economic and social threats (compared to a control condition) impact differentially political 
conservatism via different DPM model pathways.  
 
Hypothesis 3 (dual-process mediation). The hypothesis of dual-process mediation 
(Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) postulates that world beliefs (competitive and dangerous) and 
socio-political attitudes (RWA and SDO) will differentially mediate the impact of the 
societal threat manipulation on political conservatism (Figure 5.1) 
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Figure 5.1. Causal model of the impact of economic and social threats based on Duckitt and 
Fisher’s (2003) and Sibley and Duckitt’s (2009) models. 
 
In order to evaluate the differential mediation hypothesis, the three studies first 
evaluated whether there were differences in world beliefs and socio-political attitudes across 
conditions. Based on the DPM model, two more specific hypotheses were proposed: 
  
Hypothesis 3A. Participants assigned to the social threat condition will score 
significantly higher on dangerous world beliefs and RWA than participants assigned to 
the economic threat or control conditions 
 
Hypothesis 3B. Participants assigned to the economic threat condition will score 
significantly higher on competitive world beliefs and SDO than participants assigned 
to the social threat or control conditions  
 
Finally, it has been unclear in the literature whether threat impacts other variables 
regardless of one’s previous level of authoritarianism or whether only high authoritarians are 
impacted by threat. Thus, the present studies also explored an alternative hypothesis for the 
relationship between RWA measured before the experiment and societal threat (Feldman, 
2013). More specifically, the three studies presented in this chapter also sought to evaluate the 
activation of authoritarianism by social threat taking into account the DPM model (Figure 
5.2): 
Competitive 
worldview 
RWA 
SDO 
Dangerous 
worldview 
Economic 
threat 
Social threat 
Political 
conservatism 
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Hypothesis 4 (activation of authoritarianism by social threat). The hypothesis of 
activation of authoritarianism by social threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997) postulates 
that the interaction between RWA measured before the experiment (pre-RWA) and the 
social threat manipulation (compared to the control manipulation) will enhance 
dangerous world beliefs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2. Causal model of the impact of the interaction between RWA measured before the 
experiment and social threat on dangerous world beliefs.  
 
The Impact of Different Types of Societal Threat on Political Conservatism 
As reported in Chapter 2, studies considering the impact of societal threat on political 
conservatism have mainly considered the impact of threatening periods on political 
conservatism (Jost et al., 2003b; McCann, 2009). In these studies, the definition of threatening 
periods has been mainly based on economic, social and political indices. Natural threat, as an 
overall construct, has not been considered in these studies. Therefore, based on results from 
Study 2, the three studies presented in this chapter also aim to explore systematically how 
different types of societal threat (economic, social and natural) impact political conservatism. 
Detail of Studies  
The extant literature provides empirical and theoretical support for the impact of 
societal threat on political conservatism and for the inclusion of world beliefs and socio-
political attitudes as possible mediators of this relationship. Next, we describe three 
experimental studies which evaluated the full set of hypotheses using a combination of 
different settings and types of experimental stimulus: Study 3A was completed online with 
Dangerous worldview 
Pre-RWA  
×  
Social threat 
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textual stimuli, Study 3B was completed in a lab with textual stimuli, and Study 3C was 
completed in a lab with pictorial stimuli. 
 
Study 3A 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The participants of Study 3A were first-year psychology students at Victoria 
University of Wellington who took part in the study for partial course credit. Data for the pre-
experimental measures were obtained from an online mass testing (using SurveyMonkey) 
conducted by the School of Psychology in July of 2013 (N = 251), which included several 
measures unrelated to this study. Data for the post-experimental measures were obtained from 
an online study (using Qualtrics) conducted between August and September of the same year. 
The study including the experimental stimuli and a post-experimental survey was approved by 
the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of the Victoria 
University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee (Reference number: RM019658). 
Participants could answer the experimental study whenever it suited them by accessing the 
online link for the study from any computer. 
A total of 250 participants completed the experimental study, but only 221 participants 
who were New Zealand-born, at least 18 years old and described themselves as European 
New Zealanders (Pākehā) were considered in the final analyses. From these participants, only 
142 who completed both the mass testing and the experimental study were considered in the 
analysis including pre and post-experimental data. This was the main sample considered in 
the present study. Overall, 74.6% of the participants were female and the mean age of the 
sample was 19.23 years (SD = 2.91). Only one participant had children and 11.3% of the 
participants also described themselves as Māori or Pacific Islander in addition to Pākehā.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental scenario conditions 
and then asked to complete all other measures thinking about the given scenario. Thirty-eight 
participants read the control scenario, 30 read the economic threat scenario, 37 read the 
natural threat scenario, and 37 read the social threat scenario. 
Apparatus and Materials 
Experimental manipulation. The experimental manipulation included the threat and 
control textual stimuli validated previously (as detailed in Study 2B). More specifically, an 
experimental text depicting a control, economic threat, natural threat or social threat scenario 
was presented after participants read an introductory text. After reading the scenario text, 
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participants were asked to “type the first few words that come to mind when thinking about 
this scenario” to increase their attention on the manipulated scenario. A set time of two 
minutes was fixed for reading the introductory and experimental texts and answering the 
open-ended question so that participants could only progress further in the survey after two 
minutes had passed. After this elapsed time, participants were asked to complete three 
questions presented in random order about the extent to which economic, natural and social 
threats were depicted in the given scenario on an 11-point scale, varying from 0 (not present 
at all) to 10 (extremely present). 
Mediating variables. Competitive and dangerous worldviews were measured only 
after the experiment, while RWA and SDO were measured both before and after the 
experiment.  
Competitive and dangerous worldviews. The measure proposed by Perry and Sibley 
(2010) was used to measure both worldviews by asking participants to indicate the percentage 
of people in the country they believe acted in a specific way “just because they can”. The 
scale comprises nine items in each of the factors of competitive (e.g. “Charm someone to 
manipulate them”) and dangerous (e.g. “Rob someone”) worldviews and was answered on a 
scale varying from 0.0% to 100.0%. 
RWA. Right-wing authoritarianism was measured before the experiment with 30 items 
from Altemeyer’s (1996) original 34-items RWA scale. This scale has an equal number of 
pro-trait (e.g. “Once our government leaders give us the “go ahead”, it will be the duty of 
every patriotic citizen to help stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within”) 
and con-trait (e.g. “Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexuality, 
even if it makes them different from everyone else”) items. Participants rated their level of 
agreement to each item on a 7-point scale varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly 
agree). 
A short version of Duckitt et al.’s (2010) ACT scale was used to measure RWA after 
the experiment. The measure includes 18 items rated on a 9-point scale varying from -4 (very 
strongly disagree) to +4 (very strongly agree) which capture authoritarianism (e.g. “The facts 
on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on 
troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order”), conservatism (e.g. “Our country will 
be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders”), and traditionalism (e.g. “The 
old-fashioned ways and old-fashioned values still show the best way to live”). In the present 
study only the overall RWA score was considered. 
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SDO. Morselli et al.’s (2012) 4-item scale was used to measure social dominance 
orientation before the experiment (e.g. “In setting priorities, we must consider ALL groups”). 
Considering samples from 17 countries including New Zealand, the authors confirmed the 
reliability and measurement invariance of the scale across cultures. The measure was 
answered on a 7-point scale varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).  
A new version of the SDO scale (Ho et al., 2012) with equal number of pro-trait and 
con-trait items was used to measure SDO after the experiment. The scale includes 16 items 
rated on a 7-point scale varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) which 
capture dominance (e.g. “Having some groups on top really benefits everybody”) and 
egalitarianism (e.g. “We should not push for group equality”). In the present study only the 
overall SDO score was considered. 
Dependent variables. Two related political conservatism constructs were used as 
dependent variables. These constructs were accessed both before and after the experiment. 
Political orientation. Two variables were used to measure political orientation. 
Participants were asked to place themselves on both left/right and liberal/conservative 
continuums. Their answer could vary from 1 (extremely left or extremely liberal) to 7 
(extremely right or extremely conservative).  
Voting intention. Participants were asked to indicate in which political party they 
would vote for if a general election was to be held. This question was open-ended before the 
experiment and included eight multiple-choice options after the experiment. The eight 
multiple-choice options included the eight political parties with seats in the New Zealand 
Parliament. 
Control variables. Impact of the scenario, positive and negative affect, and values 
were measured after the experiment in order to be entered as control variables in the analyses 
(see Appendix G1 for a description of the measures). However, given the limited overall 
sample size (N = 221), the main analyses reported in the present study do not include these 
control variables.  
Participants were also asked for socio-demographic data, their sentiments toward New 
Zealand political parties and their identification with New Zealand and New Zealanders after 
the experimental study. While the variables enclosing sentiments toward New Zealand 
political parties (varying from 1 = strongly oppose to 7 = strongly support) were included in 
preliminary analyses, all other socio-demographic data only served the purpose of describing 
the sample and linking data between the pre-experimental and post-experimental phases of the 
study. Identification with New Zealand and New Zealanders was not included in the analyses 
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described in the present study. The questionnaire used in the post-experimental phase of the 
study is presented in Appendix H.  
Data Analysis 
Participants with more than 5.0% of their responses missing were excluded from the 
pre and post-experimental datasets in order to safeguard the main analyses (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Outliers and normality analyses were also undertaken but no participant was 
discarded. Multiple imputation using the expectation maximization algorithm was used to 
replace isolated missing data in the post-experimental dataset (applied in one case). On the 
pre-experimental dataset no multiple imputation was performed given that the maximum 
number of missing answers per case was only one. SPSS 20 was used to conduct analyses of 
variance and chi-square tests, while AMOS 22 was used to conduct structural equation 
models. 
 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
Appendix I presents descriptive statistics, reliability estimates and correlations 
between all variables considered in the present study. Besides these basic statistics, the 
preliminary analysis focused on the voting intention variable and manipulation check analysis 
detailed below. 
Voting intention. The variables measuring voting intention before and after the 
experiment were created by grouping intention to vote for liberal versus conservative political 
parties. This grouping was based on correlations reported in Study 1 and similar correlations 
observed in the present study. The dataset for this analysis included participants who reported 
voting for the ACT, Green, Labour, National, or NZ First political parties after the 
experiment. Overall, sentiments toward the Green and Labour parties were positively 
correlated, sentiments toward the ACT and National political parties were positively 
correlated, and sentiments toward liberal (Green and Labour) and conservative (ACT and 
National) parties were negatively correlated (Appendix J).8 The only unexpected relationship 
was the non-significant correlation between sentiments toward the ACT and Labour parties.  
                                                          
8 Given that sentiments toward political parties were measured after the experimental manipulation, one-way 
ANOVAs were performed to examine any effect of experimental condition on this variable. Sentiments toward 
ACT (p = .318), Green (p = .515), Labour (p = .574), and National parties (p = .621) did not statistically differ 
across experimental conditions. On the other hand, sentiments toward NZ First [F(3, 211) = 2.74, p = .044, ηp² 
= .04] statistically differed. Follow-up Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that participants in the social threat 
condition evaluated this political party more positively than participants in the control condition (p = .030). 
  
74 
 
Dummy variables were thus created grouping intention to vote for more liberal (Green 
or Labour = 0) and more conservative (ACT or National = 1) political parties. All analyses 
considering both voting intention measured before and after the experiment were limited to 
participants who asserted intention to vote for one of these political parties (n = 89). As 
expected, liberal/conservative voting intention measured before the experiment was positively 
correlated to left/right (r = .49) and liberal/conservative (r = .30) political orientations 
measured before the experiment, and these political orientations were highly correlated (r = 
.64). Similarly, liberal/conservative voting intention measured after the experiment was 
positively correlated to left/right (r = .36) and liberal/conservative (r = .28) political 
orientations measured after the experiment, and these political orientations were highly 
correlated (r = .60).  
Manipulation check. An initial analysis was performed to test whether participants’ 
evaluations of the threatening situations differed across conditions. The 4 (condition: 
economic threat, natural threat, social threat, control) x 3 (perception of threat: economic 
threat, natural threat, social threat) MANOVA was statistically significant, F(9, 651) = 55.80, 
p < .001, ηp² = .44. Given the violation of the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance for the 
three dependent variables, Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted.9 The Kruskal-Wallis tests 
showed that participants identified economic, natural and social threats differentially 
according to the scenario they read (all ps < .001).  
Overall, follow-up Mann-Whitney tests pairing two out of the four conditions per 
analysis confirmed predictions. Participants reading the natural and the social threat scenarios 
identified more natural and social threat, respectively (all ps < .001). Participants reading the 
economic threat scenario only marginally identified more economic threat than participants 
reading the social threat scenario (p = .093), but the mean perception of economic threat was 
higher for participants reading the economic threat scenario (Table 5.1). Based on the overall 
pattern of results, the economic threat, natural threat, social threat and control conditions were 
considered separately in subsequent analyses. 
 
 
                                                          
Overall, these results show that the experimental manipulation did not exert a strong impact on sentiments 
toward political parties and that this variable could be included in the main analyses. 
9 Before deciding to conduct the non-parametric tests presented in all studies of this chapter, the dependent 
variables were transformed using square root, logarithmic and Box-Cox transformations (Field, 2009; Osborne, 
2010). However, Levene’s test of equality of error variances continued to be significant when the transformed 
variables were entered in new analyses. Thus, non-parametric tests were implemented. 
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Table 5.1 
Means and standard deviations for the perception of economic, natural and social threats in 
Study 3A 
Perception of threat Experimental stimuli M SD 
Economic 
Control 3.08 2.33 
Economic threat 8.67 1.41 
Natural threat 6.52 2.85 
Social threat 8.04 1.94 
Natural 
Control 3.62 2.60 
Economic threat 2.84 2.49 
Natural threat 9.28 1.12 
Social threat 2.95 3.14 
Social 
Control 2.44 2.06 
Economic threat 7.59 2.08 
Natural threat 6.48 2.69 
Social threat 9.35 1.14 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. The highest means per type of perceived 
threat are presented in boldface.  
 
Conservative Shift versus Cultural Worldview Enhancement 
The first set of hypotheses concerned the effect of the experimental manipulation on 
political orientation and voting intention. The results for left/right and liberal/conservative 
orientations are presented first, followed by the results for voting intention. 
Political orientation. Regarding left/right and liberal/conservative political 
orientations, the data suggested that participants became generally more right-
wing/conservative after reading the control and the economic and natural threat scenarios 
(compared to the social threat scenario; see Table 5.2). 
 
Table 5.2 
Means, standard deviations and frequencies for political conservatism across experimental 
conditions in Study 3A 
Condition 
Left/right  
orientation 
Liberal/conservative 
orientation 
Voting intention 
Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test 
M SD M SD M SD M SD Fl Fc Fl Fc 
Control 3.29 1.35 3.34 1.02 3.08 1.50 3.21 1.17 16 10 17 9 
Economic threat 3.23 1.10 3.30 1.24 3.10 1.09 3.13 1.17 9 10 12 7 
Natural threat 3.14 1.16 3.22 1.16 3.32 1.23 3.46 1.22 18 6 18 6 
Social threat 3.68 1.11 3.62 1.06 3.43 1.24 3.27 1.07 7 13 12 8 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; Fl = Frequency liberal; Fc = Frequency conservative. 
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To test the conservative shift (H1) and the cultural worldview enhancement (H2) 
hypotheses for left/right orientation more formally, a mixed-design ANOVA was conducted. 
Before conducting this analysis, left/right orientation measured before the experiment was 
split into low and high groups, creating the variable pre-left/right categorisation.10 Then, a 
mixed-design ANOVA with left/right orientation (measured before and after the experiment) 
as a within-subjects factor and condition (economic threat, natural threat, social threat, 
control) and pre-left/right categorisation (left, right) as between-subjects factors was 
conducted.  
A two-way interaction between left/right orientation and condition would support H1 
with participants in the threat conditions becoming more right oriented after the experimental 
manipulation. On the other hand, a three-way interaction between left/right orientation, 
condition and pre-left/right categorisation would support H2. In order to support H2, this 
interaction should show: (1) participants with prior high levels of right political orientation 
becoming more right oriented in the threat conditions after the experimental manipulation, 
and (2) participants with prior high levels of left political orientation becoming more left 
oriented in the threat conditions after the experimental manipulation. Similar results were 
expected in order to confirm H1 and H2 in further analyses focusing on left/right and 
liberal/conservative orientations. 
The between-subjects analysis revealed a main effect of pre-left/right categorisation, 
F(1, 134) = 182.66, p < .001, ηp² = .58. The within-subjects analysis revealed that this effect 
was qualified by a significant interaction between left/right orientation and pre-left/right 
categorisation, F(1, 134) = 26.01, p < .001, ηp² = .16. Follow-up paired samples t-tests per 
pre-left/right categorisation showed that left-oriented participants (M = 2.25, SD = .73) 
became more right oriented after the experiment (M = 2.78, SD = 1.04), t(64) = - 4.21, p < 
.001, d = .59, while right-oriented participants (M = 4.26, SD = .57) became less right oriented 
after the experiment (M = 3.87, SD = .92), t(76) = 3.29, p = .002, d = -.51. No other main 
effect or interaction was statistically significant (all ps ≥ .328). Overall, these results confirm 
                                                          
10 A median split was initially conducted, but this procedure yielded less than five participants in some cells 
when a mixed-design ANOVA was conducted. For this reason, left/right orientation measured before the 
experiment was split as to include participants with scores below the median as left and participants with scores 
equal or above the median as right. When a similar analysis was run with the new pre-left/right categorisation 
variable, there were five or more participants in all cells. 
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neither the hypothesis of conservative shift (H1) nor the hypothesis of cultural worldview 
enhancement (H2) for left/right orientation.11 
A similar mixed-design ANOVA was also conducted to test the conservative shift 
(H1) and the cultural worldview enhancement (H2) hypotheses for liberal/conservative 
orientation. Before conducting this analysis, liberal/conservative orientation measured before 
the experiment was split by the median to form two groups, creating the variable pre-
liberal/conservative categorisation. Then, the mixed-design ANOVA with liberal/conservative 
orientation (measured before and after the experiment) as a within-subjects factor and 
condition (economic threat, natural threat, social threat, control) and pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation (liberal, conservative) as between-subjects factors was conducted.  
The between-subjects analysis revealed a main effect of pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation, F(1, 134) = 164.31, p < .001, ηp² = .55. The within-subjects analysis revealed 
that this effect was qualified by a significant interaction between liberal/conservative 
orientation and pre-liberal/conservative categorisation, F(1, 134) = 23.11, p < .001, ηp² = 
.26.12 Follow-up paired samples t-tests per pre-liberal/conservative categorisation showed that 
liberal participants (M = 2.19, SD = .74) became more conservative after the experiment (M = 
2.79, SD = 1.12), t(72) = - 5.32, p < .001, d = .63, while conservative participants (M = 4.35, 
SD = .61) became less conservative after the experiment (M = 3.78, SD = .95), t(68) = 4.66, p 
< .001, d = -.71. No other main effect or interaction was statistically significant (all ps ≥ 
.120). These results confirm neither the hypothesis of conservative shift (H1) nor the 
hypothesis of cultural worldview enhancement (H2) for liberal/conservative orientation.13 
 Voting intention. Pearson’s chi-square tests were performed to evaluate if there was 
a significant shift in the frequency of liberal/conservative voting intention after the 
experimental manipulation. The chi-square test was more appropriate for this variable given 
its dichotomous nature (liberal parties = 0 and conservative parties = 1). In this analysis, 
                                                          
11 Complementary analyses were performed by grouping all experimental conditions to compare with the control 
condition. The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped 
threat conditions. 
12 Levene’s test of equality of error variance was significant for liberal/conservative orientation measured before 
the experiment. Before including this variable in a new analysis of variance, it was transformed using square 
root, logarithmic and Box-Cox transformations (Field, 2009; Osborne, 2010). However, Levene’s test continued 
to be significant. As there is no consensus in the literature on which non-parametric procedure to adopt in 
replacement of a mixed-design ANOVA, the analysis reported in this section was run with the original 
untransformed variable. The same procedures described in this footnote were adopted for all similar analyses 
described in this chapter. 
13 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. The only difference was that the interaction between condition and pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation was significant, F(1, 138) = 5.73, p = .018, ηp² = .04.  
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condition was entered as “layer”, voting intention measured before the experiment as “row”, 
and voting intention measured after the experiment as “column”. The dichotomous nature of 
the data did not enable us to test the cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis (H2) for this 
variable. 
The chi-square tests showed significant effects when considering all four experimental 
conditions [χ²(1, N = 89) = 51.338, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .76], as well as for each specific 
condition: economic threat [χ²(1, N = 19) = 9.975, p = .003, Cramér’s V = .72], natural threat 
[χ²(1, N = 24) = 14.519, p = .001, Cramér’s V = .78], social threat [χ²(1, N = 20) = 7.179, p = 
.015, Cramér’s V = .60], and control condition [χ²(1, N = 26) = 22.024, p < .001, Cramér’s V = 
.92]. However, the cross-tabulation table showed that participants who reported intention to 
vote for liberal or conservative parties before the experiment reported similar voting intention 
after the experimental manipulation across all conditions (see Table 5.2). These results 
indicate no change in voting intention after the experimental manipulation.14 Thus, the 
conservative shift hypothesis (H1) could not be confirmed when considering voting intention. 
Dual-Process Mediation of the Impact of Societal Threat on Political Conservatism 
The results reported previously reveal that the experimental condition did not impact 
political conservatism directly. It is plausible, however, that the experimental manipulation 
might impact political conservatism indirectly via world beliefs and socio-political attitudes in 
line with the DPM model. This section explores this possibility which is outlined in H3. 
Differences in world beliefs and socio-political attitudes across scenarios. The first 
step was to examine whether the experimental manipulation had an effect on the world beliefs 
and socio-political attitude measures. Table 5.3 displays the means and standard deviations 
for these measures per condition.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. 
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Table 5.3 
Means and standard deviations per experimental condition for variables included in Duckitt’s 
DPM model (2001) in Study 3A 
Dependent 
variables 
Control 
Economic 
threat 
Natural  
threat 
Social  
threat ANOVA 
F 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Competitive 
worldview 
34.53a 20.01 39.33 18.62 33.61b 17.30 47.81a, b 21.49 6.23* 
Dangerous 
worldview 
17.20c, d 14.39 25.12c 17.39 24.10 16.43 30.35d 16.91 6.57* 
Right-wing 
authoritarianism 
-.63 1.11 -.83 1.07 -.69 .96 -.50 .93 .90 
Social dominance 
orientation 
2.86 .78 2.93 .95 3.05 .95 2.85 .89 .58 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. *p < .05. Means with similar superscripts differ significantly 
(p < .05). 
 
One-way ANOVAs showed non-significant effects of experimental condition on 
RWA (p = .441) and SDO (p = .627). However, the effect of experimental condition on 
dangerous and competitive worldviews was significant [F(3, 217) = 6.57, p < .001, ηp² = .08; 
F(3, 217) = 6.23, p < .001, ηp² = .08, respectively]. Follow-up Bonferroni post-hoc tests 
showed that dangerous world beliefs were higher in the social threat (p < .001) and economic 
threat (p = .067) conditions than in the control condition. These tests also showed that 
competitive world beliefs were significantly higher in the social threat condition than in both 
the control (p = .002) and natural threat (p = .001) conditions. These experimental effects are 
further explored considering the DPM model below. 
Indirect effects of the scenarios on political conservatism: Mediational path 
model. Given that the sample size for each of the four experimental conditions varied from 48 
to 60 participants, it was not possible to explore the differences between the four different 
conditions in a stable fashion. As a result, the path analysis focused on the comparison 
between the control and the grouped threat conditions. The control (0) versus the grouped 
threat (1) condition was used as a dichotomous exogenous variable in this analysis. 
Preliminary independent samples t-tests comparing the control with the threat 
conditions revealed non-significant effects of condition on RWA (p = .814) and SDO (p = 
.524). However, a significant effect of condition on dangerous worldview was detected, 
t(134.01) = -4.15, p < .001, d = .60, with participants who read one of the threat scenarios (M 
= 26.59, SD = 17.02) perceiving the world as more dangerous than participants who read the 
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control scenario (M = 17.20, SD = 14.39). The effect of condition on competitive worldview 
was also marginally significant, t(219) = -1.94, p = .053, d = .29, with participants who read 
one of the threat scenarios (M = 40.33, SD = 20.03) perceiving the world as more competitive 
than participants who read the control scenario (M = 34.53, SD = 20.01). Thus, the path 
analysis model investigating the indirect effect of societal threat (versus the control condition) 
on political conservatism was credible. 
Exploratory path analysis models with maximum likelihood estimation were therefore 
computed to test the differential indirect effect of societal threat (economic, natural and social 
threats) on political conservatism. Due to the mediational nature of the DPM model, 
bootstrapping procedures were implemented (with 1000 re-samplings) to calculate the indirect 
effects. Four indicators of fit were considered: the ratio χ2∕df (chi-square over degrees of 
freedom), the comparative fit index (CFI), the standardized root mean square residual 
(sRMR), and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA). Values of χ 2∕df smaller 
than two suggest good fit and values between two and three indicate acceptable fit (Bollen & 
Long, 1993). Models with CFI values close to .95 indicate an acceptable fit, while SRMR and 
RMSEA having values close to .08 and .06, respectively, indicate an acceptable fit (Hu & 
Bentler, 1999).  
An initial model was run including all predicted paths from the DPM model (Sibley & 
Duckitt, 2009) and direct paths from societal threat to world beliefs, socio-political attitudes 
and political conservatism. The non-significant paths were excluded and additional paths 
included based on modification indices. A similar approach was implemented to each of the 
political conservatism variables. Table 5.4 shows the model fit indices for the final models. 
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Table 5.4 
Model fit indices for the path analysis models including societal threat, world beliefs, socio-
political attitudes and political conservatism in Study 3A 
Model Χ2 df Χ2/df CFI sRMR 
RMSEA 
(90% CI) 
Left/right orientation 10.13 9 1.13 .99 .039 
.025 
(.000 ≤ .084) 
Liberal/conservative 
orientation 
9.41 9 1.04 1.00 .036 
.015 
(.000 ≤ .080) 
Voting intention 6.07 9 .67 1.00 .026 
.000 
(.000 ≤ .057) 
Note. Χ2 = value of the chi-square test statistic; df = degrees of freedom; Χ2/df = value of the chi-square 
test statistic divided by the number of degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; sRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 90% CI = 
90% confidence interval.  
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.3, the models were very similar across the dependent 
variables. Threat conditions (compared to the control) increased both dangerous and 
competitive worldviews. More importantly, societal threat enhanced political conservatism 
via competitive world beliefs and RWA.15 These results provide partial support for the dual-
process mediation hypothesis (H3) and the differential impact of societal threat on political 
conservatism via some of the variables included in Duckitt’s (2001) DPM model. However, it 
is worth noting that competitive and dangerous world beliefs did not predict SDO and RWA 
directly as expected in these models – only competitive worldview predicted RWA directly. 
This lack of hypothesized effect will be discussed further in the General Discussion for Study 
3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 The statistically significant (p < .05) indirect effects of condition on SDO, left/right orientation, 
liberal/conservative orientation and voting intention had the same magnitude (all βindirect effect = .01). The 
statistically marginally significant (p < .10) indirect effects of condition were as follows: dangerous worldview 
(βindirect effect = .09) and RWA (βindirect effect = .02). 
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Figure 5.3. Path analysis models of the associations between societal threat, world beliefs, 
socio-political attitudes and political conservatism in Study 3A.Only statistically significant 
paths (p < .05) are shown.  
 
Activation of Authoritarianism by Social Threat  
The present study also aimed to test whether pre-RWA would interact with the social 
threat manipulation, affecting dangerous world beliefs (H4; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). A 
moderated path analysis model showed a non-significant effect of the interaction term pre-
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RWA × social threat on dangerous worldview (β = -.36, p = .410).16 This result does not 
confirm the differential impact of social threat on high and low authoritarians (H4). 
 
Discussion 
The extant literature has suggested a link between threatening situations and political 
conservatism (Jost et al., 2003b). Providing a systematic investigation of this relationship, the 
present experimental study examined how different types of societal threat impact political 
conservatism. Four main findings were observed: (1) the societal threat manipulation did not 
enhance political conservatism directly, (2) the societal threat manipulation did not enhance 
the prior political orientation of the participants, (3) the indirect effect of the societal threat 
manipulation on political conservatism via variables included in the DPM model was only 
partially confirmed – societal threat (mainly economic and social threats) impacted 
differentially world beliefs in analyses of variance, and exploratory path analysis models 
showed that societal threat enhanced political conservatism via both competitive world beliefs 
and RWA, and (4) RWA measured before the experiment and the social threat manipulation 
did not interact in predicting dangerous world beliefs.  
Overall, the results show experimental effects in the predicted direction. However, 
these effects do not fully confirm any of the hypotheses. Only H3 was partially supported, 
while all other hypotheses were rejected. The next study attempts to provide a 
methodologically more sound test of the hypothesized experimental effects by conducting the 
experiment in a more controlled environment and using other measures to evaluate 
competitive and dangerous world beliefs and political conservatism.  
 
Study 3B 
Method 
Participants and Procedure 
The participants of Study 3B were first-year psychology students at Victoria 
University of Wellington who took part in the study for partial course credit. Data for the pre-
experimental measures were obtained from an online mass testing (using SurveyMonkey) 
                                                          
16 A similar analysis including only participants with scores in the first or fourth quartiles of pre-RWA was also 
performed. The analysis considering these extreme low and extreme high pre-RWA scores yielded a similar 
result (β = -.45, p = .376). For completeness, an additional analysis including SDO measured before the 
experiment was also performed to test the possibility that pre-SDO would interact with the economic threat 
manipulation, affecting competitive worldview. The effect of the interaction term pre-SDO × economic threat 
was non-significant (β = -.05, p = .883). 
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conducted by the School of Psychology in the beginning of July of 2014 (N = 412), which 
included several measures unrelated to this study. Data for the post-experimental measures 
were obtained in scheduled time slots in a computer lab between July and August of the same 
year. The post-experimental measures were hosted in an online platform (Qualtrics). The 
study including the experimental stimuli and a post-experimental survey was approved by the 
School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of the Victoria 
University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee (Reference number: 0000020636).  
A total of 149 students completed the experimental study, but only 140 participants 
who were New Zealand-born, at least 18 years old and described themselves as European 
New Zealanders (Pākehā) were considered in the final analyses. From these participants, only 
121 who completed both the mass testing and the experimental study were considered in the 
analysis including pre and post-experimental data. This was the main sample considered in 
the present study. Overall, 81.8% of these participants were female and the mean age of the 
sample was 19.05 years (SD = 1.91). Only one of the participants had children and 20.7% of 
the participants also described themselves as Māori, Pacific Islander, Indian or Asian, in 
addition to Pākehā. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental scenario conditions 
and asked to complete all other measures thinking about the given scenario. Thirty 
participants read the control scenario, 29 read the economic threat scenario, 29 read the 
natural threat scenario, and 33 read the social threat scenario.  
Apparatus and Materials 
Most of the measures and instruments included in Study 3A were included in the 
present study. The only differences were the replacement of the measure used to evaluate 
SDO before the experiment, and the addition of three new measures evaluating competitive 
and dangerous world beliefs, emotion elicited by the scenario, and political conservatism 
(political discourse preference) to the present study. These new measures are described below, 
with the exception of the measure evaluating emotion (see Appendix G2 for further 
information).  
Competitive and dangerous worldviews. The present study included two worldview 
measures. The first was the measure proposed by Perry and Sibley (2010) described in Study 
3A. Since competitive and dangerous worldviews evaluated using this measure only 
correlated significantly and highly (r = .67) with each other in Study 3A, a new measure 
including items selected by Sibley et al. (2007) was also included in the present study. The 
new balanced measure included 16 items developed by Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis and 
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Birum (2002) and used by Sibley et al. (2007) to measure competitive (e.g. “It’s a dog-eat-
dog world where you have to be ruthless at times.”) and dangerous worldviews (e.g. “Every 
day as society become more lawless and bestial, a person’s chances of being robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go up and up.”). Items were answered on a 7-point scale 
varying from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). Similarly to Study 3A, the Perry and 
Sibley (2010) measure showed lower correlations to the other variables (see Appendix K). For 
this reason, all analyses reported below only consider scores on Sibley et al.’s (2007) 
competitive and dangerous worldview measure. 
SDO. The same scale used to measure SDO after the experiment in Study 3A was 
used to measure SDO before and after the experiment in Study 3B (Ho, et al., 2012; Ho et al., 
in press).17 
Political discourse preference. Political discourses were designed to portray the 
values, visions and principles of four New Zealand political parties: ACT, Green, Labour and 
National. These political parties were chosen based on results from Study 1. The discourses 
were presented without naming any political party. After reading the discourses, participants 
were asked to indicate their preferred discourse thinking about the scenario they read (see 
Appendix L for further information). This variable was measured only after the experimental 
manipulation. 
Similarly to Study 3A, the impact of the scenario, positive and negative affect, values, 
and emotion were measured after the experiment in order to be entered as control variables in 
the analyses. Again, given the limited overall sample size (N = 140), the main analyses 
described in the present study do not include these control variables. The description of the 
control variables is presented in Appendices G1 and G2. All the new measures included in the 
present study and answered after the experiment are presented in Appendix M. 
Data Analysis 
The same data analysis procedures described in Study 3A were deployed in the present 
study. Apart from participants with 5.0% or more data missing, no other participants were 
discarded. The maximum number of missing answers per case was two and these missing 
answers were limited to the pre-experimental dataset.  
 
Results 
Preliminary Analysis 
                                                          
17 The study included a later version of the scale to measure SDO before the experiment (Ho et. al., in press) 
which differed in one item from the previous version (Ho et al., 2012).  
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Appendix K presents descriptive statistics, reliability estimates and correlations 
between all variables considered in this study. Besides these basic statistics, the preliminary 
analysis focused on the voting intention and political discourse preference variables and 
manipulation check analysis detailed below.  
Voting intention and political discourse preference. The variables measuring voting 
intention before and after the experiment and political discourse preference after the 
experiment were created by grouping intention to vote for liberal versus conservative political 
parties/discourses. This grouping was based on correlations reported in Study 1 and similar 
correlations observed in the present study. The dataset for this analysis included participants 
who reported voting for the ACT, Green, Labour, National, or NZ First political parties after 
the experiment. Overall, sentiments toward the Green and Labour parties were positively 
correlated, sentiments toward the ACT and National political parties were positively 
correlated, and sentiments toward liberal (Green and Labour) and conservative (ACT and 
National) parties were negatively correlated (Appendix N).18 The only unexpected 
relationships were the non-significant correlations between sentiments toward the ACT party 
with sentiments toward the Green and Labour parties. Dummy variables were thus created 
grouping intention to vote for more liberal (Green or Labour = 0) and more conservative 
(ACT or National = 1) political parties/discourses. All analyses considering both voting 
intention measured before and after the experiment were limited to participants who asserted 
intention to vote for one of these political parties (n = 73).  
As expected, liberal/conservative voting intention measured before the experiment was 
positively correlated to left/right (r = .50) and liberal/conservative (r = .34) political 
orientations measured before the experiment, and these political orientations were highly 
correlated (r = .70). Similarly, liberal/conservative voting intention measured after the 
experiment was positively correlated to liberal/conservative political discourse preference (r = 
.32) and left/right (r = .38) and liberal/conservative (r = .35) political orientations measured 
after the experiment. Left/right and liberal/conservative political orientations were highly 
correlated (r = .58) and correlated positively to liberal/conservative political discourse 
preference (both rs = .32). 
                                                          
18 Given that sentiments toward political parties were measured after the experimental manipulation, one-way 
ANOVAs were performed to examine any effect of experimental condition on this variable. Sentiments toward 
ACT (p = .471), Green (p = .187), Labour (p = .233), National (p = .116), and NZ First (p = .755) parties did not 
statistically differ across experimental conditions. Overall, these results show that the experimental manipulation 
did not impact sentiments toward political parties and that this variable could be included in the main analyses. 
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Manipulation check. An initial analysis was performed to test whether participants’ 
evaluations of the threatening situations differed across conditions. The 4 (condition: 
economic threat, natural threat, social threat, control) x 3 (perception of threat: economic 
threat, natural threat, social threat) MANOVA was statistically significant, F(9, 408) = 41.90, 
p < .001, ηp² = .48. Given the violation of the hypothesis of homogeneity of variance for the 
three dependent variables, Kruskal-Wallis tests were conducted. The Kruskal-Wallis tests 
showed that participants identified economic, natural and social threats differentially 
according to the scenario they read (all ps < .001). Follow-up Mann-Whitney tests pairing two 
conditions per analysis confirmed predictions. Participants reading the economic, natural and 
social threat scenarios identified more economic, natural and social threat, respectively, in the 
scenarios they read (all ps < .001). Means and standard deviations for the perception of 
economic, natural, and social threats per condition are depicted in Table 5.5. 
 
Table 5.5  
Means and standard deviations for the perception of economic, natural and social threats in 
Study 3B 
Perception of threat Experimental stimuli M SD 
Economic 
Control 2.88 1.92 
Economic threat 9.51 .89 
Natural threat 5.82 3.33 
Social threat 8.46 1.28 
Natural 
Control 3.35 2.32 
Economic threat 2.91 2.68 
Natural threat 9.29 1.82 
Social threat 2.41 2.68 
Social 
Control 2.44 1.80 
Economic threat 8.20 1.68 
Natural threat 5.59 3.24 
Social threat 9.62 .98 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. The highest means per type of perceived 
threat are presented in boldface. 
 
Conservative Shift versus Cultural Worldview Enhancement 
The first set of hypotheses concerned the effect of the experimental manipulation on 
political orientation, voting intention, and political discourse preference. The results for 
left/right and liberal/conservative orientations are presented first, followed by the results for 
voting intention and political discourse preference. 
Political orientation. Regarding left/right and liberal/conservative political 
orientations, the data suggested that participants became generally more right-
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wing/conservative after reading the threat scenarios (compared to the control scenario; see 
Table 5.6).  
 
Table 5.6 
Means, standard deviations and frequencies for political conservatism across experimental 
conditions in Study 3B 
Condition 
Left/right  
orientation 
Liberal/conservative 
orientation Voting intention 
Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test 
M SD M SD M SD M SD Fl Fc Fl Fc 
Control 3.37 .89 3.20 1.00 3.30 .99 3.07 1.08 6 12 9 9 
Economic threat 3.00 1.19 3.39 .83 2.96 1.43 3.04 1.00 7 9 9 7 
Natural threat 3.18 1.54 3.21 1.26 3.00 1.25 3.00 1.02 11 4 11 4 
Social threat 3.39 1.22 3.55 1.09 3.09 1.47 3.12 .93 9 15 8 16 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; Fl = Frequency liberal; Fc = Frequency conservative. 
 
To formally test the conservative shift (H1) and the cultural worldview enhancement 
(H2) hypotheses for left/right orientation, a mixed-design ANOVA was conducted. Before 
conducting this analysis, left/right orientation measured before the experiment was split by 
the median to form two groups, creating the variable pre-left/right categorisation. Then, the 
mixed-design ANOVA with left/right orientation (measured before and after the experiment) 
as a within-subjects factor and condition (economic threat, natural threat, social threat, 
control) and pre-left/right categorisation (left, right) as between-subjects factors was 
conducted.  
The between-subjects analysis revealed a main effect of pre-left/right categorisation 
and an interaction effect of condition and pre-left/right categorisation, [F(1, 112) = 244.04, p 
< .001, ηp² = .69; F(3, 112) = 2.75, p = .046, ηp² = .07, respectively]. The within-subjects 
analysis showed that these effects were qualified by an interaction between left/right 
orientation and pre-left/right categorisation, F(1, 112) = 18.82, p < .001, ηp² = .14. Follow-up 
paired samples t-tests per pre-left/right categorisation revealed that left-oriented participants 
(M = 2.23, SD = .69) became more right oriented after the experiment (M = 2.69, SD = .90), 
t(60) = - 3.44, p = .001, d = .57, while right-oriented participants (M = 4.27, SD = .64) became 
less right oriented after the experiment (M = 4.03, SD = .69), t(58) = 3.05, p = .003, d = -.36.19 
No other main effect or interaction was statistically significant (all ps ≥ .202). Overall, these 
                                                          
19 Levene’s test of equality of error variance was significant for left/right orientation measured before the 
experiment. 
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results confirm neither the hypothesis of conservative shift (H1) nor the hypothesis of cultural 
worldview enhancement (H2) for left/right orientation.20 
To test the conservative shift (H1) and the cultural worldview enhancement (H2) 
hypotheses for liberal/conservative orientation, a similar mixed-design ANOVA was 
conducted including liberal/conservative orientation as within-subjects factor and condition 
and pre-liberal/conservative categorisation as between-subjects factors.  
The between-subjects analysis revealed a main effect of pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation, while the within-subjects analysis revealed a significant interaction between 
liberal/conservative orientation and pre-liberal/conservative categorisation [F(1, 112) = 
282.71, p < .001, ηp² = .72; F(1, 112) = 22.83, p < .001, ηp² = .17, respectively].21 These 
effects were qualified by a three-way interaction between liberal/conservative orientation, 
condition and pre-liberal/conservative categorisation, F(3, 112) = 2.69, p = .050, ηp² = .07.  
Follow-up paired samples t-tests per condition and category of pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation showed that participants categorised as liberal became more conservative after 
reading the economic and social threat scenarios [Mpre = 2.11, SDpre = .74, and Mpost = 2.58, 
SD post = .77, t(18) = - 4.02, p < .001, d = .62; Mpre = 2.19, SDpre = .68, and M post = 2.62, SD 
post = .80, t(20) = -2.42, p = .025, d = .58, respectively]. In contrast, participants categorised as 
conservative became marginally less conservative after reading the same scenarios [Mpre = 
4.50, SDpre = .97, and Mpost = 3.80, SDpost = .92, t(9) = 1.91, p = .089, d = -.74; Mpre = 4.67, 
SDpre = 1.07, and Mpost = 4.00, SDpost = .00, t(11) = 2.15, p = .054, d = -.89, respectively]. No 
significant interaction effects were observed for the natural threat (both ps ≥ .164) and control 
(both ps ≥ .270) conditions. No other main effect or interaction was statistically significant 
(all ps ≥ .115).  
Overall, these results support neither the hypothesis of conservative shift (H1) nor the 
hypothesis of cultural worldview enhancement (H2) for liberal/conservative orientation.22 
                                                          
20 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. The only differences were that the interaction between condition and pre-left/right categorisation was 
not significant (p = .184), and that the interaction between left/right orientation and condition was marginally 
significant, F(1, 116) = 3.44, p = .066, ηp² = .03. Follow-up paired samples t-tests per condition showed that 
participants in one of the grouped threat conditions became significantly more right oriented after the 
experimental manipulation (Mpre = 3.19, SDpre = 1.31, and Mpost = 3.40, SDpost = 1.07), t(89) = -2.13, p = .036, d 
= .18.  
21 Levene’s test of equality of error variance was significant for liberal/conservative orientation measured before 
and after the experiment.  
22 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. The only difference was that the effect of liberal/conservative orientation was marginally significant, 
F(1, 116) = 3.16, p = .078, ηp² = .03. In addition, paired samples t-tests were conducted to investigate the three-
way interaction between liberal/conservative orientation, condition and pre-liberal/conservative categorisation. 
These additional analyses showed that liberal participants became more conservative and conservative 
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More specifically, the significant interaction between liberal/conservative orientation, 
condition and pre-liberal/conservative categorisation suggests that participants categorised as 
liberal became more conservative after being submitted to threat stimuli, while participants 
categorised as conservative became more liberal after being submitted to threat stimuli. This 
effect is the opposite of what was expected according to H2 (cultural worldview enhancement 
hypothesis) – that societal threat would enhance participants’ prior political orientation. 
Voting intention and political discourse preference. When considering voting 
intention, Pearson’s chi-square tests showed significant effects for all four experimental 
scenarios [χ²(1, N = 73) = 45.080, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .79], as well as for each specific 
condition: economic threat [χ²(1, N = 16) = 9.679, p = .003, Cramér’s V= .78], natural threat 
[χ²(1, N = 15) = 15.000, p = .001, Cramér’s V = 1.00], social threat [χ²(1, N = 24) = 12.800, p 
= .001, Cramér’s V = .73], and control condition [χ²(1, N = 18) = 9.000, p = .009, Cramér’s V 
= .71]. However, the cross-tabulation table showed that participants who reported intention to 
vote for liberal or conservative parties before the experiment reported similar voting intention 
after the experiment across all conditions. These results indicate no change in voting intention 
after the experiment (see Table 5.6).  
A Pearson’s chi-square test was also performed to test the effect of experimental 
condition on political discourse preference given that this variable was dichotomous (liberal 
parties = 0 and conservative parties = 1). As this variable was only measured after the 
experiment and included two categories, the test only evaluated the hypothesis of 
conservative shift (H1). The Pearson’s chi-square test was non-significant (p = .153), showing 
that participants did not show stronger preference for conservative political discourses after 
the threat manipulation. Once again, the conservative shift hypothesis (H1) could not be 
confirmed when considering voting intention and political discourse preference.23  
Dual-Process Mediation of the Impact of Societal Threat on Political Conservatism  
This section explores the possibility of an indirect effect of societal threat on political 
conservatism via world beliefs and socio-political attitudes (H3). 
Differences in world beliefs and socio-political attitudes across scenarios. Table 
5.7 displays the means and standard deviations for competitive and dangerous worldviews, 
RWA and SDO per condition.  
                                                          
participants became less conservative in the grouped threat condition [Mpre = 2.11, SDpre = .69, and Mpost = 2.51, 
SDpost = .77, t(54) = -4.34, p < .001, d = .55; Mpre = 4.43, SDpre = .88, and Mpost = 3.89, SDpost = .58, t(34) = 3.28, 
p = .002, d = -.72, respectively]. 
23 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. 
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Table 5.7 
Means and standard deviations per experimental condition for variables included in Duckitt’s 
DPM model (2001) in Study 3B 
Dependent variables 
Control 
Economic 
threat 
Natural 
threat 
Social threat ANOVA 
F 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Competitive 
worldview (Duckitt 
et al., 2002) 
2.47 .59 2.93a 0.96 2.39a .97 2.51 .70 3.03* 
Dangerous 
worldview (Duckitt 
et al., 2002) 
3.64b .71 4.06 1.01 3.68 .95 4.18b .79 3.46* 
Right-wing 
authoritarianism 
-.88 1.15 -.88 1.02 -1.32 1.41 -1.09 1.02 1.15 
Social dominance 
orientation 
2.76 .78 2.86 .99 2.69 1.13 2.83 1.06 .21 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. *p < .05. Means with similar superscripts differ significantly 
or marginally (p < .10). 
 
One-way ANOVAs showed non-significant effects of experimental condition on 
RWA (p = .333) and SDO (p = .891). However, the effects of experimental condition on 
dangerous, F(3, 136) = 3.46, p = .018, ηp² = .07, and competitive world beliefs, F(3, 136) = 
3.03, p = .032, ηp² = .06, were significant. Follow-up Bonferroni post-hoc tests showed that 
dangerous world beliefs were marginally higher in the social threat condition than in the 
control condition (p = .055), and that competitive world beliefs were significantly higher in 
the economic threat condition than in the natural threat condition (p = .043). These 
experimental effects are further discussed considering the DPM model below. 
Indirect effects of the scenarios on political conservatism: Mediational path 
model. Following the criteria described in Study 3A, path analysis models with maximum 
likelihood estimation were computed. Given that the sample size for each of the four 
experimental conditions varied from 32 to 35 participants, the present study could not explore 
further the differences between the four conditions in a stable fashion. Thus, the path analysis 
focused on the comparison between the control condition and the grouped threat conditions. 
The control (0) versus the grouped threat (1) condition was used as a dichotomous exogenous 
variable in this analysis. 
Preliminary independent samples t-tests comparing the control to the grouped threat 
conditions revealed non-significant effects of condition on competitive worldview (p = .378), 
RWA (p = .342) and SDO (p = .842). However, a significant effect of condition on dangerous 
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worldview was detected, t(138) = -2.00, p = .048, d = .42, with participants who read one of 
the grouped threat scenarios (M = 3.98, SD = .93) perceiving the world as more dangerous 
than participants who read the control scenario (M = 3.64, SD = .71). Therefore, the path 
analysis model investigating the indirect effect of societal threat (versus the control condition) 
on political conservatism was credible. 
Similarly to Study 3A, an initial model was run including all predicted paths from the 
DPM model (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009) and direct paths from societal threat to world beliefs, 
socio-political attitudes and political conservatism. The non-significant paths were excluded 
and additional paths included based on modification indices. A similar approach was 
implemented to each of the political conservatism variables. Table 5.8 shows the model fit 
indices for the final models. 
 
Table 5.8 
Model fit indices for the path analysis models including societal threat, world beliefs, socio-
political attitudes and political conservatism in Study 3B 
Model Χ2 df Χ2/df CFI sRMR 
RMSEA 
(90%CI) 
Left/right orientation 7.58 5 1.52 .98 .060 
.063  
(.000 ≤ .147) 
Liberal/conservative 
orientation 
7.50 5 1.50 .98 .039 
.062  
(.000 ≤ .146) 
Voting intention 3.37 5 .67 1.00 .034 
.000  
(.000 ≤ .098) 
Political discourse 
preference 
6.53 4 1.63 .97 .042 
.069  
(.000 ≤ .161) 
Note. Χ2 = value of the chi-square test statistic; df = degrees of freedom; Χ2/df = value of the chi-square 
test statistic divided by the number of degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; sRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 90% CI = 
90% confidence interval.  
 
 Figure 5.4 presents the final model for each political conservatism variable. As the 
threat conditions (compared to the control) did not predict any variable in the models, societal 
threat is not included in the figure. Similar to results reported in Study 3A, competitive world 
beliefs directly predicted RWA across all models. Overall, these results do not provide 
support for the differential impact of societal threat on political conservatism via variables 
included in the DPM model (H3).  
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Figure 5.4. Path analysis models of the associations between societal threat, world beliefs, 
socio-political attitudes and political conservatism in Study 3B. Only statistically significant 
paths (p < .05) are shown. 
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Similarly to Study 3A, a moderated path analysis model showed a non-significant 
effect of the interaction term pre-RWA × social threat on dangerous world beliefs (β = -.13, p 
= .761).24 This result does not provide any evidence for the differential impact of social threat 
on high and low authoritarians (H4). 
 
Discussion 
The present study advanced Study 3A by conducting the experiment in a lab 
environment to examine key theoretical predictions from the literature regarding societal 
threat and political conservatism. Four main findings were observed: (1) the societal threat 
manipulation did not enhance political conservatism directly, (2) participants’ previous level 
of political conservatism (as indexed by liberal/conservative orientation) interacted with the 
threat manipulation in predicting political conservatism variation, but not in the expected 
direction, (3) the indirect effect of the societal threat manipulation on political conservatism 
via variables included in the DPM model was not confirmed – threat only impacted 
differently world beliefs in analyses of variance, and exploratory path analysis models did not 
show any significant impact of societal threat on any other variable included in the models, 
and (4) RWA measured before the experiment and the social threat manipulation did not 
interact in predicting dangerous world beliefs.  
Overall, the findings do not support the theoretical and empirical view that 
experiencing a threatening situation will make people more conservative or that this effect 
will depend on people being conservative at onset. The findings also do not support that the 
influence of societal threat on political conservatism is mediated by particular worldviews and 
socio-political attitudes in line with the DPM model. Study 3C will explore these findings 
further by making the threatening situations more salient with the use of images instead of 
texts. Research has shown that images are more easily and frequently recalled by people than 
words (McBride & Dosher, 2002; Shepard, 1967). 
 
Study 3C 
Method 
                                                          
24 A similar analysis including only participants with scores in the first or fourth quartiles of pre-RWA was also 
performed. The analysis considering these extreme low and extreme high pre-RWA scores yielded a similar 
result (β = -.62, p = .104). For completeness, an additional analysis including SDO measured before the 
experiment was also performed to test the possibility that pre-SDO would interact with the economic threat 
manipulation, affecting competitive worldview. The effect of the interaction term pre-SDO × economic threat 
was also non-significant (β = .46, p = .238). 
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Participants and Procedure 
The participants of Study 3C were first-year psychology students at Victoria 
University of Wellington who took part in the study for partial course credit. Data for the pre-
experimental measures were obtained from an online mass testing (using SurveyMonkey) 
conducted by the School of Psychology in the beginning of July of 2014 (N = 412), which 
included several unrelated measures to this study. Data for the post-experimental measures 
were obtained in scheduled time slots in a computer lab between July and August of the same 
year. The post-experimental measures were hosted in an online platform (Qualtrics). The 
study including the experimental stimuli and a post-experimental survey was approved by the 
School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of the Victoria 
University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee (Reference number: 0000020636). 
A total of 126 participants completed the experimental study, but only 115 participants 
who were New Zealand-born, at least 18 years old and described themselves as European 
New Zealanders (Pākehā) were considered in the final analyses. From these participants, only 
99 who completed both the mass testing and the experimental study were considered in the 
analysis including pre and post-experimental data. This was the main sample considered in 
the present study. Overall, 85.9% of these participants were female and the mean age of the 
sample was 18.94 years (SD = 1.77). Only one participant had children and 17.2% of the 
participants also described themselves as Māori, Pacific Islander, Asian, or “other ethnicity” 
in addition to Pākehā.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four experimental scenario conditions 
and then asked to complete all other measures thinking about the given scenario. Twenty-one 
participants saw the control scenario, 29 saw the economic threat scenario, 26 saw the natural 
threat scenario, and 23 saw the social threat scenario.  
Apparatus and Materials 
The same measures used in Study 3B were included in the present study. Only the 
experimental manipulation differed between Study 3B and the present study, which is 
described below. 
Experimental manipulation. The experimental manipulation included the threat and 
control pictorial stimuli validated previously (as detailed in Study 2C). More specifically, 
participants were randomly allocated to one of the four experimental conditions. A set of 
images depicting a control, economic threat, natural threat or social threat scenario was 
presented after participants read the introductory text described in Study 2B. The introductory 
text and the images were presented one at a time on a slide presentation converted into a 
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Windows Media Video File. The video was hosted on Qualtrics online platform. After seeing 
the experimental scenario, participants were asked to “type the first few words that come to 
mind when thinking about this scenario” to focus their attention on the experimental 
condition. A set time of two minutes was fixed for reading the introductory text, seeing the 
experimental scenario and answering the open-ended question so that participants could only 
progress further in the survey after two minutes had passed.  
Participants were presented with the introductory text for 20 seconds and the images 
for 51 seconds (three seconds per image). The order of presentation of the images was 
randomly assigned within each condition. It was expected that participants would take nine 
seconds to successfully load the video and start watching it, giving them at least 40 seconds to 
envision the scenario they were assigned to. After the two minutes, participants were asked to 
complete three questions presented in random order about the extent to which economic, 
natural and social threats were depicted in the given scenario on an 11-point scale, varying 
from 0 (not present at all) to 10 (extremely present). 
As in Study 3B, impact of the scenario, positive and negative affect, values, and 
emotion were measured after the experiment in order to be entered as control variables in the 
analyses. However, given the limited overall sample size (N = 115), the main analyses 
reported in the present study do not include these control variables.  
Data Analysis 
The same data analysis procedures described in Study 3A were employed in the 
present study. Apart from participants with 5.0% or more data missing, no other participants 
were discarded. The maximum number of missing answers per case was two and these 
missing answers were limited to the pre-experimental dataset.  
 
Results 
Preliminary analysis 
Appendix O presents descriptive statistics, reliability estimates and correlations 
between all variables included in this study. Besides these basic statistics, the preliminary 
analysis focused on the voting intention and political discourse preference variables and 
manipulation check analysis detailed below.  
Voting intention and political discourse preference. The variables measuring voting 
intention before and after the experiment and political discourse preference after the 
experiment were created based on how sentiments toward liberal and conservative political 
parties related to each other (see Study 1 for further details). The dataset for this analysis 
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included participants who reported voting for the ACT, Green, Labour, National, or NZ First 
political parties after the experiment. Overall, sentiments toward the Green and Labour parties 
were positively correlated, sentiments toward the ACT and National political parties were 
positively correlated, and sentiments toward liberal (Green and Labour) and conservative 
(ACT and National) parties were negatively correlated (Appendix P).25 The only unexpected 
relationship was the non-significant correlation between sentiments toward the ACT and 
Labour parties. Dummy variables were thus created grouping intention to vote for more 
liberal (Green or Labour = 0) and more conservative (ACT or National = 1) political 
parties/discourses. All analyses considering both voting intention measured before and after 
the experiment were limited to participants who asserted intention to vote for one of these 
political parties (n = 65).  
As expected, liberal/conservative voting intention measured before the experiment 
was positively correlated to left/right (r = .54) and liberal/conservative (r = .47) political 
orientations measured before the experiment, and these political orientations were highly 
correlated (r = .64). Similarly, liberal/conservative voting intention measured after the 
experiment was positively correlated to liberal/conservative political discourse preference (r = 
.27) and left/right (r = .34) and liberal/conservative (r = .37) political orientations measured 
after the experiment. Left/right and liberal/conservative political orientations were highly 
correlated (r = .67), and liberal/conservative political orientation correlated significantly to 
liberal/conservative political discourse preference (r = .20). The correlation between left/right 
political orientation and liberal/conservative political discourse preference was positive but 
not statistically significant (r = .18).  
Manipulation check. The 4 (condition: economic threat, natural threat, social threat, 
control) x 3 (perception of threat: economic threat, natural threat, social threat) MANOVA 
was statistically significant, F(9, 333) = 38.61, p < .001, ηp² = .51. Given the violation of the 
hypothesis of homogeneity of variance for the three dependent variables, Kruskal-Wallis tests 
were conducted. The Kruskal-Wallis tests showed that participants identified economic, 
natural and social threats differentially according to the scenario they saw (all ps < .001). 
Mann-Whitney tests pairing two conditions per analysis confirmed that participants seeing the 
economic, natural and social threat scenarios identified more economic, natural and social 
                                                          
25 Given that sentiments toward political parties were measured after the experimental manipulation, one-way 
ANOVAs were performed to examine any effect of condition on this variable. Sentiments toward ACT (p 
= .990), Green (p = .354), Labour (p = .124), National (p = .919) and NZ First (p = .184) did not statistically 
differ across experimental conditions. Overall, these results show that the experimental manipulation did not 
impact sentiments toward political parties and that this variable could be included in the main analyses. 
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threat, respectively, in the scenarios they saw (all ps < .01). Means and standard deviations for 
the perception of economic, natural and social threats per condition are depicted in Table 5.9. 
 
Table 5.9  
Means and standard deviations for the perception of economic, natural and social threats in 
Study 3C 
Perception of threat Experimental stimuli M SD 
Economic 
Control 1.78 1.55 
Economic threat 9.03 1.13 
Natural threat 6.11 3.60 
Social threat 7.48 1.34 
Natural 
Control 3.19 2.70 
Economic threat 3.61 2.69 
Natural threat 9.71 .76 
Social threat 2.85 2.49 
Social 
Control 1.19 1.39 
Economic threat 6.97 2.69 
Natural threat 4.57 3.32 
Social threat 9.22 1.12 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. The highest means per type of perceived 
threat are presented in boldface. 
 
Conservative Shift versus Cultural Worldview Enhancement 
The first set of hypotheses focused on the effect of the experimental manipulation on 
political orientation, voting intention and political discourse preference. As before, the results 
for left/right and liberal/conservative orientations are presented first, followed by the results 
for voting intention and political discourse preference.  
Political orientation. Descriptive statistics for left/right and liberal/conservative 
orientations suggested that participants became generally more right-wing/conservative after 
seeing the threat scenarios (compared to the control scenario; see Table 5.10). 
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Table 5.10  
Means, standard deviations and frequencies for political conservatism across experimental 
conditions in Study 3C 
Condition 
Left/right  
orientation 
Liberal/conservative 
orientation 
Voting intention 
Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test Pre-test Post-test 
M SD M SD M SD M SD Fl Fc Fl Fc 
Control 3.48 1.69 3.19 1.33 3.00 1.70 2.81 1.08 7 6 6 7 
Economic threat 3.79 1.18 3.79 .56 3.17 1.10 3.31 .93 8 11 9 10 
Natural threat 2.96 1.22 3.19 .94 2.81 1.27 3.15 1.16 10 8 11 7 
Social threat 3.00 1.21 3.13 .97 2.83 1.23 3.30 1.22 6 9 6 9 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; Fl = Frequency liberal; Fc = Frequency conservative. 
 
Before conducting a mixed-design ANOVA to formally test H1 and H2 for left/right 
orientation, left/right orientation measured before the experiment was split into high and low 
groups, creating the variable pre-left/right categorisation.26 Then, the mixed-design ANOVA 
with left/right orientation (measured before and after the experiment) as a within-subjects 
factor and condition (economic threat, natural threat, social threat, control) and pre-left/right 
categorisation (left, right) as between-subjects factors was conducted.  
The between-subjects analysis revealed main effects of both pre-left/right 
categorisation and condition [F(1, 91) = 169.04, p < .001, ηp² = .65; F(3, 91) = 2.79, p = .045, 
ηp² = .08, respectively]. The interaction between these two variables was also significant, F(3, 
91) = 3.61, p = .016, ηp² = .11. The within-subjects analysis showed that these effects were 
qualified by an interaction between left/right orientation and pre-left/right categorisation, F(1, 
91) = 27.85, p < .001, ηp² = .23. Follow-up paired samples t-tests per pre-left/right 
categorisation showed that left-oriented participants (M = 2.13, SD = .81) became more right 
oriented after the experiment (M = 2.69, SD = .92), t(44) = -4.58, p < .001, d = .65, while 
right-oriented participants (M = 4.31, SD = .77) became less right oriented after the 
experiment (M = 3.91, SD = .62), t(53) = 3.25, p = .002, d = -.57.27 No other main effect or 
interaction was statistically significant (all ps ≥ .293). Overall, these results confirm neither 
                                                          
26 A median split was initially conducted, but this procedure yielded less than five participants in some cells 
when a mixed-design ANOVA was conducted. For this reason, left/right orientation measured before the 
experiment was split as to include participants with scores below the median as left and participants with scores 
equal or above the median as right. When a similar analysis was run with the new pre-left/right categorisation 
variable, there were five or more participants in all cells. 
27 Levene’s test of equality of error variance was significant for left/right orientation measured before and after 
the experiment. 
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the hypothesis of conservative shift (H1) nor the hypothesis of cultural worldview 
enhancement (H2) for left/right orientation.28 
A similar mixed-design ANOVA was also conducted to test H1 and H2 for 
liberal/conservative orientation. Before conducting this analysis, liberal/conservative 
orientation measured before the experiment was split by the median into two groups, creating 
the variable pre-liberal/conservative categorisation. Then, a mixed-design ANOVA with 
liberal/conservative orientation (measured before and after the experiment) as a within-
subjects factor and condition (economic threat, natural threat, social threat, control) and pre-
liberal/conservative categorisation (liberal, conservative) as between-subjects factors was 
conducted.  
The between-subjects analysis revealed a main effect of pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation and an interaction effect of condition and pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation [F(1, 91) = 188.87, p < .001, ηp² = .67; F(3, 91) = 2.47, p = .067, ηp² = .08, 
respectively]. The within-subjects analysis revealed that these effects were qualified by a 
significant interaction between liberal/conservative orientation and pre-liberal/conservative 
categorisation, F(1, 91) = 17.80, p < .001, ηp² = .16.29 Follow-up paired samples t-tests per 
pre-liberal/conservative categorisation showed that liberal participants (M = 2.04, SD = .82) 
became significantly more conservative after the experiment (M = 2.58, SD = .94), t(56) = - 
4.34, p < .001, d = .61, while conservative participants (M = 4.21, SD = .61) became 
marginally less conservative after the experiment (M = 3.95, SD = .73), t(41) = 1.92, p = .062, 
d = -.39.  
The within-subjects analysis also revealed that the interaction between 
liberal/conservative orientation and condition was marginally significant, F(3, 91) = 2.24, p = 
.089, ηp² = .07. Follow-up paired samples t-tests per condition showed that participants who 
saw the natural and social threat scenarios became more conservative after the experiment 
[Mpre = 2.81, SDpre = 1.27, and Mpost = 3.15, SDpost = 1.16, t(25) = -2.37, p = .026, d = .28; 
Mpre = 2.83, SDpre = 1.23, and Mpost = 3.30, SDpost = 1.22, t(22) = -2.42, p = .024, d = .38, 
respectively]. The variation between liberal/conservative orientation measured before and 
                                                          
28 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. The only differences were that the effect of condition was not significant (p = .471) and the 
interaction between left/right orientation and condition was marginally significant, F(1, 95) = 3.02, p = .085, ηp² 
= .03. Follow-up paired samples t-tests per condition did not show any significant effect (both ps ≥ .267). 
29 Levene’s test of equality of error variance was significant for liberal/conservative orientation measured before 
the experiment. However, when the largest variance was divided by the smallest variance between conditions, 
the value was just slightly above two – the cut-off value for safely confirming the hypothesis of homogeneity of 
variance (Field, 2009). 
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after the experiment was not significant in the economic threat (p = .489) and control (p = 
.463) conditions.  
No other main effect or interaction was statistically significant (all ps ≥ .154). Overall, 
these results provide more support for the hypothesis of conservative shift (H1) than for the 
hypothesis of cultural worldview enhancement (H2) for liberal/conservative orientation.30 
According to the results, the natural and social threat scenarios made participants more 
conservatively oriented. However, this effect was only marginally significant and small in 
terms of effect size.  
Voting intention and political discourse preference. When considering voting 
intention, Pearson’s chi-square tests showed significant effects for all four experimental 
scenarios [χ²(1, N = 65) = 53.597, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .91], as well as for each specific 
scenario: economic threat [χ²(1, N = 19) = 15.354, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .90], natural threat 
[χ²(1, N = 18) = 14.318, p < .001, Cramér’s V = .89], social threat [χ²(1, N = 15) = 15.000, p < 
.001, Cramér’s V = 1.00], and control scenario [χ²(1, N = 13) = 9.551, p = .005, Cramér’s V = 
.86]. However, the cross-tabulation table suggested again no significant change in voting 
intention across conditions after the experimental manipulation (see Table 5.10).  
When considering political discourse preference, the Pearson chi-square test 
evaluating the hypothesis of conservative shift (H1) was non-significant (p = .117). As in 
Study 3B, the conservative shift hypothesis (H1) was not supported when considering voting 
intention and political discourse preference.31 
Dual-process Mediation of the Impact of Societal Threat on Political Conservatism 
As in Studies 3A and 3B, this section explores the possibility of an indirect effect of 
societal threat on political conservatism via world beliefs and socio-political attitudes (H3). 
Differences in world beliefs and socio-political attitudes across scenarios. Table 
5.11 presents the means and standard deviations for competitive and dangerous worldviews, 
RWA and SDO per condition.  
 
 
 
                                                          
30 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. In addition, paired samples t-tests were conducted to investigate the two-way interaction between 
liberal/conservative orientation and condition. This additional analysis showed that only participants seeing one 
of the threatening stimuli became more conservative after the experimental manipulation [Mpre = 2.95, SDpre = 
1.19, and Mpost = 3.26, SDpost = 1.09, t(77) = - 2.92, p = .005, d = .27]. 
31 The same pattern of results was observed when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions. 
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Table 5.11  
Means and standard deviations per experimental condition for variables included in Duckitt’s 
DPM model (2001) in Study 3C 
Dependent variables 
Control 
Economic 
threat 
Natural 
threat 
Social 
threat ANOVA 
F 
M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Competitive 
worldview (Duckitt 
et al., 2002) 
2.44 .57 2.64 .90 2.24 0.75 2.63 .60 1.96 
Dangerous 
worldview (Duckitt 
et al., 2002) 
3.64a .83 4.32a .87 4.08 1.06 4.13 .70 3.10* 
Right-wing 
authoritarianism 
-.76 1.29 -1.11 1.22 -1.15 .97 -.78 .87 1.01 
Social dominance 
orientation 
2.74 .72 3.06 1.14 2.76 .88 3.29 .81 2.29† 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. *p < .05; † p < .10. Means with similar superscripts differ 
significantly (p < .05). 
 
One-way ANOVAs showed non-significant effects of experimental condition on 
competitive worldview (p = .124) and RWA (p = .393). In addition, the impact of condition 
on SDO was only marginally significant, F(3, 111) = 2.29, p = .082, ηp² = .06, while the 
impact of condition on dangerous worldview was statistically significant, F(3, 111) = 3.10, p 
= .030, ηp² = .08. Follow-up Bonferroni post-hoc tests did not show any differences across 
conditions for SDO (all ps ≥ .174), but showed that dangerous world beliefs were 
significantly higher in the economic threat condition than in the control condition (p = .021). 
The significant differences between experimental conditions are further discussed considering 
the DPM model below. 
Indirect effects of the scenarios on political conservatism: Mediational path 
model. Following the criteria described in Study 3A, path analysis models with maximum 
likelihood estimation were computed. Given that the sample size for each of the four 
experimental conditions varied from 26 to 31 participants, the present study could not explore 
further the differences between the four conditions in a stable fashion. Therefore, as in Studies 
3A and 3B, the path analysis focused on the comparison between the control condition and 
the grouped threat conditions. The control (0) versus the grouped threat (1) condition was 
used as a dichotomous exogenous variable in this analysis. 
Preliminary independent samples t-tests comparing the control to the grouped threat 
conditions revealed non-significant effects of condition on competitive worldview (p = .659), 
RWA (p = .290) and SDO (p = .152). However, a significant effect of condition on dangerous 
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worldview was detected, t(113) = -2.85, p = .005, d = .64, with participants who saw the 
grouped threat scenarios (M = 4.19, SD = .88) perceiving the world as more dangerous than 
participants who saw the control scenario (M = 3.64, SD = .83). Thus, the path analysis model 
investigating the indirect effect of societal threat on political conservatism was credible. 
Similarly to Studies 3A and 3B, an initial model was run including all predicted paths 
from the DPM model (Sibley & Duckitt, 2009) and direct paths from societal threat to world 
beliefs, socio-political attitudes and political conservatism. The non-significant paths were 
excluded and additional paths included based on modification indices. Table 5.12 shows the 
model fit indices for the final models.  
 
Table 5.12 
Model fit indices for the path analysis models including societal threat, world beliefs, socio-
political attitudes and political conservatism in Study 3C 
Model Χ2 df Χ2/df CFI sRMR 
RMSEA 
(90%CI) 
Left/right orientation 13.39 9 1.49 .95 .078 
.067  
(.000 ≤ .136) 
Liberal/conservative 
orientation 
8.22 7 1.17 .98 .055 
.040  
(.000 ≤ .128) 
Voting intention 10.25 8 1.28 .97 .058 
.051  
(.000 ≤ .129) 
Political discourse 
preference 
8.51 9 .95 1.00 .054 
.000  
(.000 ≤ .103) 
Note. Χ2 = value of the chi-square test statistic; df = degrees of freedom; Χ2/df = value of the chi-square 
test statistic divided by the number of degrees of freedom; CFI = comparative fit index; sRMR = 
standardized root mean square residual; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; 90% CI = 
90% confidence interval. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.5, the grouped threat conditions (compared to the control 
condition) increased political conservatism via dangerous world beliefs, RWA, and SDO.32 
Also, societal threat impacted directly only liberal/conservative orientation (as shown in 
previous analyses). Finally, only RWA predicted left/right and liberal/conservative 
orientations, only SDO predicted political discourse preference, and both RWA and SDO 
predicted voting intention. These results provide partial support for the dual-process 
                                                          
32 The statistically significant (p < .05) indirect effects of condition were as follows: RWA (βindirect effect = .05), 
SDO (βindirect effect = .01), left/right orientation (βindirect effect = .02), liberal/conservative orientation (βindirect effect 
= .02), voting intention (βindirect effect = .02) and political discourse preference (βindirect effect = .003). 
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mediation hypothesis (H3) and the differential impact of societal threat on political 
conservatism via some of the variables included in Duckitt’s (2001) DPM model.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5. Path analysis models of the associations between societal threat, world beliefs, 
socio-political attitudes and political conservatism in Study 3C. Only statistically significant 
paths (p < .05) are shown. 
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Activation of Authoritarianism by Social Threat  
Similarly to Studies 3A and 3B, a moderated path analysis model showed a non-
significant effect of the interaction term pre-RWA × social threat on dangerous world beliefs 
(β = -.70, p = .199).33 This result does not provide any evidence for the differential impact of 
social threat on high and low authoritarians (H4). 
 
Discussion 
Investigating further the relationship between societal threat and political conservatism 
with an experiment conducted in a lab and with visual stimuli, four main findings were 
observed in the present study: (1) the societal threat manipulation enhanced political 
conservatism directly (as indexed by liberal/conservative orientation), (2) the societal threat 
manipulation did not enhance the prior political orientation of the participants, (3) the indirect 
effect of the societal threat manipulation on political conservatism via variables included in 
the DPM model was only partially confirmed – societal threat (mainly economic threat) 
differently impacted dangerous world beliefs in analyses of variance, and exploratory path 
analysis models showed that societal threat enhanced political conservatism via dangerous 
world beliefs, RWA and/or SDO, and (4) RWA measured before the experiment and the 
social threat manipulation did not interact in predicting dangerous world beliefs. Overall, the 
results show some interesting experimental effects in the predicted direction. Next, we present 
the general discussion for Study 3.  
 
General Discussion for Study 3 
The extant literature has suggested a link between threatening situations and political 
conservatism, although it is not clear how these variables are connected. In order to clarify 
these relationships, three experimental studies were conducted using different methodologies. 
Overall, the three experiments suggested more support for the conservative shift (H1) than for 
the cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis (H2). Additionally, the indirect effects of 
societal threat on political conservatism via some of the variables in the DPM model were 
                                                          
33 A similar analysis including only participants with scores in the first or fourth quartiles of pre-RWA was also 
performed. The analysis considering these extreme low and extreme high pre-RWA scores yielded a similar 
result (β = -.52, p = .441). For completeness, an additional analysis including SDO measured before the 
experiment was also performed to test the possibility that pre-SDO would interact with the economic threat 
manipulation, affecting competitive worldview. The effect of the interaction term pre-SDO × economic threat 
was also non-significant (β = .10, p = .828). 
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observed in two of the three studies (H3). Finally, the interaction between RWA measured 
before the experiment and the social threat manipulation did not impact dangerous world 
beliefs in any of the studies (H4). These findings are discussed in more detail below. 
Limitations of the experimental studies and direction for further studies will be discussed in 
detail in the final chapter of the thesis. 
Conservative Shift versus Cultural Worldview Enhancement 
The hypothesis of conservative shift (H1; Jost et al., 2003b) predicted that participants 
would become more politically conservative after the threat manipulation. On the other hand, 
the related hypothesis of cultural worldview enhancement (H2; Burke et al., 2013) predicted 
that only participants who were already conservative would become more conservative after 
the threat manipulation. Overall, the studies presented in this chapter provided more support 
for the conservative shift than for the cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis, although 
this support was limited to a marginally significant effect for liberal/conservative orientation 
in Study 3C.  
This marginally significant effect showed that participants in the natural and social 
threat (but not in the economic threat and control) conditions became more conservative after 
the experiment. Additionally, when the control condition was compared to the grouped threat 
conditions, the same effect was observed. Compared to participants in the control condition, 
participants in the grouped threat conditions became more conservative after the experimental 
manipulation.  
These results suggest that economic, natural and social threats have different effects, 
with only the natural and social threat manipulations impacting liberal/conservative political 
orientation. This distinct impact of the threat types could be linked to the cross-sectional 
findings of Study 1. We observed in that study that liberal/conservative orientation was more 
strongly influenced by RWA (which according to the DPM model should be impacted more 
strongly by social threatening situations), which support the stronger influence of the social 
threat manipulation on liberal/conservative orientation when compared to the economic threat 
manipulation. No specific predictions were made for the natural threat manipulation, but its 
influence on liberal/conservative orientation might be linked to findings indicating a strong 
effect of natural threat situations on RWA (Fritsche, et al., 2012). 
Some support for the conservative shift hypothesis was only observed in Study 3C, 
which was the only experimental study including pictorial stimuli. It is possible that stronger 
experimental manipulations including images would confirm this hypothesis in a broader 
sense also for other political conservatism variables. Given that pictorial stimuli is better 
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recalled than words (McBride & Dosher, 2002; Shepard, 1967), future studies should focus on 
using stronger images to evoke threatening situations, respecting the appropriate ethical 
guidelines. 
There was also another consistent effect (albeit only statistically significant in Study 
3B) observed in the analyses reported in the present chapter. Liberal-oriented participants 
became significantly more conservative after the experiment in the economic and social threat 
conditions. On the other hand, conservative-oriented participants became marginally less 
conservative after the experiment also in the economic and social threat conditions. These 
results suggest exactly the opposite of what should be expected according to the cultural 
worldview enhancement hypothesis – that societal threat would enhance participants’ prior 
political view. Therefore, it was expected that only participants with already high levels of 
conservatism would become more conservative after the experimental manipulation.  
This unexpected effect was somewhat consistent not only for liberal/conservative 
orientation but also for left/right orientation. Indeed, although not statistically significant, this 
pattern of results appears in 44 out of the 48 analyses across all experimental conditions and 
studies. That is, left/liberal-oriented participants became significantly more right-
wing/conservative while right-wing/conservative-oriented participants became less right-
wing/conservative (as depicted in the two-way interactions between left/right orientation and 
pre-left/right categorisation and between liberal/conservative orientation and pre-
liberal/conservative categorisation). One possible explanation for this pattern of results is 
regression toward the mean. Here participants with higher scores in any of the dependent 
variables will lower their scores in a subsequent measurement, while participants with lower 
scores will increase their scores. We expected that the experimental manipulation would 
override this statistical phenomenon, but the pattern of findings suggest this was not 
accomplished. Again, this suggests that stronger threat manipulations are required. 
Previous literature considering mainly archival data and proxy measures of political 
conservatism (e.g. conversion to authoritarian churches) has provided support for both the 
hypotheses of conservative shift (Jost et al., 2003b) and cultural worldview enhancement 
(Burke et al., 2013). The limited effects presented in the present research (in particular the 
opposite effects regarding H2) might be understood in terms of the experimental nature of the 
studies. It is possible that political orientation only changes consistently after enduring 
periods of societal threat, and not after experimental manipulation. Hence, although able to 
detect causal relationships more reliably (Spencer et al., 2005), experimental studies might 
not be the best option when evaluating political orientation change. Despite this consideration, 
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we still believe experimental designs should be able to detect the impact of threatening 
situation on political orientations (e.g. see Duckitt & Fisher, 2003), but that the experimental 
manipulation might need to be stronger in order to induce the effect as tentatively shown in 
Study 3C. 
At the same time, no consistent overall pattern was observed across the dependent 
variables (left/right orientation, liberal/conservative orientation, voting intention and political 
discourse preference), even though they are all positively correlated. This observation 
suggests it might be too simplistic to expect that the dependent variables considered are 
organised in a single continuum of liberal-conservativeness that could be used to explain 
alone conservative shift. Past studies have already contested the traditional left/right or 
liberal/conservative continuum by showing that political orientation should include at least 
economic and social dimensions (e.g. Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Jost et al., 2009). Likewise, 
although these dimensions have been treated as similar constructs in the literature (Jost et al., 
2009) and are often strongly correlated, the observed distinct effects on left/right and 
liberal/conservative orientations suggest that these variables enclose a few distinct aspects of 
political conservatism. In addition, scholars have also posited that the positions each political 
party would take on particular issues is determined by the number of cultural, attitudinal and 
political cleavages existing in the country (e.g. socioeconomic class, post-materialism, 
ethnicity, economic interventionism and social conservatism; Nagel, 1994). Future 
experimental studies should take these suggestions into consideration. 
Dual-Process Mediation of the Impact of Societal Threat on Political Conservatism 
The dual-process mediation hypothesis (H3; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003) predicted that 
world beliefs (competitive and dangerous) and socio-political attitudes (RWA and SDO) 
would differentially mediate the impact of the societal threat manipulation on political 
conservatism. More specifically, it tested whether economic and social threats (compared to 
the control condition) impacted political conservatism via different paths of the DPM model 
(Duckitt, 2001). This hypothesis was tested with preliminary analyses of variance, followed 
by path analysis models.  
Overall, only scores on competitive and dangerous world beliefs varied across 
conditions in analyses of variance. In five of the seven significantly or marginally significant 
comparisons, participants in the economic or social threat conditions perceived the world as 
more competitive or dangerous than participants in the control condition. More specifically, 
participants in the economic or social threat conditions perceived the world as more 
dangerous than participants in the control condition in four of the comparisons, and 
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participants in the social threat condition perceived the world as more competitive than 
participants in the control condition in one of the comparisons.  
The results only supported H3A partially by showing that participants in the social 
threat condition perceived the world as more dangerous than participants in the control 
condition. The absence of significant differences in the perception of the world as competitive 
and dangerous between the economic and social threat conditions might suggest that both 
world beliefs are impacted by economic and social threats (see Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). It 
also might suggest that, overall, these types of threat impact dangerous (and not competitive) 
world beliefs to a major extent (see Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). That both economic and social 
threat impact more strongly dangerous than competitive world beliefs resonates with 
evolutionary psychology accounts of human reaction to threatening situations. When 
experiencing threatening events there is a necessity of a rapid response/action toward fighting 
or fleeing the threat (Öhman, 1997), and the perception of the world as dangerous might be 
more adaptive, pressing and fast in eliciting prompt reactions to threat than the perception of 
the world as competitive.  
In general, the analyses of variance also showed that participants in both the control 
and the natural threat conditions perceived the world as less competitive than participants in 
the economic and social threat conditions. These results might suggest that natural threat is 
perceived as a more mild type of threat than economic and social threats. On the other hand, 
this could be alternatively explained by the location in which the data were collected. The 
data were collected in a city located in an earthquake-generating tectonic collision zone, and 
where residents already expect the occurrence of earthquakes (one of the natural hazards 
depicted in the natural threat condition; see McClure et al., 2015). This means that the natural 
threat manipulation might have been less efficient in residents of this city compared to 
residents from other cities, and that the economic and social threat conditions might have had 
a greater impact. Given that past research has shown an increase on authoritarianism in 
response to a specific type of natural threat (e.g. climate change; Fritsche, et al., 2012), further 
exploration of the role of natural threat in impacting conservatism is needed. 
Moving on to the path models, the results showed a consistent indirect effect of 
societal threat on political conservatism in two of the three studies, albeit the strength of this 
indirect effect was only weak. In particular, societal threat (compared to the control condition) 
increased political conservatism via competitive world beliefs and RWA in Study 3A, and 
increased political conservatism via dangerous world beliefs, RWA and/or SDO in Study 3C. 
Societal threat impacted directly only liberal/conservative orientation in Study 3C. Overall, 
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these results provide support for the mediated impact of societal threat on political 
conservatism via DPM model variables (e.g. Duckitt & Fisher, 2003).  
Regarding the particular mediators, the results showed some consistency for RWA, 
which acted as the main mediator in these models. This result supports the important role of 
authoritarianism in underpinning political conservatism (Wilson & Sibley, 2013) as well as its 
importance for understanding the effect of societal threat (Duckitt, 2013). This consistent 
mediation role of RWA would suggest a similar mediation role for dangerous world beliefs, 
following the DPM model. However, the mediation role of dangerous (and also competitive) 
world beliefs varied across studies. While dangerous world beliefs mediated the impact of 
societal threat on political conservatism in Study 3C, competitive world beliefs mediated the 
impact of societal threat on political conservatism in Study 3A. Perhaps the type of measure 
used to access world beliefs can explain these differences.  
Study 3A included the measure proposed by Perry and Sibley (2010) in the main 
analyses and Study 3C included the measure proposed by Sibley et al. (2007) in the main 
analyses. While competitive mean scores were higher than dangerous mean scores when the 
Perry and Sibley measure was used [t(209) = 10.66, p < .001], the opposite pattern was 
observed when the Sibley et al. measure was used [t(110) = -22.61, p < .001]. It is possible 
that this observed effect could have contributed for competitive world beliefs to act as the 
mediator in Study 3A and for dangerous world beliefs to act as the mediator in Study 3C. 
Another point worth noting is the strength of the difference between the mean 
perception of the world as dangerous in the grouped threat condition and in the control 
condition in Studies 3B and 3C. Both studies used the same world beliefs measure but varied 
in the type of experimental manipulation used. The strength of the difference in the scores of 
dangerous world beliefs was stronger in the experiment using pictorial stimuli (Study 3C) 
than in the study using textual stimuli (Study 3B). Given that images have been shown to be 
better recalled than words, this result was as expected (McBride & Dosher, 2002; Shepard, 
1967).  
In conclusion, only a limited number of studies have investigated the mechanism 
underlying the impact of societal threat on political conservatism (but see Duckitt & Fisher, 
2003). In this sense, the differences in the mediation of the effect of societal threat on political 
conservatism by world beliefs and socio-political attitudes should be explored in future 
studies. Moreover, only a limited number of studies have investigated the association between 
societal threat and political conservatism experimentally. The present research advances the 
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area by showing that societal threat enhances political conservatism via variables in the DPM 
model.  
Activation of Authoritarianism by Social Threat  
Finally, the hypothesis of activation of authoritarianism by social threat (H4; Feldman 
& Stenner, 1997) predicted that the interaction between RWA measured before the 
experiment and the social threat manipulation (compared to the control manipulation) would 
enhance dangerous world beliefs. None of the interaction terms between RWA measured 
before the experiment and the social threat manipulation were significant in predicting 
dangerous world beliefs. These results support the non-significant interaction reported by 
Duckitt and Fisher (2003). Experimental evidence provided in the present research and by 
Duckitt and Fisher suggests that the previous level of authoritarianism does not influence 
individuals’ reaction to threatening scenarios.  
The impact of the interaction between authoritarianism and threat on other variables 
has been discussed and tested empirically in the literature for some time now, but the 
prevalence of this effect is yet to be confirmed (McCann, 2009). The theme even deserved a 
special edition in the International Journal of Psychology (Duckitt, 2013). As observed by one 
of the key authors in the field, threat has been sometimes conceived as a moderator of the 
impact of authoritarianism on other variables (as tested in our H4), and sometimes it has been 
conceived as the predictor of other variables independent of pre-existing levels of 
authoritarianism (Feldman, 2013). Overall, the accumulated evidence in the present studies 
showed that societal threat increased directly liberal/conservative orientation (H1), that 
societal threat increased indirectly political conservatism via variables in the DPM model 
(H3), and that RWA did not interact with social threat in the prediction of dangerous world 
beliefs (H4). 
A limitation of the overall findings regarding H4 is that the levels of authoritarianism 
measured before the experiment were not especially high in the three studies presented in this 
chapter (see Appendices I, K and O for further information), which might have limited the 
possible interaction between RWA and social threat in the present research and also in the 
undergraduate sample considered in Duckitt and Fisher (2003). In particular, the levels of 
RWA measured before the experimental manipulation were below the scale middle point in 
Studies 3A, 3B and 3C [t(74) = -8.43, p < .001; t(62) = -9.22, p < .001; t(43) = -6.67, p < 
.001, respectively]. Maybe with a more representative sample from the authoritarianism 
spectrum, the predicted interaction could have emerged. 
Next, we present the general discussion for the present thesis. 
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This thesis had the main goal of providing a systematic evaluation of how societal 
threat impacts political conservatism, as indexed by political orientation, voting intention and 
political discourse preference. Alongside this main goal, the thesis also had the secondary 
goal of evaluating whether or not different types of societal threat – namely economic, natural 
and social threats – impact differentially political conservatism. In order to achieve the main 
and secondary goals, seven empirical studies were conducted. The first four empirical studies 
provided the grounding empirical basis for the last three experimental studies testing four 
specific hypotheses targeting the relationship between societal threat and political 
conservatism. 
The experimental studies tested first whether participants became more conservative 
after the threat manipulation (conservative shift hypothesis, H1; Jost et al., 2003b) or whether 
only participants who had high levels of conservatism before the threat manipulation became 
more conservative after it (cultural worldview enhancement hypothesis, H2; Burke et al., 
2013). After testing these two main hypotheses, the experimental studies moved on to test a 
mediation hypothesis and a moderation hypothesis. The mediation hypothesis focused on 
whether societal threat impacted political conservatism indirectly via world beliefs and socio-
political attitudes as proposed in the dual-process motivational (DPM) model (dual-process 
mediation hypothesis, H3; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003). Moreover and in line with the DPM 
model, the studies also tested whether participants assigned to the social threat condition 
(compared to the economic threat and control conditions) scored significantly higher on 
dangerous world beliefs and RWA (H3A), and whether participants assigned to the economic 
threat condition (compared to the social threat and control conditions) scored significantly 
higher on competitive world beliefs and SDO (H3B). Finally, the moderation hypothesis 
focused on whether the interaction between previous levels of RWA and social threat 
impacted dangerous world beliefs (activation of authoritarianism by social threat hypothesis, 
H4; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). In the following, we provide an overview of the seven 
empirical studies and the findings of the experimental test of the four hypotheses. 
Overview of Research Findings 
Duckitt’s DPM model and the prediction of voting intention and political 
orientation. The first study included in this thesis relied on a secondary dataset enclosing 
2,884 New Zealanders: (1) to test an expanded DPM model including the big-five personality 
Chapter 6: General Discussion for the Thesis 
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traits following the model observed in Sibley and Duckitt (2009); and (2) to test whether this 
model could predict political conservatism as indexed by voting intention and political 
orientation. The findings showed that a modified model provided better fit to the data than the 
model reported by Sibley and Duckitt (2009). Different from their model, the best-fitting 
model for our data excluded three paths (i.e. extraversion  dangerous worldview, 
agreeableness  SDO, and emotional stability  RWA) and included three new paths (i.e. 
emotional stability  SDO, dangerous worldview  SDO, and extraversion  RWA). 
Despite these minor distinctions, the only path theoretically predicted that was not found in 
our study was the path from agreeableness to SDO. In our study, agreeableness only impacted 
SDO indirectly. 
The modified model was then tested in predicting voting intention and political 
orientation. The final models presented moderate fit to the data and adequately predicted the 
dependent variables. The only distinction among the models was that SDO predicted voting 
intention and left/right orientation more strongly than RWA, while RWA predicted 
liberal/conservative orientation more strongly than SDO. The overall results from Study 1 
showed that world beliefs (dangerous and competitive) and socio-political attitudes (RWA 
and SDO) explained political conservatism, suggesting that they could be considered as 
mediators of the impact of societal threat on political conservatism in further experimental 
studies. 
Threat manipulation design. Three studies were then conducted in order to design 
experimental stimuli for the last three experimental studies. First, Study 2A investigated the 
psychological meanings of economic, natural and social threats among 78 Pākehā New 
Zealanders (Figueroa, González, & Solís, 1981; Reyes-Lagunes, 1993). The descriptions used 
to elicit the psychological meaning of economic and social threats were based on descriptions 
of competitive and dangerous world beliefs provided by Perry and Sibley (2010). Results 
indicated 12 meaningful words/expressions for social threat, 18 for economic threat, and five 
for natural threat. Among these, only “war” was evoked by more than one type of societal 
threat (i.e. social and economic threats), and therefore not considered in subsequent studies. 
Additionally, the frequency of words/expressions elicited by natural and social threats was 
statistically higher than the frequency of words/expressions elicited by economic threat. These 
results suggest that participants had more difficulty in attributing meaning to economic threat 
compared to the other threat types, and that this type of societal threat includes a broad range 
of concepts not so tightly related to its meaning. 
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Building on these results, Study 2B had the goal of validating textual experimental 
stimulus. This study relied on answers from 181 Pākehā New Zealanders and used 
experimental scenarios based on those used by Duckitt and Fisher (2003). More specifically, 
participants were assigned randomly to one of four scenarios (control, economic threat, 
natural threat or social threat) and answered questions related to the given scenario. The 
results showed that participants who read the economic, natural and social threat scenarios 
identified more economic, natural and social threat, respectively, in the scenarios they read. 
However, when it was investigated whether or not voting intention and left/right and 
liberal/conservative orientations varied across conditions, no significant differences were 
observed. Still, given that the different scenarios were perceived differently, the scenarios 
were considered in subsequent experimental studies without further amendments. 
Study 2C then validated images to be used as pictorial experimental stimulus in a 
further experimental study. This study relied on answers from 40 Pākehā New Zealanders to 
select images characterizing economic, natural and social threats. The participants also 
evaluated images characterizing New Zealand’s natural geography to be used in the control 
stimulus. Except for the image selected for “money”, all the other images elicited more 
negative than positive emotions. Based on three different criteria, 17 images were selected per 
type of societal threat and control conditions. 
The impact of threatening scenarios on political conservatism. Three experimental 
studies were then conducted in order to formally test the four specific hypotheses described 
previously. As a secondary goal, the experimental studies also evaluated whether economic, 
natural and social threats differentially impact political conservatism. Study 3A was 
completed online with textual stimuli, Study 3B was completed in a lab with textual stimuli, 
and Study 3C was completed in a lab with pictorial stimuli. These studies included 142, 121 
and 99 Pākehā New Zealander undergraduate students, respectively. Supporting the 
experimental manipulation, participants generally identified more economic, natural and 
social threat when seeing the economic, natural and social threat scenarios, respectively. The 
only exception was for participants in the economic threat condition in Study 3A who 
identified only marginally more economic threat than participants reading the social threat 
scenario. 
Only the results from Study 3C (using pictorial experimental stimulus) provided some 
confirmation for H1 (conservative shift hypothesis; Jost et al., 2003b) over H2 (cultural 
worldview enhancement hypothesis; Burke et al., 2013). More specifically, there was a 
marginally significant effect of the experimental manipulation on liberal/conservative 
  
116 
 
orientation, with participants tending to become more conservative after seeing the natural 
and social threat scenarios. Importantly and confirming H1, the effect was significant when 
comparing the control condition with the grouped threat conditions, with participants in the 
grouped threat conditions becoming more conservative while those in the control condition 
did not shift their political orientation. 
Surprisingly, Study 3B showed the exact opposite pattern of results that would be 
expected according to H2. Participants categorised as liberal before the experiment became 
significantly more conservative after reading the economic or social threat scenarios, while 
participants categorised as conservative became marginally more liberal after reading the 
same scenarios. Although this unexpected effect was not significant in other studies (or even 
when considering left/right orientation), the same pattern of results was observed across all 
three experiments when considering both liberal/conservative and left/right orientations and 
different experimental conditions. 
Some support was observed for H3 (dual-process mediation hypothesis; Duckitt & 
Fisher, 2003). First, the results partially confirmed H3A by showing that participants in the 
social threat condition perceived the world as more dangerous than participants in the control 
condition. Overall, the results also showed that participants in the social or economic threat 
conditions scored higher on competitive and/or dangerous world beliefs than participants in 
the control condition. Higher scores on competitive world beliefs were also observed in two 
of the experiments for participants in the social and economic threat conditions compared to 
participants in the natural threat condition. Second, path models showed that the impact of 
societal threat on political conservatism was mediated by world beliefs and socio-political 
attitudes in two of the experiments. While societal threat impacted political conservatism via 
competitive world beliefs and RWA in Study 3A, societal threat impacted political 
conservatism via dangerous world beliefs, RWA and/or SDO in Study 3C.  
Finally, moderated path models examined H4 (activation of authoritarianism by social 
threat hypothesis; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). The results showed no support for this 
hypothesis. High authoritarians were not more sensitive to social threat, and the pre-RWA × 
social threat interaction term did not impact dangerous world beliefs measured after the 
experimental manipulation. 
The seven empirical studies presented in this thesis contribute to the literature in a 
number of ways, and their findings were discussed in each of the specific chapters. Next, we 
discuss general theoretical contributions of the present thesis. 
Theoretical Contributions of the Thesis 
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The present thesis provides seven main theoretical contributions for the extant 
literature. The first contribution of this thesis was to provide a “conceptual map” of distinct 
but related predictions derived from the research area investigating the impact of threat on 
political conservatism. This conceptual map emerged from a number of distinct theoretical 
models and culminated on the explicit hypotheses tested in the present research. The 
frameworks of system justification theory (Jost & Banaji, 1994) and terror management 
theory (Rosenblatt et al., 1989) were both reviewed in order to formulate the two main 
competing hypotheses (i.e. conservative shift hypothesis, H1; cultural worldview 
enhancement hypothesis, H2, respectively).  
In addition, two different frameworks related to the mechanism underlying the impact 
of threat on political conservatism were also reviewed. The dual-process motivational model 
framework (Duckitt, 2001) led to the dual-process mediational hypothesis (H3), while the 
activation of authoritarianism by threat framework (Feldman & Stenner, 1997) led to the 
activation of authoritarianism by social threat hypothesis (H4). Whilst all these hypotheses are 
related, they had not been conceptually organised, integrated and considered jointly in 
previous studies (but see Huddy & Feldman, 2011). The present thesis identified the key 
predictions of these distinct theoretical traditions, and then elaborated, described and tested 
four hypotheses identified under these different frameworks. The conceptual map integrating 
theoretical arguments accessing the influence of threat on political conservatism is useful in 
guiding future research. 
The present research also extends past studies by experimentally examining the impact 
of societal threat on political conservatism. A number of studies have examined the impact of 
societal threat on political conservatism, but this impact has been studied mainly using 
archival data (e.g. Jost et al., 2003b). By developing and implementing three experiments with 
distinct methodologies, the present research provides a more systematic study of the threat–
political conservatism relation. In particular, the experimental design used in the present 
research complements the extant literature by testing hypotheses originated from correlational 
designs in a more controlled fashion, diminishing the impact of confounding variables. In this 
sense, the studies described in the present thesis advance the area by providing evidence that 
there is a limited but visible effect of societal threat on political conservatism in a more 
controlled experimental environment. In addition, the experimental studies described in the 
present thesis also complement past correlational studies by enabling arguments of causality. 
In this sense, we advance the research in the area by providing some experimental evidence 
that societal threat impacts political conservatism.  
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Another important theoretical contribution refers to the dependent variables 
considered in the present thesis. Past research has often focused on proxy measures of 
political conservatism such as conversion to authoritarian churches, authoritarian letters to 
newspaper editors or authoritarian comics (Jost et al., 2003b; Perrin, 2005; Peterson & 
Gerstein, 2005). Perrin (2005), for instance, examined letters to the editor published in 17 
different newspapers in the USA before and after the 9/11 terrorist attack, and found that 
letters published after the 9/11 attacks exhibited both more authoritarian and anti-authoritarian 
ideas than letters published before the attacks. In the present thesis, we advance past studies 
by using more direct and broad measures of political conservatism (i.e. left/right orientation, 
liberal/conservative orientation, voting intention and political discourse preference). Even 
though the impact of societal threat was not generalised across all the dependent variables in 
Study 3C (using pictorial stimuli), we believe that the limited impact of societal threat on 
political conservatism leads to important conclusions about the nature of political 
conservatism. More specifically, the impact of societal threat on political conservatism was 
limited to conservative orientation and not the other indicators. This result suggests that 
conservative orientation has a different meaning from right orientation, conservative voting 
intention and preference for conservative political discourse, even though these variables are 
intrinsically related (Jost et al., 2009).  
Additionally, the apparent lack of experimental impact on conservative voting 
intention and conservative political discourse preference might imply that these variables 
enclose more than the often assumed liberal–conservative continuum, enclosing also 
worldviews related to different cultural, attitudinal and political cleavages (e.g. 
socioeconomic class, post materialism, ethnicity, economic interventionism, and social 
conservatism; Nagel, 1994). This might explain why researchers have mainly examined 
preference for different conservative policies and other proxy measures but not conservative 
voting per se in previous studies (Burke et al., 2013; Jost et al., 2003b). Another alternative 
explanation for the apparent lack of experimental effect on conservative voting intention 
across studies might be that some political variables might be less changeable by 
experimental manipulation than others, being perhaps more impacted by factors in place long 
before the experiment. Indeed, longitudinal studies have shown that conservative orientation 
can be formed at young age and is associated, for instance, to authoritarian parenting attitudes 
and psychological characteristics in early childhood (Block & Block, 2006; Fraley, Griffin, 
Belsky, & Roisman, 2012). Studies have also shown an association between political attitudes 
and genome characteristics (Jost & Amodio, 2012).  
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A fourth important theoretical contribution of the present thesis was to provide 
empirical support for the role of variables in the DPM model as mediators of the impact of 
societal threat on political conservatism (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). 
The model tested in the present thesis was based on previous theoretical and empirical work 
showing that (1) different social contexts (threatening and competitive-jungle) differentially 
impact world beliefs (dangerous and competitive) and socio-political attitudes (RWA and 
SDO) (e.g. Duckitt & Fisher, 2003), and (2) that different social contexts, world beliefs and 
socio-political attitudes could impact differentially right-wing politics (e.g. Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010). By testing the impact of societal threat on political conservatism via world beliefs and 
socio-political attitudes, our studies showed that societal threat impacts political conservatism 
mainly indirectly via these variables and not directly. Based on the present results, we argue 
that the DPM model is a parsimonious framework to test the impact of societal threat on 
political conservatism by integrating the “real world” (societal threat) to the “perceived 
world” (world beliefs), and integrating these to the main factors enclosed by political 
conservatism (RWA and SDO) and political conservatism per se. Parsimonious and 
measurable models for the impact of societal threat on political conservatism such as the 
DPM model should be preferred rather than integrative but too large models that might be 
untestable (see Jost et al., 2003b).  
Additionally, the experimental studies presented in this thesis also support the 
meaningful role of both dangerous world beliefs and RWA in mediating the impact of societal 
threat on political conservatism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, RWA has been the variable most 
studied alongside threat when examining conservative orientation. Authoritarianism has also 
been recognized as an important variable for the understanding of reactions toward threat, 
although the nature of this relationship is still unclear (see Altemeyer, 2006; Feldman & 
Stenner, 1997). Thus, given the close relationship between RWA and dangerous world beliefs 
in the DPM model, the mediational role of these two variables on the impact of societal threat 
on political conservatism was as expected, highlighting their importance in explaining the 
impact of societal threat on political conservatism.  
Also noteworthy is that our results might imply that dangerous world beliefs and 
RWA are more important when reacting to societal threat than competitive world beliefs and 
SDO. In this sense, dangerous world beliefs and RWA might have evolutionary advantages 
when reacting to threat. From an evolutionary psychology standpoint, fighting or fleeing 
threat is adaptive for survival (Öhman, 1997). Our results show that the threat manipulation 
had a more consistent impact on dangerous world beliefs (with a subsequent impact on 
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RWA). In this sense, perceiving the world as dangerous appears to be the mechanism by 
which a threatening situation is processed to culminate in the behavioural response to flight or 
flee. 
A fifth theoretical contribution refers to the test of the activation of authoritarianism 
by threat (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). The contradictory relationship between threat and 
authoritarianism has been discussed for many years in the literature (Feldman, 2013). While 
some researchers argue that threat impacts other variables irrespective of people’s prior level 
of authoritarianism, other researchers argue that people who score highly on authoritarianism 
are more prone to react and be impacted by threat (Feldman, 2013; Feldman & Stenner, 
1997). Given the conflicting ways in which the relationship between authoritarianism and 
threat has been studied, this thesis also tried to resolve this impasse experimentally by testing 
the differential effect of the interaction between pre-RWA× social threat on dangerous world 
beliefs. In agreement with results reported in Duckitt and Fisher (2003), the present research 
did not support the activation of authoritarianism by threat. This suggests that threat might 
induce political conservatism irrespective of prior levels of authoritarianism. At the same 
time, it is still possible that this lack of significant interaction in predicting dangerous world 
beliefs resulted from the type of threat manipulation used. In both the present study and in the 
study by Duckitt and Fischer (2003), societal threat (and not subjective perceptions of 
external threat) was considered (but see also Hastings & Shaffer, 2005). On the other hand, 
Feldman and Stenner (1997), the precursors of the activation of authoritarianism by threat 
hypothesis, considered participants’ subjective perception of threat evoked by societally 
threatening situations. This suggests that the inconclusive relationship between threat and 
authoritarianism might be a result of the differential focus on societal threat versus subjective 
perceptions of external threat (see also Kossowska et al., 2011). That subjective perception 
might be more important in the interaction with authoritarianism is related to a previous 
model suggesting that perceived control in the face of threat can be more important than threat 
itself (Fritsche et al., 2011). In particular, these authors argued that perceived control is more 
meaningful than threat per se in impacting ethnocentric tendencies. 
A sixth important theoretical contribution of the present thesis is the systematic 
evaluation of the impact of different types of societal threat (i.e. economic threat, natural 
threat and social threat) on political conservatism. Previous research has mainly included 
aggregated indicators of societal threat based on economic, social and political indicators or 
expert opinions (Jost et al., 2003b). In addition, the impact of natural threat on political 
conservatism has been mainly studied in terms of specific natural disasters (e.g. climate 
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change, Fritsche et al., 2012) and variables related to political conservatism such as 
authoritarianism. Advancing previous research, the present thesis provided empirical support 
for the distinction between economic, natural and social threats. More particularly, Study 3C 
showed that participants became more conservative after being exposed to social and natural 
threats but not after being exposed to a control scenario or economic threat. Also advancing 
previous research, Studies 3A, 3B and 3C showed that participants perceived the world as 
more dangerous in the economic and social threat conditions than in the control condition and 
as more competitive in the economic and social threat conditions than in the control and 
natural threat conditions. These results provide empirical support for the claim that societal 
threat impacts differentially world beliefs (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). 
The final important theoretical contribution of the present thesis is the design of valid 
experimental stimuli. When designing the textual and pictorial stimuli, we tried not to focus 
on direct in-group/out-group conflict, even though some of the variables proposed as 
mediators of the impact of societal threat on political conservatism were intrinsically related 
to the group level (i.e. RWA and SDO). In addition, the experimental stimulus designed for 
the three last experimental studies did not specifically focus on consequences of the different 
types of societal threat as previously done (Fritsche et al., 2012). Furthermore, it was also our 
interest to base the threat manipulation on what European New Zealanders regularly felt as 
threatening in Wellington, New Zealand, and not on what academics felt as threatening 
(McCann & Stewin, 1990). To the best of our knowledge, no experimental study focusing on 
threat and voting intention or political orientation has used images as stimulus for threat 
enhancement (but see Butler, 2013). Studies have shown that images are more easily and 
frequently recalled by people than words (McBride & Dosher, 2002; Shepard, 1967), and 
participants in our studies were also requested to recall the scenario while answering the 
questions. Using this methodology (images and recall) to enhance the effect of the 
experimental manipulation advances previous research.  
Next, we describe limitations of the present research and some future directions for the 
research area focusing on the societal threat – political conservatism link. 
Limitations and Future Research 
Regarding the textual and pictorial scenarios validation studies, there are two main 
methodological points that should be addressed in future studies. First, in the study validating 
textual experimental stimulus, it would have been more methodologically sound to present the 
descriptions of economic, natural and social threats in a random order and not in a fixed order 
as done in Study 2B. Second, we acknowledge that the process of searching for images to be 
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used as experimental stimulus could have followed stricter inclusion criteria that also 
accounted for definition and size of the images before validating the images. Also connected 
to this point, it would have been interesting to have more evaluators selecting the images, 
granting greater reliability to the process. 
Regarding the three experimental studies, it would have been more worthwhile to have 
measured political orientation in terms of its economic and social dimensions as discussed by 
Feldman and Johnston (2014) and Jost et al. (2009). These variables could have added to the 
understanding of how different types of societal threat impact different niches of political 
conservatism. It would be important to understand more deeply whether or not economic and 
social threats impact only political orientation in niches they are directly connected to.  
Also, due to a methodological flaw, identity with New Zealanders and New Zealand 
was measured after participants read or saw the experimental manipulation. It would have 
been valuable to have measured this variable beforehand as this could be used in evaluating 
whether it moderates the impact of societal threat on political conservatism. Research has 
already shown that identity can moderate the effect of experimental manipulations (e.g. 
Fischer, Ferreira, Milfont, & Pilati, 2014), and models such as the one presented by Fritsche 
et al. (2011) have already pointed out the relevance of group membership for understanding 
the impact of (sense of control over) threat on ethnocentric tendencies. Thus, group 
membership and identity should be considered in future studies. Sense of control over threat 
could also be a significant variable to include in future studies, given that the model proposed 
by Fritsche et al. (2011) has also shown that sense of control over threat might be a more 
important factor when focusing on the impact of threat over other variables than threat per se.  
The levels of authoritarianism in the experimental samples included in the present 
thesis were overall low. More particularly, the levels of RWA measured before the 
experimental manipulation were below the scale middle point in all studies [Study 3A: t(74) = 
-8.43, p < .001; Study 3B: t(62) = -9.22, p < .001; Study 3C: t(43) = -6.67, p < .001]. 
Therefore, future tests of the activation of threat by authoritarianism should also consider a 
more representative sample of the authoritarian spectre (Feldman & Stenner, 1997). A more 
representative sample would test the alternative explanation that the lack of significance for 
the interaction between pre-RWA × social threat in our studies was related to the non-
representation of the full authoritarian spectre in our samples. 
Moreover, the three experimental studies tested the hypothesis that societal threat led 
to cultural worldview enhancement (H2; Burke et al., 2013) based on our view that societal 
threat might remind people of the salience of their deaths. However, it was not measured 
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whether or not the experimental manipulation made mortality more salient. Future studies 
could try to elucidate the connection between societal threat, death salience and political 
conservatism further by measuring how much participants were reminded of their own death 
by the threatening stimulus. 
Furthermore, significant differences between experimental conditions were not 
observed across studies for RWA and SDO scores. These results might suggest that, unlike 
world beliefs, RWA and SDO scores require deeper, more widespread and continuous societal 
threat to be modified. These results might also alternatively suggest that the stimuli used in 
the present studies were not strong enough to evoke these changes systematically as shown in 
Duckitt and Fisher (2003). In this sense, the pictorial stimuli used in the present study could 
be strengthen in order to evoke change in RWA and SDO. An alternative and reliable way to 
study this change would be through longitudinal studies including actual scores of participants 
in these variables and scores for systemic threat based on economic, natural and social 
indicators. This type of initiative has been in place already. One example of such an initiative 
is the New Zealand Attitudes and Values Survey (NZAVS) which through longitudinal data 
collection enables this type of meticulous test (Sibley, 2015).  
We encountered different technical problems when collecting data for the last two 
experimental studies. For example, the PowerPoint presentation included in the last study 
would occasionally not play properly to participants, or participants in both studies were 
sometimes disconnected from the online platform. These technical problems led to the loss of 
some participants given that it would have not been methodologically sound to let participants 
restart the study seeing or reading a new random scenario. This loss of participants impacted 
the analyses conducted to test the differential effect of economic, natural and social threats on 
political conservatism. Future studies should try to address this differential impact 
systematically given that it remains under researched, even though theoretical support for the 
differential impact of economic and social threats has been provided (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2010).  
Finally, four out of the seven studies presented in this thesis included only 
undergraduate students who categorised themselves as European (Pākehā) New Zealanders. 
When the studies were first designed, we intended to include members of the general 
population and from different ethnicities. However, time frame constraints led to the inclusion 
of only members of the ethnically dominant group in order to avoid misleading findings 
linked to the association between ethnicity and political behaviour. This inclusion criterion 
was intentional so as to have more homogeneous participants across studies. The same time 
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constraints described above were responsible for the inclusion only of undergraduate students 
in the three last experimental studies. Future studies investigating the impact of societal threat 
on political conservatism should try to extend our findings by also including different ethnic 
groups and participants from the general population. 
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the present research shows that societal threat impacts political conservatism 
when considering more vivid experimental scenarios including images. The present research 
also shows that societal threat does not generally enhance political conservatism directly, but 
that the influence of societal threat on political conservatism happens via world beliefs and 
socio-political attitudes. These results highlight the importance of examining the underlying 
mechanisms of the relationship between societal threat and political conservatism, increasing 
chances to intervene in variables that could actually diminish the power of threat. Given that 
the world we live in is far different from the one our ancestors from 10,000 years ago lived in, 
the evolutionary response to threat might not be always the most adequate one.  
In a world in which often liberals and conservatives see each other as less deserving 
and some researchers attribute conservative political orientation to “bad childhood” and “ugly 
personality traits” (Haidt, 2012), it is important to make it clear that the main application of 
this thesis is not to use societal threat, world beliefs, RWA and SDO to make people more 
left-oriented/liberal or more right-oriented/conservative. Instead, we suggest that the main 
application of our findings is to provide systematic knowledge about what to expect 
politically during threatening periods of time. Only systematic knowledge would make it 
possible to justify regulations that could, for instance, limit the use of societal threat in 
political campaigns around the world. In our research, societal threat enhanced political 
conservatism, but this enhancement was via world beliefs, RWA and SDO, variables also 
associated to prejudice and discrimination. It is not reasonable to assume that societal threat 
could be used freely to enhance political conservatism by politicians if there are also other 
societal consequences connected to it that could generate a social crisis.  
Finally, we agree that direct threats require decisive action as pointed out by Dick 
Cheney during the 2004 World Economic Forum (Associated Press, 2004). However, we 
believe that this decisive action should never include the use of societal threat as a political 
subterfuge to convince people to act in a specific way, enhancing authoritarianism, social 
dominance orientation and discrimination in return. 
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Appendix A. Study 1 Correlation Table 
 
Table A.1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between measures included in Study 1 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Agreeableness - .22** .09** .16** .29** -.28** .01 .04* -.15** -.06** .02 .00 
2. Conscientiousness - - .06** .08** .33** -.03 .10** .11** .03 .10** .13** .11** 
3. Extraversion - - - .28** .17** .04* .01 .01 .02 .06** -.01 .08** 
4. Openness to experience - - - - .22** -.09** -.11** -.21** -.14** -.14** -.18** -.09** 
5. Emotional stability - - - - - -.03 -.01 .02 .06** .12** .09** .12** 
6. Competitive worldview - - - - - - .27** .21** .48** .35** .22** .29** 
7. Dangerous worldview - - - - - - - .43** .25** .28** .33** .28** 
8. Right-wing authoritarianism - - - - - - - - .45** .45** .52** .42** 
9. Social dominance orientation - - - - - - - - - .55** .41** .47** 
10. Left/right orientation - - - - - - - - - - .64** .68** 
11. Liberal/conservative orientation - - - - - - - - - - - .54** 
12. Liberal/conservative voting 
intention 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
M 5.14 5.59 4.24 5.23 5.23 3.26 4.37 2.85 2.63 3.83 3.49 .58 
SD 1.07 1.08 1.44 1.06 1.22 1.25 1.42 1.03 1.05 1.57 1.59 - 
α .39 .50 .70 .44 .62 .52 .45 .72 .78 - - - 
Skewness -.25 -.69 -.10 -.35 -.67 .02 -.16 .33 .33 -.01 .24 -.32 
Kurtosis -.46 -.05 -.68 -.35 -.01 -.49 -.60 -.48 -.56 -.74 -.76 -1.90 
Note. ** p < .01; * p < .05. Point biserial correlation coefficients are provided for analyses including liberal/conservative voting intention.
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Appendix B. Study 2A Actual Survey 
Appendix B1. Information Sheet for the Actual Survey 
 
 
SECTION 1. INFORMATION SHEET 
Welcome! 
What is the purpose of this research? 
You will be presented with three questions about social, economic and natural threats. The goal 
of this research is to understand your perceptions of these threats. 
Who is conducting the research? 
Clara Cantal is a PhD student in the School of Psychology of Victoria University of Wellington. 
Dr. Taciano Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson are responsible for supervising this project and the 
other projects in the student thesis. This research has been approved by the School of 
Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of the VUW Human Ethics 
Committee. 
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to complete a short survey. The survey 
asks you about social, economic and natural threats, and some demographic questions. We 
anticipate that the survey will take you no more than 10 minutes to complete. During the 
research you are free to withdraw at any point before your survey has been completed. 
Privacy and confidentiality 
This survey is anonymous. Please do not put your name anywhere on the survey. You will never 
be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or publication. The information 
you provide will be coded by number only. We will keep your survey for at least five years 
after publication. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and 
organizations, your coded survey may be shared with other competent researchers. Your coded 
data may be used in other, related studies. A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody 
of Clara Cantal in the Environmental Psychology Lab. 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
The data you provide may be used for the following purposes: The overall findings may be 
submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences. The 
findings will be part of a PhD thesis that will be submitted for assessment. If you would like to 
know the results of this study, they will be available approximately next year (2014) upon 
request via email to Ms. Cantal. 
Consent for participation 
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Please note that by completing and returning the questionnaire to the researchers you agree that 
your survey responses will be used and analyzed. If you have any further questions regarding 
this study, please do not hesitate to contact the investigator listed below. 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research! 
 
Clara Cantal 
PhD Student 
Environmental Psychology Lab. 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Science 
Victoria University of Wellington 
Email: Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
Appendix B2. Main Questionnaire for the Actual Survey 
SECTION 2. MEASURE (Please use printed letters) 
 
On the following pages there are three open-ended questions. Please respond to them with your 
first, natural response. We are looking for peoples’ gut-level reactions to these questions. There 
are no correct or incorrect answers.  
 
Social threats are associated to the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to the creation of a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and 
disruption to others’ lives. Social threats can involve persons of your own society or even from 
other countries, as well as relationships between your country and other countries.  
 
Please take a few minutes to ENVISION social threats that could affect you and people in your 
society. Visualize images, symbols, activities, groups, facts or incidents. Then list 5 words or 
expressions that you associate with these threats. Answer with the first words that come to 
mind.  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Economic threats are associated to the competition for power and resources between people 
and by natural hierarchical relationships between both individuals and social groups. These 
threats can involve individuals of your own society or even from other countries, as well as 
relationships between your country and other countries. 
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Please take a few minutes to ENVISION economic threats that could affect you and people 
living in your society. Visualize images, symbols, activities, groups, facts or incidents. Then 
list 5 words or expressions that you associate with these threats. Answer with the first words 
that come to mind.  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Natural threats are associated to natural disasters that could impact your society and affect the 
way you and others live.  
 
Please take a few minutes to ENVISION natural threats that could affect you and people in 
your society. Visualize images, symbols, activities, groups, facts or incidents. Then list 5 words 
or expressions that you associate with these threats. Answer with the first words that come to 
mind.  
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
SECTION 3. BACKGROUND QUESTIONS (Please remember that your responses are 
confidential) 
 
Please answer the following socio-demographic questions.  
 
1. How old are you (in years)? _____ 
 
2. Are you male or female?                             Male    Female          (please  tick one)  
 
3. Were you Born in New Zealand?   Yes    No 
 
4. What () is your ethnicity? 
 European/ Pakeha                     Asian                  
 Maori                                        Indian   
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 Pacific nations                        Other: ________________  
 
5. Which () is your highest degree of education? 
 Primary School                        College or University Degree                    
 High School                             Specialization, MBA, masters or Doctorate         
 
 
Appendix B3. Debriefing for the Actual Survey 
SECTION 4. DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
Thank you for taking part in this study! 
 
The aim of this study is to examine if people can differentiate between social, economic and 
natural threats. These types of threats often appear mixed or not well delimitated in the 
literature, which makes it difficult to study whether different threats have a different impact on 
people’ behaviors.  In this study we were interested to see if people can differentiate these main 
types of threatening events. Results from this study will contribute to the existing literature by 
providing initial information to test how these differential threats impact people’ behaviors.  
 
The research project is being conducted by Clara Cantal, a PhD student, and her supervisors, 
Dr. Taciano L. Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson, from the School of Psychology, Victoria 
University of Wellington. If you have any questions regarding your involvement in this 
research, or issues regarding the research in general, please do not hesitate to contact me via e-
mail at Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz. 
 
Thanks again! 
Clara Cantal 
Taciano Milfont 
Marc Wilson
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Appendix C. Study 2B Actual Survey 
Appendix C1. Information Sheet for the Actual Survey 
 
 
SECTION 1. INFORMATION SHEET 
 
Welcome! 
What is the purpose of this research? 
You will be presented with one brief scenario. We are interested on your view of it and also on 
how you feel about it. The goal of this research is to understand your perceptions, evaluations 
and feelings towards this scenario. 
Who is conducting the research? 
Clara Cantal is a PhD student in the School of Psychology of Victoria University of Wellington. 
Dr. Taciano Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson are responsible for supervising this project and the 
other projects in the student thesis.  
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to complete a short survey. The survey 
asks you about social, economic and natural threats, and some demographic questions. We 
anticipate that the survey will take you no more than 20 minutes to complete. During the 
research you are free to withdraw at any point before your survey has been completed. 
Privacy and confidentiality 
This survey is anonymous. Please do not put your name anywhere on the survey. You will never 
be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or publication. The information 
you provide will be coded by number only. We will keep your survey for at least five years 
after publication. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and 
organizations, your coded survey may be shared with other competent researchers. Your coded 
data may be used in other, related studies. A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody 
of Clara Cantal in the Environmental Psychology Lab. 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
The data you provide may be used for the following purposes: The overall findings may be 
submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences. The 
findings will be part of a PhD thesis that will be submitted for assessment. If you would like to 
know the results of this study, they will be available approximately next year (2014) upon 
request via email to Ms. Cantal. 
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Consent for participation 
Please note that by completing and returning the questionnaire to the researchers online you 
agree that your survey responses will be used and analyzed. If you have any further questions 
regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact the investigator listed below. 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research! 
 
Clara Cantal 
PhD Student 
Environmental Psychology Lab. 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Science 
Victoria University of Wellington 
            Email: Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
Appendix C2. Main questionnaire for the Actual Survey 
Appendix C2.1. Main questionnaire for the economic threat condition  
SECTION 2. SCENARIO 
 
Please imagine the scenario described below as real and happening right now in New 
Zealand. After reading the scenario, you will be asked to answer five questions related to the 
scenario followed by some socio-demographic questions.  
 
Scenario 
Imagine that this is happening in New Zealand right now. For you personally, the 
situation is basically as you expected or planned it to be. Thus, your personal affairs concerning 
partnering, children, marriage, jobs, career, friends, etc. have not changed unexpectedly. 
However, while your personal affairs are going well, there have been dramatic and far-reaching 
changes in New Zealand at present.  
State-owned assets have been sold. New Zealand has accumulated a large debt and the 
economy is in recession. Some say the economy is even in depression. New Zealand is in an 
unprecedented economic crisis, with high inflation, job losses, unemployment and bankruptcy 
of various businesses. Politics is incomprehensible and corruption cases are broadcasted on the 
news and television almost daily. Inequality between the rich and the poor has risen. Life in 
New Zealand is now about greed, competition, money and capitalism. Globalization is reaching 
the country as never before. 
 
SECTION 3. SCENARIO EVALUATION 
 
Now, after imagining yourself in this scenario, please complete the following questions. 
Please read each question carefully.  
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You will probably find that in some cases your answers to this scenario might be different 
to what they would be otherwise, while for other questions your answers won’t be that 
different. It’s important that you read each question and select your answers carefully, 
being at all times mindful of the scenario you read above.  
 
1. To what extent did the scenario you just read present social threats?  
(Social threats are associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to the creation of a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and 
disruption to others’ lives.)   
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2. To what extent did the scenario you just read present economic threats?  
(Economic threats are associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. To what extent did the scenario you just read present natural threats?  
(Natural threats are associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect 
the way you and others live.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
4. Please mark the degree to which you think that the situation presented in the scenario 
would impact your life and result in negative consequences. 
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Not at all  Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Still considering the scenario you read above, imagine that there is a national 
election coming in a few days. Given this scenario, which party would you vote 
for? 
 
 ACT 
 Green 
 Labour 
 Mana 
 Māori                 
 National 
 NZ First 
 United Future 
SECTION 4. BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
 
Thank you for completing the questions related to the scenario. Please answer these final 
background questions. 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use 
the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1 
very slightly 
or not at all 
2 
a little 
3 
moderately 
4 
quite a bit 
5 
extremely 
 
Interested 1     2     3     4     5 Irritable 1     2     3     4     5 
Distressed 1     2     3     4     5 Alert 1     2     3     4     5 
Excited 1     2     3     4     5 Ashamed 1     2     3     4     5 
Upset 1     2     3     4     5 Inspired 1     2     3     4     5 
Strong 1     2     3     4     5 Nervous 1     2     3     4     5 
Guilty 1     2     3     4     5 Determined 1     2     3     4     5 
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Scared 1     2     3     4     5 Attentive 1     2     3     4     5 
Hostile 1     2     3     4     5 Jittery 1     2     3     4     5 
Enthusiastic 1     2     3     4     5 Active 1     2     3     4     5 
Proud 1     2     3     4     5 Afraid 1     2     3     4     5 
 
1. How old are you (in years)? _____ 
 
2. Are you male or female?  (please  tick one)             
 Male 
 
 Female           
 
3. Were you born in New Zealand?   
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
4. What () is your ethnicity? 
 European/ Pakeha 
 Maori 
 Pacific  
 
 Asian                  
 Indian   
  Other: ________________  
5. Which () is your highest degree of education? 
 Primary School 
 High School 
    
 College or University Degree                    
 Specialization, MBA, Masters or Doctorate      
 
6. Sometimes, people use the terms “liberal” or “conservative” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 
 1. Extremely liberal 
 2. Liberal 
 3. Slightly liberal 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly conservative 
 6. Conservative 
 7. Extremely conservative 
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7. Sometimes, people use the terms “left-wing” or “right-wing” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 1. Extremely left-wing 
 2. Left-wing 
 3. Slightly left-wing 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly right-wing 
 6. Right-wing 
  7. Extremely right-wing 
 
Appendix C2.2. Main questionnaire for the natural threat condition  
SECTION 2. SCENARIO 
 
Please imagine the scenario described below as real and happening right now in New 
Zealand. After reading the scenario, you will be asked to answer five questions related to the 
scenario followed by some socio-demographic questions.  
 
Scenario 
Imagine that this is happening in New Zealand right now. For you personally, the 
situation is basically as you expected or planned it to be. Thus, your personal affairs concerning 
partnering, children, marriage, jobs, career, friends, etc. have not changed unexpectedly. 
However, while your personal affairs are going well, there have been dramatic and far-reaching 
changes in New Zealand at present.  
Strong earthquakes shook both the North and South Islands. Undersea earthquakes are 
also occurring, and tsunamis around the New Zealand coast are highly likely and have triggered 
tsunami alerts. Global warming and climate change are impacting New Zealand and a 
combination of diseases, drought, fires, floods, hurricanes and tornados are affecting many parts 
of the country. Forest fires are common, and volcanic activity is high with frequent volcanic 
eruptions. The possibility of a meteorite hitting New Zealand is also likely. Devastation, 
destruction and helplessness are consuming New Zealand citizens. 
 
SECTION 3. SCENARIO EVALUATION 
Now, after imagining yourself in this scenario, please complete the following questions. 
Please read each question carefully.  
You will probably find that in some cases your answers to this scenario might be different 
to what they would be otherwise, while for other questions your answers won’t be that 
different. It’s important that you read each question and select your answers carefully, 
being at all times mindful of the scenario you read above.  
 
1. To what extent did the scenario you just read present social threats?  
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(Social threats are associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to the creation of a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and 
disruption to others’ lives.)   
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
2. To what extent did the scenario you just read present economic threats?  
(Economic threats are associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
3. To what extent did the scenario you just read present natural threats?  
(Natural threats are associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect 
the way you and others live.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4. Please mark the degree to which you think that the situation presented in the scenario 
would impact your life and result in negative consequences. 
 
Not at all  Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
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5. Still considering the scenario you read above, imagine that there is a national 
election coming in a few days. Given this scenario, which party would you vote 
for? 
 ACT 
 Green 
 Labour 
 Mana 
 Māori                 
 National 
 NZ First 
 United Future 
SECTION 4. BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
 
Thank you for completing the questions related to the scenario. Please answer these final 
background questions. 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use 
the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1 
very slightly 
or not at all 
2 
a little 
3 
moderately 
4 
quite a bit 
5 
extremely 
 
Interested 1     2     3     4     5 Irritable 1     2     3     4     5 
Distressed 1     2     3     4     5 Alert 1     2     3     4     5 
Excited 1     2     3     4     5 Ashamed 1     2     3     4     5 
Upset 1     2     3     4     5 Inspired 1     2     3     4     5 
Strong 1     2     3     4     5 Nervous 1     2     3     4     5 
Guilty 1     2     3     4     5 Determined 1     2     3     4     5 
Scared 1     2     3     4     5 Attentive 1     2     3     4     5 
Hostile 1     2     3     4     5 Jittery 1     2     3     4     5 
Enthusiastic 1     2     3     4     5 Active 1     2     3     4     5 
Proud 1     2     3     4     5 Afraid 1     2     3     4     5 
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1. How old are you (in years)? _____ 
 
2. Are you male or female? (please  tick one)              
 Male 
 
 Female           
 
3. Were you born in New Zealand?   
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
4. What () is your ethnicity? 
 European/ Pakeha 
 Maori 
 Pacific  
 
 Asian                  
 Indian   
  Other: ________________  
5. Which () is your highest degree of education? 
 Primary School 
 High School 
    
 College or University Degree                    
 Specialization, MBA, Masters or Doctorate      
 
6. Sometimes, people use the terms “liberal” or “conservative” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 
 1. Extremely liberal 
 2. Liberal 
 3. Slightly liberal 
 4. Moderate 
 
 5. Slightly conservative 
 6. Conservative 
 7. Extremely conservative 
 
7. Sometimes, people use the terms “left-wing” or “right-wing” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 1. Extremely left-wing 
 2. Left-wing 
 5. Slightly right-wing 
 6. Right-wing 
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 3. Slightly left-wing 
 4. Moderate 
  7. Extremely right-wing 
Appendix C2.3. Main questionnaire for the social threat condition  
SECTION 2. SCENARIO 
 
Please imagine the scenario described below as real and happening right now in New 
Zealand. After reading the scenario, you will be asked to answer five questions related to the 
scenario followed by some socio-demographic questions.  
 
Scenario 
Imagine that this is happening in New Zealand right now. For you personally, the 
situation is basically as you expected or planned it to be. Thus, your personal affairs concerning 
partnering, children, marriage, jobs, career, friends, etc. have not changed unexpectedly. 
However, while your personal affairs are going well, there have been dramatic and far-reaching 
changes in New Zealand at present.  
Gangs have taken up the streets and racism against various groups is high. Drug abuse 
has increased and there are drugs available everywhere. Violence, in the form of bullying, 
looting, intimidation, assault and rape, is taking place everywhere in New Zealand. Terrorist 
attacks, sometimes even with bombs, are also occurring. The possession of guns is legalized 
and New Zealand citizens have been buying them profusely. Religion extremism is visible 
across the country. People are rude and living for power. Fear is stamped on the faces of New 
Zealand citizens. 
 
 
 
SECTION 3. SCENARIO EVALUATION 
 
Now, after imagining yourself in this scenario, please complete the following questions. 
Please read each question carefully.  
You will probably find that in some cases your answers to this scenario might be different 
to what they would be otherwise, while for other questions your answers won’t be that 
different. It’s important that you read each question and select your answers carefully, 
being at all times mindful of the scenario you read above.  
 
1. To what extent did the scenario you just read present social threats?  
(Social threats are associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to the creation of a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and 
disruption to others’ lives.)   
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Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2. To what extent did the scenario you just read present economic threats?  
(Economic threats are associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. To what extent did the scenario you just read present natural threats?  
(Natural threats are associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect 
the way you and others live.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4. Please mark the degree to which you think that the situation presented in the scenario 
would impact your life and result in negative consequences. 
 
Not at all  Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Still considering the scenario you read above, imagine that there is a national 
election coming in a few days. Given this scenario, which party would you vote 
for? 
 ACT 
 Green 
 Labour 
  Māori                 
 National 
 NZ First 
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 Mana  United Future 
SECTION 4. BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
 
Thank you for completing the questions related to the scenario. Please answer these final 
background questions. 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use 
the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1 
very slightly 
or not at all 
2 
a little 
3 
moderately 
4 
quite a bit 
5 
extremely 
 
Interested 1     2     3     4     5 Irritable 1     2     3     4     5 
Distressed 1     2     3     4     5 Alert 1     2     3     4     5 
Excited 1     2     3     4     5 Ashamed 1     2     3     4     5 
Upset 1     2     3     4     5 Inspired 1     2     3     4     5 
Strong 1     2     3     4     5 Nervous 1     2     3     4     5 
Guilty 1     2     3     4     5 Determined 1     2     3     4     5 
Scared 1     2     3     4     5 Attentive 1     2     3     4     5 
Hostile 1     2     3     4     5 Jittery 1     2     3     4     5 
Enthusiastic 1     2     3     4     5 Active 1     2     3     4     5 
Proud 1     2     3     4     5 Afraid 1     2     3     4     5 
 
1. How old are you (in years)? _____ 
 
2. Are you male or female?  (please  tick one)             
 Male 
 
 Female           
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3. Were you born in New Zealand?   
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
4. What () is your ethnicity? 
 European/ Pakeha 
 Maori 
 Pacific  
 Asian                  
 Indian   
  Other: ________________  
 
5. Which () is your highest degree of education? 
 Primary School 
 High School 
    
 College or University Degree                    
 Specialization, MBA, Masters or Doctorate      
 
6. Sometimes, people use the terms “liberal” or “conservative” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 1. Extremely liberal 
 2. Liberal 
 3. Slightly liberal 
 4. Moderate 
 
 5. Slightly conservative 
 6. Conservative 
 7. Extremely conservative 
 
7. Sometimes, people use the terms “left-wing” or “right-wing” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 1. Extremely left-wing 
 2. Left-wing 
 3. Slightly left-wing 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly right-wing 
 6. Right-wing 
  7. Extremely right-wing 
 
Appendix C2.4. Main questionnaire for the control condition  
SECTION 2. SCENARIO 
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Please imagine the scenario described below as real and happening right now in New 
Zealand. The scenario will be presented along with some real facts about New Zealand. After 
reading the scenario and the facts, you will be asked to answer five questions related to the 
scenario followed by some socio-demographic questions. 
 
Scenario and facts 
Imagine that this is happening in New Zealand right now. For you personally, the 
situation is basically as you expected or planned it to be. Thus, your personal affairs concerning 
partnering, children, marriage, jobs, career, friends, etc. have not changed unexpectedly. Your 
personal affairs are going well, and there have been no dramatic or far-reaching changes in New 
Zealand at present. 
New Zealand’s location protects the country from unexpected changes. The country is 
made up of two main islands and some smaller islands, located near the centre of the water 
hemisphere (largest area of water of the Earth’s surface), and far away from other big land 
masses. The country is situated some 1,500 kilometres east of Australia across the Tasman Sea, 
and roughly 1,000 kilometres south of some Pacific islands. New Zealand is long (over 1,600 
kilometres) and narrow (with a maximum of 400 kilometres) if considered the main islands.  
 
SECTION 3. SCENARIO EVALUATION 
 
Now, after imagining yourself in the scenario and reading real facts about New Zealand, 
please complete the following questions. Please read each item carefully.  
You will probably find that in some cases your answers to this scenario might be different 
to what they would be otherwise, while for other questions your answers won’t be that 
different. It’s important that you read each question and select your answers carefully, 
being at all times mindful of the scenario you read above. 
 
1. To what extent did the scenario and the facts you just read present social threats?  
(Social threats are associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to the creation of a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and 
disruption to others’ lives.)   
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2. To what extent did the scenario and the facts you just read present economic threats?  
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(Economic threats are associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. To what extent did the scenario and the facts you just read present natural threats?  
(Natural threats are associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect 
the way you and others live.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
4. Please mark the degree to which you think that the situation and the facts presented in 
the text would impact your life and result in negative consequences. 
 
Not at all  Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
5. Still considering the scenario and the facts you read above, imagine that there 
is a national election coming in a few days. Given this scenario and the facts, 
which party would you vote for? 
 
 ACT 
 Green 
 Labour 
 Mana 
 Māori                 
 National 
 NZ First 
 United Future 
SECTION 4. BACKGROUND QUESTIONS 
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Thank you for completing the questions related to the scenario and the facts. Please 
answer these final background questions. 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment. Use 
the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1 
very slightly 
or not at all 
2 
a little 
3 
moderately 
4 
quite a bit 
5 
extremely 
 
Interested 1     2     3     4     5 Irritable 1     2     3     4     5 
Distressed 1     2     3     4     5 Alert 1     2     3     4     5 
Excited 1     2     3     4     5 Ashamed 1     2     3     4     5 
Upset 1     2     3     4     5 Inspired 1     2     3     4     5 
Strong 1     2     3     4     5 Nervous 1     2     3     4     5 
Guilty 1     2     3     4     5 Determined 1     2     3     4     5 
Scared 1     2     3     4     5 Attentive 1     2     3     4     5 
Hostile 1     2     3     4     5 Jittery 1     2     3     4     5 
Enthusiastic 1     2     3     4     5 Active 1     2     3     4     5 
Proud 1     2     3     4     5 Afraid 1     2     3     4     5 
 
1. How old are you (in years)? _____ 
 
2. Are you male or female?  (please  tick one)         
 Male 
 
 Female           
 
3. Were you born in New Zealand?   
 Yes 
 
 No 
 
4. What () is your ethnicity? 
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 European/ Pakeha 
 Maori 
 Pacific  
 
 Asian                  
 Indian   
  Other: ________________  
5. Which () is your highest degree of education? 
 Primary School 
 High School 
    
 College or University Degree                    
 Specialization, MBA, Masters or Doctorate      
 
6. Sometimes, people use the terms “liberal” or “conservative” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 
 1. Extremely liberal 
 2. Liberal 
 3. Slightly liberal 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly conservative 
 6. Conservative 
 7. Extremely conservative 
 
 
7. Sometimes, people use the terms “left-wing” or “right-wing” to describe their 
political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option that 
best describes you. 
 1. Extremely left-wing 
 2. Left-wing 
 3. Slightly left-wing 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly right-wing 
 6. Right-wing 
  7. Extremely right-wing 
 
Appendix C3. Debriefing for the Actual Survey 
SECTION 5. DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
 
Thank you for participating in this study! 
 
The aim of this study is to evaluate if people can differentiate between social, economic and 
natural threat. These types of threat often appear mixed or are not well delimited in the 
literature, which makes it difficult to study whether different threats have a different impact on 
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people’ behaviors. Different participants in this study read different kinds of scenarios, 
evaluating their link to social, economic and natural threat. The results of the various 
participants will be evaluated together in order to evaluate if different scenarios are linked to 
different kinds of threat. Results from this study will contribute to the existing literature by 
providing initial information to test how these differential threats impact people’ behaviors.  
 
The research project is being conducted by Clara Cantal, a PhD student, and her supervisors, 
Dr. Taciano L. Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson, from the School of Psychology, Victoria 
University of Wellington. If you have any questions regarding your involvement in this 
research, or issues regarding the research in general, please do not hesitate to contact me via e-
mail at Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz. 
 
Thanks again! 
 
Clara Cantal 
Taciano Milfont 
Marc Wilson 
 
Thank you for participating in our study!
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Appendix D. Study 2C Actual Survey 
Appendix D1. Information Sheet for the Actual Survey 
 
 
SECTION 1. INFORMATION SHEET 
Welcome!   
What is the purpose of this research?           
 You will be presented with 85 images and 4 Party proposals.    
 We are interested on your views of them. The goal of this research is to understand your 
perceptions of these images and of the political discourses.      
Who is conducting the research?            
 Clara Cantal is a PhD student in the School of Psychology of Victoria University of 
Wellington. Dr. Taciano Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson are responsible for supervising this 
project and the other projects in the student thesis.  
 This research has been approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee 
under delegated authority of the VUW Human Ethics Committee (Approved 12/02/2013; 
Reference number: RM019658).            
What is involved if you agree to participate?          
 If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to complete a short survey.       
 The survey asks you about social, economic and natural threats, and some demographic 
questions.  
 We anticipate that the survey will take you no more than 30 minutes to complete.  
 During the research you are free to withdraw at any point before your survey has been 
completed.             
Privacy and confidentiality           
 This survey is anonymous. Please do not put your name anywhere on the survey.  
 You will never be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or 
publication. The information you provide will be coded by number only. We will keep your 
survey for at least five years after publication. 
 In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and organizations, your 
coded survey may be shared with other competent researchers.   
 Your coded data may be used in other, related studies. A copy of the coded data will remain 
in the custody of Clara Cantal in the Environmental Psychology Lab.    
 Provided ID will only be used to award IPRP credits for taking part in the study and will not 
be stored.              
 What happens to the information that you provide?           
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 The data you provide may be used for the following purposes: The overall findings may be 
submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences.  The 
findings will be part of a PhD thesis that will be submitted for assessment.  
 If you would like to know the results of this study, they will be available approximately next 
year (2014) upon request via email to Ms. Cantal.             
Consent for participation          
 Please note that by completing and returning the questionnaire to the researchers online you 
agree that your survey responses will be used and analyzed. If you have any further questions 
regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact the investigator listed below.    
Thank you for considering participating in this research! 
 
Clara Cantal 
PhD Student  
Environmental Psychology Lab  
School of Psychology, Faculty of Science  
Victoria University of Wellington  
Email: Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz 
 
 
Do you consent your participation? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
This study has five parts. On the first part you will be presented with 85 images and asked three 
questions about each image. On the second part you will be asked to read short Political Party 
proposals and asked to identify to which New Zealand Party it belongs to. On the third part you 
will be asked some background questions. On the fourth part you will be given the study debrief. 
Finally, on the fifth part you will answer a brief post-experimental questionnaire and your 
student ID will be required. 
 
Appendix D2. Main Questionnaire for the Actual Survey 
Part 1: Image Validation 
 
 
In this part of the questionnaire you will be presented with 85 images and asked whether the 
image depicts one of the following: economic threat, natural threat, social threat, or New 
Zealand natural territory. A definition of these categories is presented below: 
  
 Economic threat -- associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups 
  
 Natural threat -- associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect the 
way you and others live 
  
 Social threat -- associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and disruption to others 
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 New Zealand natural territory -- landscapes or characteristics of New Zealand territory 
 
(questions presented after each of the 85 images) 
 
 Economic threat -- associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups 
 
 Natural threat -- associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect the 
way you and others live  
  
 Social threat -- associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and disruption to others  
  
 New Zealand natural territory -- landscapes or characteristics of New Zealand territory 
 
1. This image more strongly illustrates… 
 Economic threat 
 Natural threat 
 Social threat  
 New Zealand natural territory 
 
2. How well does this image illustrate the category you selected? 
 
Illustrates the category 
0=Not at all   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   8    9    10=Very well 
 
3. In which extent this image evokes positive and negative emotion? 
 
Negative emotion 
0=Not at all   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   8    9    10=Extremely 
 
Positive emotion 
0=Not at all   1    2    3    4    5    6    7   8    9    10=Extremely 
 
 
Thank you for completing the first part of this study. In the second part that follows you will be 
asked to read four Political Party proposals and indicate to which party it belongs to. 
 
Part 2: Party proposals validation 
  
Please read the following Political Party proposals and indicate to which New Zealand party 
you think it belongs to. 
 
(options presented after each of the four political discourses) 
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 ACT 
 Green  
 Labour  
 Mana  
 Māori 
 National 
 New Zealand First 
 United Future 
 I don’t know 
 
Thank you for completing the second part of this study. In this section you will be asked some 
background questions. 
 
Part 3: background data 
Please answer the following socio-demographic questions.      
1. How old are you (in years)? ____ 
 
2. Are you male or female?  
 male 
 female 
 
3. Were you born in New Zealand?   
 Yes 
 No 
 
4. Which is your ethnicity? 
 European 
 Māori 
 Pacific Islander 
 Asian 
 Indian 
 Other ____________________ 
 
Thank you for participating in this study!   You will be presented with the debriefing below. 
Please read it carefully to be able to complete the post-experimental questionnaire. You will 
also be asked for your student ID. This is necessary to award you course credit. 
 
Appendix D3. Debriefing for the Actual Survey 
Part 4: debriefing 
  
Thank you for participating in this study! 
  
The aim of this study is to examine if people can differentiate between social, economic and 
natural threats and if they can differentiate some of New Zealand’s Parties proposals. Results 
from this study will contribute to the existing literature by providing initial information on how 
to test how these differential threats impact people’ voting intention. 
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The research project is being conducted by Clara Cantal, a PhD student, and her supervisors, 
Dr. Taciano L. Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson, from the School of Psychology, Victoria 
University of Wellington. If you have any questions regarding your involvement in this 
research, or issues regarding the research in general, please do not hesitate to contact me via e-
mail at Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz. 
  
Thanks again! 
  
Clara Cantal 
Taciano Milfont 
Marc Wilson 
 
Thank you for reading the debriefing. In the last part of the survey you will answer some 
questions about this study. 
 
Appendix D4. Post-Experimental Questionnaire for the Actual Survey  
Part 5: post-experimental questionnaire 
 
Please tell us a bit about the study in which you just participated. We want to be able to get a 
sense of what you learned now that you have been debriefed:   
 
1. Every research project tries to answer at least one question. What question was this  project 
trying to answer? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Research projects usually have one major hypothesis. What was the hypothesis in this  
project? 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. If you were to predict what the data will look like when the study is completed, do you  
think the data will support the hypothesis? Please briefly explain your answer. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Do you have any other comments about this project? We are always looking  for helpful 
feedback. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Student ID: _________________ 
6. Surname: __________________ 
 
Thank you for completing all the survey!  
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Appendix E. Study 2C Image Evaluation Table 
 
Table E.1   
Image evaluation scores for images selected according to the first and second criteria 
Image Correct category 
% of 
participants 
who 
pointed out 
the correct 
category 
M extent to 
which the 
image 
represents the 
correct 
category 
SD extent to 
which the 
image 
represents the 
correct 
category 
M difference 
between 
negative and 
positive 
sentiments  
SD difference 
between 
negative and 
positive 
sentiments 
Number of 
participants 
who pointed 
out the correct 
category 
Total number 
of participants 
assetsales2 Economic threat 100.00 7.91 1.76 5.36 4.18 11 11 
assetsales3 Economic threat 100.00 3.30 2.00 1.60 2.76 10 10 
assetsales4 Economic threat 100.00 6.50 1.51 4.33 3.94 12 12 
assetsales5 Economic threat 90.90 6.80 2.30 5.70 3.06 10 11 
bankruptcy 2 Economic threat 100.00 8.00 1.83 7.00 2.45 9 9 
bankruptcy 4  Economic threat 100.00 7.10 0.99 6.30 2.91 10 10 
bankruptcy1 Economic threat 100.00 7.25 1.66 7.50 2.28 12 12 
bankruptcy5 Economic threat 100.00 6.30 2.26 6.30 2.54 10 10 
bankruptcynew Economic threat 100.00 7.30 1.77 7.60 2.22 10 10 
capitalism4 Economic threat 92.30 7.92 1.98 4.25 4.03 12 13 
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competition2 Economic threat 100.00 5.45 2.46 1.00 2.61 11 11 
competition4 Economic threat 80.00 6.13 2.80 2.38 3.66 8 10 
corruption3 Economic threat 91.70 6.00 1.55 3.09 4.32 11 12 
corruption5 Economic threat 100.00 6.00 2.00 3.92 3.40 13 13 
corruptionnew1 Economic threat 83.30 6.60 2.55 2.10 4.09 10 12 
corruptionnew2 Economic threat 91.70 7.09 2.07 4.36 4.23 11 12 
corruptionnew3 Economic threat 91.70 7.27 2.15 6.00 3.13 11 12 
debt2 Economic threat 100.0 8.00 1.41 6.88 1.96 8 8 
debt3 Economic threat 90.90 6.20 2.78 4.30 3.37 10 11 
debt4 Economic threat 100.00 7.40 1.07 4.90 3.75 10 10 
debt5 Economic threat 93.30 6.00 2.15 4.00 3.37 14 15 
debtnew Economic threat 100.00 7.38 1.41 5.75 3.06 8 8 
depression1 Economic threat 100.00 7.18 2.18 6.36 3.29 11 11 
depression3 Economic threat 91.70 8.00 1.34 5.64 2.50 11 12 
depression4 Economic threat 100.00 7.30 2.26 5.90 3.35 10 10 
depression5 Economic threat 100.00 5.70 2.36 4.10 3.31 10 10 
economiccrisis1 Economic threat 100.00 8.13 2.36 7.13 2.90 8 8 
economiccrisis2 Economic threat 90.90 7.20 1.75 5.00 3.27 10 11 
economiccrisis4 Economic threat 88.90 4.63 1.85 3.88 3.18 8 9 
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economiccrisis5 Economic threat 90.90 6.00 2.16 4.60 3.50 10 11 
economiccrisisnew Economic threat 100.00 7.50 1.58 5.00 3.02 10 10 
globalisation1 Economic threat 90.90 6.70 2.16 6.20 3.22 10 11 
globalisation4 Economic threat 92.90 7.62 1.61 5.08 3.40 13 14 
globalisationnew Economic threat 91.70 8.55 1.57 4.09 3.73 11 12 
greed1 Economic threat 100.00 4.40 1.58 2.40 4.17 10 10 
greed3 Economic threat 100.00 7.67 1.97 4.92 4.85 12 12 
greed4 Economic threat 100.00 8.56 1.42 5.44 3.21 9 9 
greed5 Economic threat 88.90 6.88 2.80 5.13 3.72 8 9 
inequality2 Economic threat 72.70 7.00 1.51 5.75 3.37 8 11 
inflation1 Economic threat 100.00 6.00 2.83 3.75 3.39 12 12 
inflation2 Economic threat 100.00 7.60 1.80 6.27 3.31 15 15 
inflation3 Economic threat 100.00 7.40 2.88 5.40 3.10 10 10 
inflation4 Economic threat 100.00 8.63 1.51 6.25 3.11 8 8 
jobloss1 Economic threat 92.30 5.50 2.20 5.58 3.48 12 13 
jobloss5 Economic threat 100.00 6.25 1.39 5.88 3.09 8 8 
money1 Economic threat 86.70 5.92 2.50 -1.69 2.84 13 15 
money2 Economic threat 100.00 4.80 2.10 -3.40 3.37 10 10 
money4 Economic threat 90.90 5.40 2.67 -2.40 4.45 10 11 
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money5 Economic threat 91.70 4.27 2.15 -3.45 4.23 11 12 
moneynewzealand1 Economic threat 100.00 4.30 3.20 -2.50 3.92 10 10 
politics2 Economic threat 70.00 6.14 2.97 1.29 2.43 7 10 
politics3 Economic threat 91.70 3.91 1.87 2.45 3.47 11 12 
politics4 Economic threat 75.00 5.56 2.88 .78 3.67 9 12 
politics5 Economic threat 73.30 4.82 3.57 .09 4.68 11 15 
recession1 Economic threat 100.00 7.73 1.79 5.45 2.91 11 11 
recession3 Economic threat 100.00 7.00 4.24 6.00 5.66 10 10 
recessionnew Economic threat 90.90 5.80 2.35 1.10 3.51 10 11 
unemployment3 Economic threat 91.70 6.09 2.34 4.73 2.28 11 12 
unemployment4 Economic threat 100.00 7.30 2.16 6.40 2.84 10 10 
climatechange1 Natural threat 100.00 6.82 1.60 6.18 3.60 11 11 
climatechange2 Natural threat 80.00 7.13 2.53 5.13 3.36 8 10 
climatechange4 Natural threat 88.90 6.25 2.66 5.88 3.52 8 9 
climatechange5 Natural threat 100.00 6.80 3.08 5.30 3.40 10 10 
destruction1 Natural threat 81.80 8.00 1.73 7.56 2.60 9 11 
destruction2 Natural threat 90.00 8.78 1.20 8.00 2.69 9 10 
destruction4 Natural threat 100.00 6.27 2.61 6.18 2.48 11 11 
destruction5 Natural threat 100.00 8.10 1.29 6.90 2.47 10 10 
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devastation2 Natural threat 85.70 7.17 1.70 6.83 2.59 12 14 
devastation4 Natural threat 100.00 7.30 2.58 7.60 2.72 10 10 
devastation5 Natural threat 90.90 8.30 1.77 5.80 3.08 10 11 
devastationnewzealandnew Natural threat 76.90 7.70 1.57 7.70 2.54 10 13 
disease3 Natural threat 76.90 6.10 1.79 7.50 2.64 10 13 
drought2 Natural threat 90.00 5.89 2.76 3.22 3.46 9 10 
drought5 Natural threat 100.00 6.91 2.30 5.27 3.80 11 11 
earthquakes1 Natural threat 100.00 7.62 2.40 7.08 2.84 13 13 
fires2 Natural threat 100.00 8.18 1.72 7.36 2.29 11 11 
fires4 Natural threat 100.00 8.13 1.73 7.25 2.87 8 8 
fires5 Natural threat 100.00 7.82 1.99 6.73 2.83 11 11 
floods1 Natural threat 100.00 8.30 1.64 7.30 2.11 10 10 
floods2 Natural threat 100.00 8.80 1.75 7.70 2.50 10 10 
floods5 Natural threat 100.00 9.00 1.47 7.23 2.83 13 13 
forestfires1 Natural threat 100.00 8.00 2.05 6.80 3.29 10 10 
forestfires3 Natural threat 100.00 8.60 1.35 8.00 2.17 15 15 
forestfires4 Natural threat 100.00 8.63 1.69 7.75 1.91 8 8 
globalwarming2 Natural threat 81.80 6.44 1.94 5.22 3.83 9 11 
hurricanes1 Natural threat 100.00 8.70 1.57 7.60 2.80 10 10 
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hurricanes4 Natural threat 100.00 8.82 2.09 7.64 3.04 11 11 
hurricanes5 Natural threat 100.00 8.10 1.79 6.70 2.21 10 10 
meteorites1 Natural threat 100.00 8.89 1.96 7.44 2.83 9 9 
meteorites2 Natural threat 100.00 8.75 1.22 5.92 4.01 12 12 
meteorites3 Natural threat 100.00 7.67 2.99 6.83 3.74 12 12 
meteorites4 Natural threat 100.00 7.83 2.29 6.83 2.98 12 12 
meteorites5 Natural threat 100.00 7.60 2.12 5.80 4.16 10 10 
tornados1 Natural threat 100.00 8.50 2.02 6.50 3.12 12 12 
tornados2 Natural threat 100.00 8.88 1.13 6.50 4.07 8 8 
tornados3 Natural threat 100.00 9.13 1.25 6.75 4.03 8 8 
tornados4 Natural threat 100.00 8.89 1.76 7.33 2.65 9 9 
tornados5 Natural threat 100.00 8.56 1.42 6.89 3.79 9 9 
tsunamis4 Natural threat 100.00 9.00 1.51 7.63 2.97 8 8 
tsunamis5 Natural threat 88.90 7.75 2.05 4.50 4.00 8 9 
volcanicactivity1 Natural threat 100.00 7.75 2.26 4.92 4.32 12 12 
volcanicactivity2 Natural threat 90.00 8.56 1.59 3.78 4.74 9 10 
volcanicactivity3 Natural threat 88.90 7.63 1.69 6.75 1.67 8 9 
volcanicactivity5 Natural threat 100.00 7.13 0.99 3.75 2.66 8 8 
volcaniceruption1 Natural threat 100.00 8.00 2.08 4.92 4.17 13 13 
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volcaniceruption2 Natural threat 100.00 7.85 2.12 3.31 5.34 13 13 
volcaniceruption3 Natural threat 100.00 8.09 1.64 4.55 3.56 11 11 
volcaniceruption4 Natural threat 90.90 7.80 1.75 3.90 4.41 10 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory1 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.00 2.75 -2.30 6.02 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory12 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
90.00 8.00 2.24 -4.22 4.44 9 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory14 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.80 1.14 -7.80 2.39 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory16 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
90.00 5.22 2.44 -3.22 4.32 9 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory17 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.56 1.94 -5.22 3.19 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory18 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
80.00 6.50 2.33 -6.88 3.09 8 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory19 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.10 2.28 -7.50 3.17 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory2 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.30 1.49 -3.40 3.86 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory21 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.00 1.73 -5.82 2.99 11 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory22 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 6.67 2.74 -1.58 3.68 12 12 
newzealandnaturalterritory27 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
92.90 7.15 2.30 -5.38 3.64 13 14 
newzealandnaturalterritory28 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
81.80 6.44 2.07 -3.00 4.24 9 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory3 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.67 1.78 -7.67 3.28 12 12 
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newzealandnaturalterritory30 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.13 1.89 -2.75 3.88 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory31 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 9.30 1.34 -5.40 5.85 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory33 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.75 1.04 -7.88 2.23 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory35 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
90.90 7.00 2.75 -5.80 4.54 10 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory37 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.88 1.25 -5.38 6.57 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory38 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.00 3.10 -6.33 2.77 12 12 
newzealandnaturalterritory39 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 9.33 .87 -7.33 3.35 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory4 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 9.00 2.00 -6.22 3.56 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory42 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.63 2.20 -6.00 2.00 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory43 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.50 1.18 -7.10 2.08 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory45 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.88 0.99 -7.75 1.98 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory46 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.67 2.18 -6.56 3.00 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory47 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.29 1.86 -6.12 3.46 17 17 
newzealandnaturalterritory50 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 6.82 2.09 -5.55 2.91 11 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory51  
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.50 1.65 -6.70 3.09 10 10 
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newzealandnaturalterritory52 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
90.00 7.33 2.50 -4.67 4.61 9 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory53 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 6.17 2.69 -6.17 3.24 12 12 
newzealandnaturalterritory55 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.27 2.15 -6.00 4.07 11 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory58 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.27 2.53 -6.91 2.59 11 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory59 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
88.90 8.00 1.51 -7.00 2.20 8 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory60 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.80 1.99 -6.60 2.72 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritory62 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.38 1.66 -7.38 2.06 13 13 
newzealandnaturalterritory66 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 6.27 2.25 -5.80 3.26 15 15 
newzealandnaturalterritory67 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
66.70 6.00 2.33 -1.88 5.49 8 12 
newzealandnaturalterritory69 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
91.70 8.36 1.80 -7.18 2.99 11 12 
newzealandnaturalterritory7 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
90.90 8.70 1.42 -7.40 2.95 10 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory70 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.00 2.00 -5.73 4.80 11 11 
newzealandnaturalterritory71 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.63 1.19 -8.00 1.51 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory72 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 9.00 1.07 -3.88 3.64 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory73 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
91.70 5.36 2.29 -3.36 2.77 11 12 
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newzealandnaturalterritory74 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.50 1.31 -7.00 1.41 8 8 
newzealandnaturalterritory76 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.44 1.67 -6.00 2.35 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory77 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.78 1.09 -6.33 2.74 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory78 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.50 2.20 -3.75 3.19 12 12 
newzealandnaturalterritory81 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 9.08 1.16 -7.17 4.93 12 12 
newzealandnaturalterritory82 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 7.56 1.24 -5.33 2.74 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritory83 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 6.67 2.45 -5.78 3.96 9 9 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew1 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
88.90 5.25 2.49 -1.75 3.41 8 9 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew2 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.45 1.44 -5.91 5.19 11 11 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew3 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 9.54 .66 -7.62 3.36 13 13 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew5 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 5.60 2.59 -5.90 2.92 10 10 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew6 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
91.70 7.91 2.55 -6.73 2.97 11 12 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew7 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
90.90 6.60 1.84 -2.60 4.90 10 11 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew8 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.00 2.00 -6.36 2.84 11 11 
newzealandnaturalterritorynew9 
New Zealand 
natural territory 
100.00 8.67 1.50 -6.89 2.71 9 9 
assault2 Social threat 100.00 7.62 1.12 6.85 1.95 13 13 
  
177 
 
assault3 Social threat 100.00 7.23 1.83 6.23 3.06 13 13 
assault4 Social threat 100.00 7.45 2.16 6.64 2.87 11 11 
assault5 Social threat 100.00 7.40 2.17 7.50 2.32 10 10 
bomb2 Social threat 88.90 6.25 1.98 7.63 2.67 8 9 
bullying1 Social threat 100.00 7.90 1.45 7.30 2.71 10 10 
bullying3 Social threat 100.00 8.50 1.51 7.38 2.67 8 8 
bullying4 Social threat 100.00 8.11 1.90 7.33 3.24 9 9 
bullying5  Social threat 100.00 7.75 1.58 6.75 2.82 8 8 
drugabuse2 Social threat 81.80 7.67 2.96 4.56 5.83 9 11 
drugabuse3 Social threat 100.00 6.67 2.69 5.56 3.13 9 9 
drugabuse5 Social threat 100.00 6.36 2.66 6.73 3.07 11 11 
drugs1 Social threat 100.00 6.73 1.79 6.18 2.56 11 11 
drugs2 Social threat 90.00 6.89 2.67 5.78 4.06 9 10 
drugs3 Social threat 90.90 6.40 2.46 6.30 4.52 10 11 
drugs5 Social threat 100.00 7.07 2.30 7.07 2.87 14 14 
fear1 Social threat 100.00 4.38 3.36 3.08 3.50 13 13 
fear2 Social threat 100.00 3.11 2.26 1.22 1.92 9 9 
fear3 Social threat 100.00 4.33 2.45 3.11 3.10 9 9 
fear5 Social threat 92.30 4.83 2.25 5.00 2.89 12 13 
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gang1 Social threat 81.80 5.67 1.41 3.33 3.08 9 11 
gang2 Social threat 100.00 7.88 1.25 8.00 1.60 8 8 
gang3 Social threat 100.00 6.80 2.49 5.40 3.53 10 10 
gang4 Social threat 81.80 5.67 3.04 4.33 2.50 9 11 
guns1 Social threat 90.00 4.89 2.52 5.67 3.61 9 10 
gunsnew Social threat 90.00 6.56 1.59 6.78 2.68 9 10 
intimidation3 Social threat 90.00 6.11 3.30 5.00 3.04 9 10 
intimidation4 Social threat 88.90 6.00 2.27 3.38 4.07 8 9 
intimidation5 Social threat 90.00 6.56 2.24 5.56 2.70 9 10 
intimidationnew Social threat 66.70 6.38 2.62 6.00 2.56 8 12 
looting4 Social threat 80.00 7.13 1.89 6.13 3.68 8 10 
looting5 Social threat 72.70 7.63 2.00 5.75 3.62 8 11 
powerful Social threat 57.10 6.38 2.00 3.50 3.46 8 14 
powerhungry1 Social threat 90.00 5.78 2.99 5.44 4.19 9 10 
racism4 Social threat 100.00 7.45 1.69 8.00 2.41 11 11 
racism6 Social threat 91.70 7.27 2.28 5.27 3.29 11 12 
rape2 Social threat 88.90 5.63 2.92 6.63 3.34 8 9 
religionextremism2 Social threat 100.00 5.38 2.22 3.38 3.18 13 13 
religionextremism3 Social threat 100.00 6.78 2.17 5.78 2.44 9 9 
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religionextremism6 Social threat 100.00 8.22 1.56 7.44 3.17 9 9 
rudeness1 Social threat 100.00 6.10 2.08 6.40 2.80 10 10 
rudeness2 Social threat 100.00 4.50 2.83 3.50 2.93 8 8 
rudeness3 Social threat 100.00 4.44 1.94 4.00 2.96 9 9 
rudeness4 Social threat 100.00 5.27 2.69 5.00 4.05 11 11 
terrorism5 Social threat 80.00 6.88 2.17 7.38 1.92 8 10 
violence2 Social threat 100.00 7.25 1.04 7.50 2.93 8 8 
violence4 Social threat 90.90 7.60 1.43 7.90 1.52 10 11 
violence5 Social threat 92.90 8.23 1.83 7.69 2.14 13 14 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation. Images included in the experimental stimuli are presented in boldface.  
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Appendix F. Examples of Images Selected for Study 3C per Type of Condition 
Appendix F1. Economic Threat 
These images have been removed for copyright reasons. 
Appendix F2. Natural Threat 
These images have been removed for copyright reasons. 
Appendix F3. Social Threat 
These images have been removed for copyright reasons. 
Appendix F4. Control  
These images have been removed for copyright reasons. 
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Appendix G. Description of the Control Measures Initially Included in Study 3 
Appendix G1. Measures Included in Studies 3A, 3B and 3C 
Impact of the scenario. Participants were asked about the extent to which the 
scenario would impact their life and result in negative consequences. Participants’ answers 
could vary from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely).  
Positive and negative affect. The positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS) was 
used to measure affect (Watson et al., 1988). This measure includes two factors that enclose 
positive (e.g. “proud”) and negative (e.g. “guilty”) affect. The measure was answered on a 5-
point scale, varying from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely). The number of 
factors, as well as their high internal reliability, has been confirmed by previous research 
(Crawford & Henry, 2004). 
Values. The short form of the Schwartz Value Survey (SSVS) was used to measure 
values (Lindeman & Verkasalo, 2005). This measure maintains the circumplex relationship 
between values. The SSVS includes 10 items rated on a 9-point scale ranging from 0 
(opposed to my principles) to 8 (of supreme importance). An additional environmental item 
(“UNIVERSALISM – NATURE/ENVIRONMENTAL - beauty of nature, unity with nature, 
environmental protection”) was included in Studies 3A, 3B and 3C to provide a finer 
distinction between the social and environmental universalism dimensions.  
Appendix G2. Measure Included in Studies 3B and 3C 
Impact of the scenario. Three items measured the level of pleasure, arousal and 
control that participants felt after reading the scenario (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Answers were 
given in a 5-point semantic differential scale with images attached to each of the points. The 
items varied from Happy/Pleased to Unhappy/Unsatisfied, from Excited/Aroused to 
Calm/Relaxed, and from Submissive/Controlled to Dominant/In control.
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Appendix H. Study 3A Actual Survey 
Appendix H1. Information Sheet for the Actual Survey 
 
Welcome! 
What is the purpose of this research? 
You will be presented with one brief scenario. We are interested on your view of it and also on 
how you feel about it. The goal of this research is to understand your perceptions, evaluations 
and feelings towards this scenario. 
Who is conducting the research? 
Clara Cantal is a PhD student in the School of Psychology of Victoria University of Wellington. 
Dr. Taciano Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson are responsible for supervising this project and the 
other projects in the student thesis. This research has been approved by the School of 
Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of the VUW Human Ethics 
Committee (Approved 29/07/2013; Reference number: RM019658).  
What is involved if you agree to participate? 
If you agree to participate in this study you will be asked to complete a short survey. The survey 
asks you about social, economic and natural threats, and some demographic questions. We 
anticipate that the survey will take you no more than 30 minutes to complete. During the 
research you are free to withdraw at any point before your survey has been completed. 
Privacy and confidentiality 
This survey is anonymous. Please do not put your name anywhere on the survey. You will never 
be identified in my research project or in any other presentation or publication. The information 
you provide will be coded by number only. We will keep your survey for at least five years 
after publication. In accordance with the requirements of some scientific journals and 
organizations, your coded survey may be shared with other competent researchers. Your coded 
data may be used in other, related studies. A copy of the coded data will remain in the custody 
of Clara Cantal in the Environmental Psychology Lab. Provided ID will only be used to award 
IPRP credits for taking part in the study and will not be stored. 
What happens to the information that you provide? 
The data you provide may be used for the following purposes: The overall findings may be 
submitted for publication in a scientific journal, or presented at scientific conferences. The 
findings will be part of a PhD thesis that will be submitted for assessment. If you would like to 
know the results of this study, they will be available approximately next year (2014) upon 
request via email to Ms. Cantal. 
Consent for participation 
Please note that by completing and returning the questionnaire to the researchers online you 
agree that your survey responses will be used and analyzed. If you have any further questions 
regarding this study, please do not hesitate to contact the investigator listed below. 
 
Thank you for considering participating in this research! 
Clara Cantal 
PhD Student 
Environmental Psychology Lab. 
School of Psychology, Faculty of Science 
Victoria University of Wellington 
  
183 
 
Email: Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Do you consent your participation? 
 Yes 
 No  
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete our study! This study has three parts. In the first part 
you will be presented with a scenario and asked to think about it. The second part asks 
you several questions related to the scenario. After these sections related to the scenario, you 
will be presented with the third and final part with socio-demographic questions. Please click 
'next' to proceed to the first part. 
 
Appendix H2. Main Questionnaire for the Actual Survey 
Appendix H2.1. Main questionnaire for the threat conditions 
Please imagine the scenario described below as real and happening right now in New Zealand. 
After reading the scenario, you will be asked to answer five questions related to the scenario. 
 
[Threat scenario] 
Please take two minutes to ENVISION this scenario. After two minutes, the survey will give 
you the option to progress to the next page. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Now, after imagining yourself in this scenario, please complete the following questions. Please 
read each question carefully. You will probably find that in some cases your answers to this 
scenario might be different to what they would be otherwise, while for other questions your 
answers won’t be that different. It’s important that you read each question and select your 
answers carefully, being at all times mindful of the scenario you read before.        
 
1. To what extent did the scenario you just read present social threats?  
(Social threats are associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to the creation of a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and 
disruption to others’ lives.)   
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2. To what extent did the scenario you just read present economic threats?  
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(Economic threats are associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. To what extent did the scenario you just read present natural threats?  
(Natural threats are associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect 
the way you and others live.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
4. Please mark the degree to which you think that the situation presented in the scenario would 
impact your life and result in negative consequences. 
 
Not at all  Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Thank you for completing the first part of this study. Please click 'next' to move to the second 
part. In the second part of this study you will be asked to answer the questions thinking about 
the scenario you just read. After answering these questions, you will be asked for some socio-
demographic data in the third part. 
 
 
Part 2 
 
1. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO… We would like you to give your best guess 
about the percentage of people in New Zealand that would do each of the following things 
provided there were no apparent personal gains or losses as a result of their action. That is, the 
percentage of people in New Zealand that would do these things just because they could.    
Please note this research is designed to measure people’s best guesses about the percentage of 
New Zealanders that would do each of these things in a hypothetical, consequence-free 
situation. It does not matter if you have no idea of the actual or official number; we are interested 
in your best guess or estimation. Please try to give your best guess for every item. 
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a. Rob someone.  ___% 
b. Mug someone.  ___% 
c. Break into someone’s house.  ___% 
d. Commit a violent crime.  ___% 
e. Attack someone for no reason at all.  ___% 
f. Attack someone purely out of meanness. ___% 
g. Terrorize other people. ___% 
h. Abuse their children. ___% 
i. Deal drugs. ___% 
 
 
2. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO... We would like you to give your best guess 
about the percentage of people in New Zealand that would do each of the following things 
provided there were no apparent personal gains or losses as a result of their action. That is, the 
percentage of people in New Zealand that would do these things just because they could.    
Please note this research is designed to measure people’s best guesses about the percentage of 
New Zealanders that would do each of these things in a hypothetical, consequence-free 
situation. It does not matter if you have no idea of the actual or official number; we are interested 
in your best guess or estimation. Please try to give your best guess for every item. 
 
a. Charm someone to manipulate them. ___% 
b. Take advantage of people that play by the rules. ___% 
c. Intimidate someone to get what they want. ___% 
d. Put money, wealth and luxury before other important concerns. ___% 
e. Trick their friends out of an important opportunity. ___% 
f. Intimidate someone with their social position to get what they want. ___% 
g. Be cruel to another person to impress their friends. ___% 
h. Deliberately make a mess someone else had to clean up. ___% 
i. Treat poor people as if they were scum. ___% 
3. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO... Please indicate to what extent you disagree 
or agree with each of the following statements of opinion by marking the number (ranging 
from -4 to +4) that best reflects your degree of disagreement or agreement given the scenario 
you just read. 
 
 
-4= Very strongly disagree              
-3=  Strongly disagree         
-2= Somewhat disagree     
-1 = Slightly disagree         
  0= Unsure/neutral                 
+1= Slightly agree        
+2= Somewhat agree           
+3= Strongly agree                 
+4= Very strongly agree   
 
a. Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your 
weakness, so it’s best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
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b. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
c. Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws. 
  
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
d. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on 
troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
e. Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
f. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
g. It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
h. Strong, tough government will harm not help our country 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
i. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
j. The way things are going in this country, it's going to take a lot of "strong medicine" to 
straighten out the troublemakers, criminals, and perverts. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
k. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
l. Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much 
better care, instead of so much punishment. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
m. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, 
and pay more attention to family values.  
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
n. People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws that they don’t agree with. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
o. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is 
too late. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
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p. Nobody should stick to the "straight and narrow". Instead people should break loose and try 
out lots of different ideas and experiences. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
q. Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize, and 
confront established authorities. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
r. The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
 
4. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO... Indicate how much you oppose or favour 
each idea below by selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below. You can work quickly; 
your first feeling is generally best. Consider the scenario you read previously. 
 
1= Strongly disagree 
2= Somewhat disagree 
3= Slightly disagree 
4= Neutral 
5= Slightly agree 
6= Somewhat agree 
7= Strongly agree 
 
a. Having some groups on top really benefits everybody. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
b. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
c. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
d. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
e. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
f. No one group should dominate in society. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
g. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
h. Group dominance is a poor principle.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
i. We should not push for group equality. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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j. We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
k. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
l. Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
m. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
n. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
o. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the same 
chance in life.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
p. Group equality should be our ideal. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
 
5. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO... Sometimes, people use the terms “left-
wing” or “right-wing” to describe their political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these 
terms? Select the option that best describes you. 
 
 1. Extremely left-wing 
 2. Left-wing 
 3. Slightly left-wing 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly right-wing 
 6. Right-wing 
  7. Extremely right-wing 
 
6. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO... Imagine that there is a national election 
coming in a few days. Given this scenario, which political party would you vote for? 
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 ACT  
 Green  
 Labour 
 Mana 
 Māori 
 National 
 NZ First 
 United Future 
 
7. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO... Sometimes, people use the terms “liberal” 
or “conservative” to describe their political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? 
Select the option that best describes you. 
 
 1. Extremely liberal 
 2. Liberal 
 3. Slightly liberal 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly conservative 
 6. Conservative 
 7. Extremely conservative 
 
 
Part 3 
 
1. This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment, after 
answering the questions displayed on this study. Use the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1 = Very slightly or not at all 
2 = A little  
3 = Moderately 
4 = Quite a bit  
5 = Extremely 
 
___ interested                     ___ irritable 
___ distressed                     ___ alert 
___  excited                        ___ ashamed 
___ upset                            ___inspired        
___ strong                          ___ nervous 
___ guilty                           ___determined 
___ scared                          ___ attentive 
___ hostile                         ___  jittery 
___ enthusiastic                 ___ active 
___ proud                          ___ afraid 
 
 
 
 
2. Please rate the importance of the following values as a life-guiding principle for you. Use the 
following scale to rate each value:  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8. Remember that:  
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0 = Opposed to my principles 
1 = Not important 
2 
3 
4 = Important 
5 
6 
7 = Very important 
8 = Of supreme importance 
 
 
 
a. POWER (social power, authority, wealth) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
b. ACHIEVEMENT (success, capability, ambition, influence on people and events) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
c. HEDONISM (gratification of desires, enjoyment in life, self-indulgence) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
d. STIMULATION (daring, a varied and challenging life, an exciting life) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
 
e. SELF-DIRECTION (creativity, freedom, curiosity, independence, choosing one’s own 
goals) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
f. UNIVERSALISM – SOCIAL (broad-mindedness, beauty of arts, social justice, a world at 
peace, equality, wisdom) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
g. UNIVERSALISM – NATURE/ENVIRONMENTAL (beauty of nature, unity with nature, 
environmental protection) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
h. BENEVOLENCE (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
i. TRADITION (respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting one's portion in life, devotion, 
modesty) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
j. CONFORMITY (obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline, politeness) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
k. SECURITY (national security, family security, social order, cleanliness, reciprocation of 
favors) 
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0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
 
 
3. Please, read the following questions and mark the alternative that best describes how you 
feel about New Zealand and New Zealanders. 
 
a. I often think about the fact that I am a New Zealander. 
_ Strongly disagree 
_ Moderately disagree  
_ Neither agree or disagree 
_ Moderately agree 
_ Strongly agree 
 
b. The fact that I am a member of New Zealand society is an important part of my identity. 
_ Strongly disagree 
_ Moderately disagree 
_ Neither agree or disagree 
_ Moderately agree 
_ Strongly agree 
 
c. Being a New Zealander is an important part of how I see myself. 
_ Strongly disagree 
_ Moderately disagree 
_ Neither agree or disagree 
_ Moderately agree 
_ Strongly agree 
 
4. How old are you (in years)? _____ 
 
5. Are you male or female?                              Male  Female         
 
6. Were you Born in New Zealand?   Yes    No 
  
7. Which is your ethnicity? 
 European                                       Asian                    
 Maori                                             Other: _________ 
 Pacific Islander     
 
8. Which () is your highest degree of education?  
 Primary School            College or University Degree                    
 High school                  Specialization, MBA, Masters or Doctorate 
 
9. Do you have kids?       Yes    No 
 
10. How many? _____ 
 
11. Do you usually vote in New Zealand?  Yes    No 
 
  
192 
 
12. Please rate how strongly you oppose or support each of the following political parties. 
 
a. ACT 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
b. Green 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
c. Labour 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
d. Mana 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
e. Māori 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
f. National 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
g. NZ First 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
h. United Future 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
 
13. Please type your surname and student ID below. (Remember that this information will only 
be used for awarding of credit, and that it will be removed from the dataset.) 
Surname: ____ 
Student ID: ____ 
 
 
Appendix H2.2. Main questionnaire for the control condition 
Please imagine the personal scenario described below as real and happening right now in New 
Zealand. The personal scenario will be presented along with some real facts about New 
Zealand. After reading the personal scenario and the facts, you will be asked to answer five 
questions related to the scenario and the facts. 
 
[Control scenario] 
Please take two minutes to ENVISION this personal scenario and the facts about New Zealand. 
After two minutes, the survey will give you the option to progress to the next page. Please type 
the first few words that come to mind when thinking about this scenario. 
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Now, after imagining yourself in the personal scenario and reading real facts about New 
Zealand, please complete the following questions. Please read each item carefully. You will 
probably find that in some cases your answers to this personal scenario might be different to 
what they would be otherwise, while for other questions your answers won’t be that different. 
It’s important that you read each question and select your answers carefully, being at all times 
mindful of the scenario you read before.           
 
1. To what extent did the personal scenario and the facts you just read present social threats?  
(Social threats are associated with the way people behave toward others “just because they can”, 
which may lead to the creation of a dangerous and threatening place, causing harm and 
disruption to others’ lives.)   
 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
2. To what extent did the personal scenario and the facts you just read present economic threats?  
(Economic threats are associated with the competition for power and resources between people 
and by hierarchical relationships between individuals and social groups.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
3. To what extent did the personal scenario and the facts you just read present natural threats?  
(Natural threats are associated with natural disasters that could impact your society and affect 
the way you and others live.) 
 
Not at all 
present 
       Extremely 
present 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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4. Please mark the degree to which you think that the situation presented in the personal scenario 
and the facts presented in the text would impact your life and result in negative consequences. 
 
Not at all  Extremely 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
Thank you for completing the first part of this study. Please click 'next' to move to the second 
part. In the second part of this study you will be asked to answer the questions thinking about 
the personal scenario and the real facts about New Zealand you just read. After answering 
these questions, you will be asked for some socio-demographic data in the third part. 
 
Part 2 
 
1. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE REAL FACTS 
ABOUT NEW ZEALAND... We would like you to give your best guess about the percentage 
of people in New Zealand that would do each of the following things provided there were no 
apparent personal gains or losses as a result of their action. That is, the percentage of people in 
New Zealand that would do these things just because they could.    Please note this research is 
designed to measure people’s best guesses about the percentage of New Zealanders that would 
do each of these things in a hypothetical, consequence-free situation. It does not matter if you 
have no idea of the actual or official number; we are interested in your best guess or estimation. 
Please try to give your best guess for every item. 
 
a. Rob someone.  ___% 
b. Mug someone.  ___% 
c. Break into someone’s house.  ___% 
d. Commit a violent crime.  ___% 
e. Attack someone for no reason at all.  ___% 
f. Attack someone purely out of meanness. ___% 
g. Terrorize other people. ___% 
h. Abuse their children. ___% 
i. Deal drugs. ___% 
 
 
2. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE REAL FACTS 
ABOUT NEW ZEALAND... We would like you to give your best guess about the percentage 
of people in New Zealand that would do each of the following things provided there were no 
apparent personal gains or losses as a result of their action. That is, the percentage of people in 
New Zealand that would do these things just because they could.    Please note this research is 
designed to measure people’s best guesses about the percentage of New Zealanders that would 
do each of these things in a hypothetical, consequence-free situation. It does not matter if you 
have no idea of the actual or official number; we are interested in your best guess or estimation. 
Please try to give your best guess for every item. 
 
a. Charm someone to manipulate them. ___% 
b. Take advantage of people that play by the rules. ___% 
c. Intimidate someone to get what they want. ___% 
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d. Put money, wealth and luxury before other important concerns. ___% 
e. Trick their friends out of an important opportunity. ___% 
f. Intimidate someone with their social position to get what they want. ___% 
g. Be cruel to another person to impress their friends. ___% 
h. Deliberately make a mess someone else had to clean up. ___% 
i. Treat poor people as if they were scum. ___% 
3. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE REAL FACTS 
ABOUT NEW ZEALAND... Please indicate to what extent you disagree or agree with each of 
the following statements of opinion by marking the number (ranging from -4 to +4) that best 
reflects your degree of disagreement or agreement given the scenario and the facts you just 
read. 
 
 
-4= Very strongly disagree              
-3=  Strongly disagree         
-2= Somewhat disagree     
-1 = Slightly disagree         
  0= Unsure/neutral                 
+1= Slightly agree        
+2= Somewhat agree           
+3= Strongly agree                 
+4= Very strongly agree   
 
a. Being kind to loafers or criminals will only encourage them to take advantage of your 
weakness, so it’s best to use a firm, tough hand when dealing with them. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
b. Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
c. Our society does NOT need tougher government and stricter laws. 
  
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
d. The facts on crime and the recent public disorders show we have to crack down harder on 
troublemakers, if we are going preserve law and order. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
e. Our country will be great if we show respect for authority and obey our leaders 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
f. There is nothing wrong with premarital sexual intercourse. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
g. It’s great that many young people today are prepared to defy authority. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
h. Strong, tough government will harm not help our country 
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-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
i. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
j. The way things are going in this country, it's going to take a lot of "strong medicine" to 
straighten out the troublemakers, criminals, and perverts. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
k. What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
l. Our prisons are a shocking disgrace. Criminals are unfortunate people who deserve much 
better care, instead of so much punishment. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
m. This country will flourish if young people stop experimenting with drugs, alcohol, and sex, 
and pay more attention to family values.  
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
n. People should be ready to protest against and challenge laws that they don’t agree with. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
o. God’s laws about abortion, pornography, and marriage must be strictly followed before it is 
too late. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
p. Nobody should stick to the "straight and narrow". Instead people should break loose and try 
out lots of different ideas and experiences. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
q. Students at high schools and at university must be encouraged to challenge, criticize, and 
confront established authorities. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
r. The “old-fashioned ways” and “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to live. 
-4    -3    -2    -1    0    +1    +2    +3    +4 
 
 
4. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE REAL FACTS 
ABOUT NEW ZEALAND... Indicate how much you oppose or favour each idea below by 
selecting a number from 1 to 7 on the scale below. You can work quickly; your first feeling is 
generally best. Consider the scenario and the facts you read previously. 
 
1= Strongly disagree 
2= Somewhat disagree 
3= Slightly disagree 
4= Neutral 
5= Slightly agree 
6= Somewhat agree 
  
197 
 
7= Strongly agree 
 
a. Having some groups on top really benefits everybody. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
b. It’s probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top and other groups are at the bottom. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
c. An ideal society requires some groups to be on top and others to be on the bottom. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
d. Some groups of people are simply inferior to other groups.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
e. Groups at the bottom are just as deserving as groups at the top.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
f. No one group should dominate in society. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
g. Groups at the bottom should not have to stay in their place.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
h. Group dominance is a poor principle.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
i. We should not push for group equality. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
j. We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the same quality of life. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
k. It is unjust to try to make groups equal. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
l. Group equality should not be our primary goal. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
m. We should work to give all groups an equal chance to succeed. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
n. We should do what we can to equalize conditions for different groups. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
o. No matter how much effort it takes, we ought to strive to ensure that all groups have the same 
chance in life.  
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
p. Group equality should be our ideal. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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5. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE REAL FACTS 
ABOUT NEW ZEALAND... Sometimes, people use the terms “left-wing” or “right-wing” to 
describe their political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option 
that best describes you. 
 
 1. Extremely left-wing 
 2. Left-wing 
 3. Slightly left-wing 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly right-wing 
 6. Right-wing 
  7. Extremely right-wing 
 
6. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE REAL FACTS 
ABOUT NEW ZEALAND... Imagine that there is a national election coming in a few days. 
Given this scenario, which political party would you vote for? 
 
 ACT  
 Green  
 Labour 
 Mana 
 Māori 
 National 
 NZ First 
 United Future 
 
7. STILL THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE REAL FACTS 
ABOUT NEW ZEALAND...  Sometimes, people use the terms “liberal” or “conservative” to 
describe their political beliefs. How would you rate yourself in these terms? Select the option 
that best describes you. 
 
 1. Extremely liberal 
 2. Liberal 
 3. Slightly liberal 
 4. Moderate 
 5. Slightly conservative 
 6. Conservative 
 7. Extremely conservative 
 
 
Part 3 
 
1. This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. 
Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the present moment, after 
answering the questions displayed on this study. Use the following scale to record your answers. 
 
1 = Very slightly or not at all 
2 = A little  
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3 = Moderately 
4 = Quite a bit  
5 = Extremely 
 
___ interested                     ___ irritable 
___ distressed                     ___ alert 
___  excited                        ___ ashamed 
___ upset                            ___inspired        
___ strong                          ___ nervous 
___ guilty                           ___determined 
___ scared                          ___ attentive 
___ hostile                         ___  jittery 
___ enthusiastic                 ___ active 
___ proud                          ___ afraid 
 
 
 
 
2. Please rate the importance of the following values as a life-guiding principle for you. Use the 
following scale to rate each value:  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8. Remember that:  
 
0 = Opposed to my principles 
1 = Not important 
2 
3 
4 = Important 
5 
6 
7 = Very important 
8 = Of supreme importance 
 
 
 
a. POWER (social power, authority, wealth) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
b. ACHIEVEMENT (success, capability, ambition, influence on people and events) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
c. HEDONISM (gratification of desires, enjoyment in life, self-indulgence) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
d. STIMULATION (daring, a varied and challenging life, an exciting life) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
e. SELF-DIRECTION (creativity, freedom, curiosity, independence, choosing one’s own 
goals) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
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f. UNIVERSALISM – SOCIAL (broad-mindedness, beauty of arts, social justice, a world at 
peace, equality, wisdom) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
g. UNIVERSALISM – NATURE/ENVIRONMENTAL (beauty of nature, unity with nature, 
environmental protection) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
h. BENEVOLENCE (helpfulness, honesty, forgiveness, loyalty, responsibility) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
i. TRADITION (respect for tradition, humbleness, accepting one's portion in life, devotion, 
modesty) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
j. CONFORMITY (obedience, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline, politeness) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
k. SECURITY (national security, family security, social order, cleanliness, reciprocation of 
favors) 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
 
 
 
3. Please, read the following questions and mark the alternative that best describes how you 
feel about New Zeland and New Zealanders. 
 
a. I often think about the fact that I am a New Zealander. 
_ Strongly disagree 
_ Moderately disagree  
_ Neither agree or disagree 
_ Moderately agree 
_ Strongly agree 
 
b. The fact that I am a member of New Zealand society is an important part of my identity. 
_ Strongly disagree 
_ Moderately disagree 
_ Neither agree or disagree 
_ Moderately agree 
_ Strongly agree 
 
c. Being a New Zealander is an important part of how I see myself. 
_ Strongly disagree 
_ Moderately disagree 
_ Neither agree or disagree 
_ Moderately agree 
_ Strongly agree 
 
4. How old are you (in years)? _____ 
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5. Are you male or female?                              Male  Female         
 
6. Were you Born in New Zealand?   Yes    No 
  
7. Which is your ethnicity? 
 European                                       Asian                    
 Maori                                             Other: _________ 
 Pacific Islander     
 
8. Which () is your highest degree of education?  
 Primary School            College or University Degree                    
 High school                  Specialization, MBA, Masters or Doctorate 
 
9. Do you have kids?       Yes    No 
 
10. How many? _____ 
 
11. Do you usually vote in New Zealand?  Yes    No 
 
12. Please rate how strongly you oppose or support each of the following political parties. 
 
a. ACT 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
b. Green 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
c. Labour 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
d. Mana 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
e. Māori 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
f. National 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
g. NZ First 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
h. United Future 
(Strongly oppose) 1    2    3    4    5    6    7 (Strongly support) 
 
 
13. Please type your surname and student ID below. (Remember that this information will only 
be used for awarding of credit, and that it will be removed from the dataset.) 
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Surname: ____ 
Student ID: ____ 
 
 
Appendix H3. Debriefing for the Actual Survey 
The aim of this study is to evaluate if people can differentiate between social, economic and 
natural threat. These types of threat often appear mixed or are not well delimited in the 
literature, which makes it difficult to study whether different threats have a different impact on 
people’ behaviors.  Different participants in this study read different kinds of scenarios, 
evaluating their link to social, economic and natural threat, and answering questions about 
attitudes related to them. The results of the various participants will be evaluated together in 
order to evaluate if different scenarios are linked to different kinds of threat and attitudes. 
Results from this study will contribute to the existing literature by providing initial information 
to test how these differential threats impact people’ behaviors. 
 
The research project is being conducted by Clara Cantal, a PhD student, and her supervisors, 
Dr. Taciano L. Milfont and Dr. Marc Wilson, from the School of Psychology, Victoria 
University of Wellington. If you have any questions regarding your involvement in this 
research, or issues regarding the research in general, please do not hesitate to contact me via e-
mail at Clara.Cantal@vuw.ac.nz 
 
Thanks again! 
 
Clara Cantal 
Taciano Milfont 
Marc Wilson 
 
Thank you for participating in our study!
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Appendix I. Study 3A Correlation Table 
 
Table I.1   
Descriptive statistics and correlations between measures in Study 3A 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Right-wing 
authoritarianism (pre-test) 
- .68** .44** .47** .41** .14 .05 .72** .41** .54** .55** .31** 
2. Social dominance 
orientation (pre-test) 
- - .31** .28** .34** .02 .00 .40** .55** .38** .38** .22* 
3. Left/right orientation 
(pre-test) 
- - - .64** .49** .18* .20* .46** .27** .52** .46** .35** 
4. Liberal/conservative 
orientation (pre-test) 
- - - - .30** .09 .13 .43** .16 .47** .56** .13 
5. Liberal/conservative 
voting intention (pre-test) 
- - - - - .18 .17 .43** .12 .45** .32** .76** 
6. Competitive worldview - - - - - - .67** .15* .09 .09 .08 .10 
7. Dangerous worldview - - - - - - - .12 .03 .06 .09 .05 
8. Right-wing 
authoritarianism (post-
test) 
- - - - - - - - .39** .51** .45** .42** 
9. Social dominance 
orientation (post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - .30** .29** .24** 
10. Left/right orientation 
(post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - .60** .36** 
11. Liberal/conservative 
orientation (post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - .28** 
12. Liberal/conservative 
voting intention (post-
test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - 
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M 2.81 2.32 3.34 3.24 .42 38.68 23.92 -.66 2.92 3.46 3.34 .35 
SD .80 .95 1.20 1.28 - 20.15 16.83 1.02 .88 1.18 1.22 - 
α .92 .74 - - - .93 .93 .86 .87 - - - 
Skewness -.05 .41 -.18 -.02 .31 .34 .77 -.50 -.03 .14 .21 .64 
Kurtosis -.67 -.65 -.15 -.50 -1.94 -.76 -.25 .75 -.69 -.02 -.20 -1.60 
Note. *p < .05; ** p < .01. Point biserial correlation coefficients are provided for analyses including liberal/conservative voting intention.
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Appendix J. Study 3A Correlations between Sentiments toward Political Parties 
 
Table J.1  
Correlations between sentiments toward five of New Zealand’s political parties in Study 3A 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. ACTa - -.19** -.09 .25** .63** 
2. Green - - .54** -.39** -.11 
3. Labour - - - -.41** -.02 
4. National - - - - .14* 
5. NZ First - - - - - 
Note. n = 215. *p < .05; **p < .01. a No participant reported intention to vote 
for the ACT political party in the pre-experimental dataset and only one 
participant reported intention to vote for this political party in the post-
experimental dataset. 
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Appendix K. Study 3B Correlation Table 
 
Table K.1   
Descriptive statistics and correlations between measures in Study 3B 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Right-wing 
authoritarianism (pre-
test) 
- .58** .45** .44** .32** .24** .22* .16 .15 .68** .52** .51** .61** .35** .18 
2. Social dominance 
orientation (pre-test) 
- - .39** .26** .17 .44** .16 .11 .11 .46** .76** .48** .39** .23* .28** 
3. Left/right orientation 
(pre-test) 
- - - .70** .50** .20* .12 -.01 .09 .49** .31** .68** .62** .51** .41** 
4. Liberal/conservative 
orientation (pre-test) 
- - - - .34** .08 .05 -.01 .00 .51** .28** .54** .71** .42** .31** 
5. Liberal/conservative 
voting intention (pre-test) 
- - - - - .18 .21 .10 .05 .30** .14 .49** .42** .79** .37** 
6. Competitive 
worldview (Duckitt et al., 
2002) 
- - - - - - .11 .26** .15 .29** .40** .32** .16 .14 .26** 
7. Competitive 
worldview (Perry & 
Sibley, 2010) 
- - - - - - - .37** .78** .10 .12 .24** .15 .10 .01 
8. Dangerous worldview 
(Duckitt et al., 2002) 
- - - - - - - - .26** .18* .11 .19* .03 .09 -.02 
9. Dangerous worldview 
(Perry & Sibley, 2010) 
- - - - - - - - - .07 .11 .14 .07 .07 -.03 
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10. Right-wing 
authoritarianism (post-
test) 
- - - - - - - - - - .51** .54** .56** .44** .31** 
11. Social dominance 
orientation (post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - .38** .38** .29** .28** 
12. Left/right orientation 
(post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - .58** .38** .32** 
13. Liberal/conservative 
orientation (post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - .35** .32** 
14. Liberal/conservative 
voting intention (post-
test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - .32** 
15. Liberal/conservative 
political discourse 
preference 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
M 2.59 2.78 3.23 3.08 .53 2.58 36.39 3.90 22.70 -1.04 2.78 3.38 3.00 .41 .59 
SD .85 1.01 1.22 1.29 - .84 20.09 .89 16.73 1.16 .99 1.04 1.01 - - 
α .94 .91 - - - .78 .94 .72 .93 .89 .90 - - - - 
Skewness .21 -.09 .10 .52 -.13 1.02 .41 -.18 1.04 .08 .21 -.02 .25 .39 -.36 
Kurtosis 
-
1.00 
-1.14 -.09 .25 -2.04 2.26 -.50 -.17 .79 .29 -.72 .36 -.83 -1.88 -1.90 
Note. *p < .05; ** p < .01. Point biserial correlation coefficients are provided for analyses including liberal/conservative voting intention and political discourse preference.
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Appendix L. Validation of the Political Discourses  
Appendix L1. Brief Description of Method, Results and Conclusion 
The political discourses were based on available information on the political parties’ 
websites and on speeches delivered in the opening parliamentary session after the 2011 
general election. After being proof-read by a native English speaker, each of the political 
discourses included 165 words. The discourses were then presented to participants along with 
the images and related questions described in Study 2C. Data were collected through the 
Qualtrics online platform during November and December of 2013. Participants were asked 
to read the political discourses and select the political party they thought the discourse 
belonged to. The political parties presented were the eight political parties with seats in New 
Zealand’s Parliament: ACT, Green, Labour, Mana, Māori, National, New Zealand First and 
United Future. The participants could also select the option “I don’t know”. The study was 
approved by the School of Psychology Human Ethics Committee under delegated authority of 
the Victoria University of Wellington Human Ethics Committee (Reference number: 
RM019658). 
Overall, 77 participants took part in the study. Of those, 40 participants who were 
New Zealand-born with at least 18 years old and described themselves as European New 
Zealanders (Pākehā) were considered in the final analyses. In total, 52.5% of the participants 
were female, the mean age of the sample was 20.73 years (SD = 3.33), and 17.5% of the 
participants also described themselves as Asian, Māori and/or Pacific Islander.  
Siegel and Castellan’s Kappa statistic was used to evaluate the reliability for these 
multi-rater categorical variables (1988, as cited in Eugenio & Glass, 2004). This type of 
Kappa is preferable than Cohen’s Kappa because it is less affected by skewed distribution of 
answers and how much coders disagree (Eugenio & Glass, 2004). Siegel and Castellan’s 
Kappa can vary from -1 to +1  with values suggesting less-than-chance agreement (< 0), 
slight agreement (.01 to .20), fair agreement (.21 to .40), moderate agreement (.41 to .60), 
substantial agreement (.61 to .80) and almost perfect agreement (.81 to .99) (Kottner et al., 
2011; Viera & Garrett, 2005). Small Kappas can become statistically significant in large 
samples given that this statistic is sensitive to the sample size. Besides the Kappa statistic, the 
percentage of agreement between raters was also calculated and used to evaluate the 
appropriateness of the political discourses.  
Overall, 80.0% of the participants paired correctly the Green party with its discourse, 
77.5% paired correctly the National party with its discourse, and 35.0% paired correctly the 
Labour and the ACT parties with their discourses. Kappas for interrater agreement between 
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each pair of political discourses ranged from .04 to .45. Overall, slight-to-moderate agreement 
was achieved for all pair of discourses being compared, with great agreement observed 
between Green and National (KSC = .45, p < .001), and Green and ACT (KSC = .24, p < .001). 
The Kappa for the four political discourses was .29 (fair agreement). Given the overall poor 
level of raters’ agreement, the political discourses were evaluated for a second time among 
experts. It was hypothesized that the student sample used to validate the discourses could be 
uninformed regarding political parties and their discourses.  
Fifteen political science/political psychology academics working at Victoria 
University of Wellington or University of Auckland were invited to take part in the study 
during February of 2014. The academics were contacted through their university email 
addresses. Data was collected through Qualtrics online platform and data analysis procedures 
were the same reported for the first political discourses validation study. Five academics 
completed the survey. The four academics that studied political issues, lived in New Zealand 
for more than one year, and had not gone abroad for more than six months at a time were 
included in the analyses. Two of the participants were male, and two were born in New 
Zealand. From those born in New Zealand, all were European New Zealanders. All had lived 
in New Zealand for more than five years.  
 Overall, all four experts correctly paired the political discourse designed for the Green 
party (100.0%), three correctly paired the political discourses designed for the National and 
the Labour parties (75.0%) and two correctly paired the political discourse designed for the 
ACT party (50.0%). The political discourses designed for ACT and National were only paired 
with one of these two parties. The only participant, who did not correctly pair the Labour 
party with its discourse, chose the option “I don’t know”.  
Kappas for interrater agreement between each pair of political discourses ranged from 
-.24 to .58. The Kappa for the four political discourses was .46 (moderate agreement). 
Moderate agreement was also reached when considered the comparisons between the pairs 
Green and ACT, Green and National, and Green and Labour. The comparison between 
Labour and National suggested only fair agreement (KSC = .27, p = .204), while the 
comparison between Labour and ACT suggested only slight agreement (KSC = .19, p = .327). 
The comparison between National and ACT was negative, indicating less-than-chance 
agreement (KSC = -.24, p = .474). 
Overall, the results were better for the second validation study than for the first 
validation study, which seems to confirm that maybe the student sample was uninformed 
about the political parties and their discourses. The results also showed that the Green party 
  
210 
 
discourse was more correctly identified. Given that participants assigned political discourses 
designed for ACT and National only to one of these two conservative parties and that the lack 
of agreement might be due to a small sample size, the unchanged discourses remained as a 
dependent variable in studies 3B and 3C. The political discourses are presented in Appendix 
L2. 
 
Appendix L2. Political Discourses per Political Party They Were Designed for 
ACT party. We believe that: individuals are the rightful owners of their lives and 
therefore have rights and responsibilities; the proper purpose of government is to protect such 
rights and not to assume such responsibilities. We take our principles into action by: 
encouraging individual choice and responsibility and the pursuit of excellence; enhancing 
living standards for all New Zealanders through sustainable economic growth and 
international competitiveness; ensuring that all New Zealanders have access to quality health 
care and have security in retirement; providing for the nation’s security and the protection of 
individual lives and property; exploring and implementing practical and innovative ways to 
protect the natural environment; maintaining sound economic management, including a 
balanced government budget, price stability and a free and open market economy; and 
limiting the involvement of central and local government to those areas where collective 
action is a practical necessity. Most of all, we believe that education should be improved and 
that welfare should be remodelled, limiting the continuity of benefits through generations. 
Green party. Our main purposes are: seek political change through fostering and 
developing community-based green action; engage individuals and communities in lively and 
constructive civic discussion and decision-making; and work constructively with all those 
who want to contribute to achieving green goals. We believe that: each of us should be aware 
of the land, water, air, energy and materials we use, using them sustainably, and taking 
responsibility for doing so; a thriving new economy, rich in creativity and meaningful work, 
results from business and the community sector embracing their social and environmental 
responsibilities; the Treaty of Waitangi should be the base for our local and national 
relationships; power imbalance should be reduced and resources should be shared more 
equally; and we protect our sovereignty and enhance sustainability by controlling corporate 
power in the public interest, limiting foreign control of our land and becoming more self-
reliant. Most of all, we believe that work is not the only requirement to eradicate poverty, nor 
is the termination of social benefits.  
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Labour party. We act according to the following democratic socialist principles: The 
natural resources of New Zealand belong to all the people and should benefit all, including 
future generations; all people should have equal access to all social, economic, cultural, 
political and legal spheres, regardless of wealth or social position; co-operation, rather than 
competition, should be the governing factor in economic relations; all people are entitled to 
dignity, self-respect and the opportunity to work; all people, either individually or in groups, 
may own wealth or property for their own use, but in any conflict of interest people are 
always more important than property and the state must ensure a just distribution of wealth; 
and the Treaty of Waitangi is the founding document of New Zealand and should be honoured 
by the government. Our guiding principles are: Freedom; equality; opportunity; solidarity; 
and sustainability. Most of all, we believe that poverty and inequality should be addressed and 
that New Zealand should grow in a clean, green and innovative way. 
National party. We seek a safe, prosperous and successful New Zealand that creates 
opportunities for all New Zealanders to reach their personal goals and dreams. We believe 
that this will only be achieved with: Loyalty to our country, its democratic principles and our 
Sovereign as Head of State; national and personal security; equal citizenship and equal 
opportunity; individual freedom and choice; personal responsibility; competitive enterprise 
and rewards for achievement; limited government; strong families and caring communities; 
and sustainable development of our environment. Our main policies are: selling of around 
49% of New Zealand’s public companies assets in order to enable the country’s development 
and the economy to recover; developing schools in order to allow graduates to gain easier 
access to the market; welfare reform, limiting the continuity of benefits through generations; 
limiting immigration to the numbers needed in our workforce; decreasing the spending in the 
public sector, fostering productivity; and not burdening struggling companies with more 
taxes. Most of all, we believe in working hard and willpower. 
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Appendix M. Measures Added to Studies 3B and 3C 
Appendix M1. Items Measuring Emotion (Bradley & Lang, 1994) 
Now, after imagining yourself in this scenario, please complete the following questions. Please 
read each question carefully.  
 
You will probably find that in some cases your answers to this scenario might be different to 
what they would be otherwise, while for other questions your answers won’t be that different. 
It’s important that you read each question and select your answers carefully, being at all times 
mindful of the scenario you read before. 
 
How do you feel after the scenario just presented?  
 
 
 
How do you feel after the scenario just presented? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
How do you feel after the scenario just presented? 
 
 
 
 
Appendix M2. Competitive and Dangerous World Beliefs Scale Based on Work of 
Duckitt et al. (2002) and Sibley et al. (2007) 
Happy/ Pleased Unhappy/ Unsatisfied 
Excited/ Aroused Calm/ Relaxed 
Submissive/ Controlled Dominant/ In control 
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STILL THINKING ABOUT THE SCENARIO (STILL THINKING ABOUT THE 
PERSONAL SCENARIO AND THE TEXT ABOUT NEW ZEALAND)... 
Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements using the 7-point scale below.  
 
1 = Strongly disagree 
2 = Somewhat disagree  
3 = Slightly disagree  
4 = Neutral 
5 = Slightly agree  
6 = Somewhat agree 
7 = Strongly agree 
 
a. There are many dangerous people in our society who will attack someone out of pure 
meanness, for no reason at all. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
b. Despite what one hears about “crime in the street,” there probably isn’t any more now than 
there ever has been. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
c. If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing bad is likely to happen to him or her; 
we do not live in a dangerous world. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
d. Every day as society become more lawless and bestial, a person’s chances of being robbed, 
assaulted, and even murdered go up and up. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
e. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a safe, 
stable and secure place in which most people are fundamentally good. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
f. It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly respectable people, and more and 
more persons with no morals at all who threaten everyone else. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
g. The “end” is not near. People who think that earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might 
be about to destroy the world are being foolish. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
h. My knowledge and experience tells me that the social world we live in is basically a 
dangerous and unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral people’s values and way 
of life are threatened and disrupted by bad people. 
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1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
i. Winning is not the first thing; it’s the only thing. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
j. The best way to lead a group under one’s supervision is to show them kindness, consideration, 
and treat them as fellow workers, not as inferiors. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
k. If it’s necessary to be cold blooded and vengeful to reach one’s goals, then one should do 
it. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
l. Life is not governed by the “survival of the fittest.” We should let compassion and moral laws 
be our guide. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
m. It is much more important in life to have integrity in your dealings with others than to have 
money and power. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
n. It’s a dog-eat-dog world where you have to be ruthless at times. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
o. Charity (i.e., giving somebody something for nothing) is admirable not stupid. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
 
p. You know that most people are out to “screw” you, so you have to get them first when you 
get the chance. 
1    2    3    4    5    6    7 
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Appendix N. Study 3B Correlations between Sentiments toward Political Parties 
 
Table N.1  
Correlations between sentiments toward five of New Zealand’s political parties in Study 3B 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. ACTa 
- 
-.05 -.05 .31** .63** 
2. Green - - .37
** -.31** -.10 
3. Labour - - - -.37
** -.03 
4. National 
- 
- - - .15 
5. NZ First - - - - - 
Note. n = 136. ** p < .01. a No participant reported intention to vote for the 
ACT political party in the pre-experimental dataset and only one participant 
reported intention to vote for this political party in the post-experimental 
dataset. 
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Appendix O. Study 3C Correlation Table 
 
Table O.1 
Descriptive statistics and correlations between measures in Study 3C 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Right-wing 
authoritarianism (pre-
test) 
- .58** .36** .36** .38** .29** .05 .15 .09 .69** .30** .45** .37** .35** .16 
2. Social dominance 
orientation (pre-test) 
- - .19 .33** .39** .42** .01 .18 .02 .42** .76** .31** .33** .40** .22* 
3. Left/right orientation 
(pre-test) 
- - - .64** .54** .28** .00 .12 .05 .40** .23* .68** .62** .39** .09 
4. Liberal/conservative 
orientation (pre-test) 
- - - - .47** .28** .06 .19 .14 .41** .20* .57** .67** .43** .06 
5. Liberal/conservative 
voting intention (pre-
test) 
- - - - - .35** .04 .11 .17 .45** .47** .51** .65** .91** .32** 
6. Competitive 
worldview (Duckitt et 
al., 2002) 
- - - - - - .14 .23* .05 .17 .44** .24** .32** .21* .13 
7. Competitive 
worldview (Perry & 
Sibley, 2010) 
- - - - - - - .32** .57** .00 .00 .00 -.01 .04 .06 
8. Dangerous worldview 
(Duckitt et al., 2002) 
- - - - - - - - .28** .21* .12 .16 .20* .09 .07 
9. Dangerous worldview 
(Perry & Sibley, 2010) 
- - - - - - - - - .12 .02 -.02 .03 .18 -.07 
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10. Right-wing 
authoritarianism (post-
test) 
- - - - - - - - - - .33** .53** .49** .38** .09 
11. Social dominance 
orientation (post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - .33** .32** .40** .28** 
12. Left/right orientation 
(post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - .67** .34** .18 
13. Liberal/conservative  
orientation (post-test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - .37** .20* 
14. Liberal/conservative 
voting intention (post-
test) 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - .27** 
15. Liberal/conservative 
political discourse 
preference 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
M 2.70 3.01 3.32 2.96 .52 2.49 37.27 4.06 18.88 -.96 2.97 3.37 3.13 .46 .54 
SD .81 .97 1.35 1.31 - .74 17.99 .90 13.1 1.11 .93 1.01 1.14 -  
α .93 .91 - - - .73 .92 .73 .92 .89 .90 - - -  
Skewness .21 -.19 .10 .08 -.09 .70 .14 .05 1.11 -.33 .19 -.63 .03 .16 -.16 
Kurtosis -.67 -.69 .38 -.34 -2.06 .87 -.63 -.39 .88 -.30 .20 -.65 -.88 -2.01 -2.01 
Note. *p < .05; ** p < .01. Point biserial correlation coefficients are provided for analyses including liberal/conservative voting intention and political discourse preference.
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Appendix P. Study 3C Correlations between Sentiments toward Political Parties 
 
Table P.1 
Correlations between sentiments toward five of New Zealand’s political parties in Study 3C 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1. ACTa - -.21* -.02 .25** .48** 
2. Green - - .35** -.52** .13 
3. Labour - - - -.37** -.01 
4. National - - - - -.11 
5. NZ First - - - - - 
Note. n = 112. * p < .05; **p < .01. a No participant reported intention to vote 
for the ACT political party in the pre-experimental dataset and only one 
participant reported intention to vote for this political party in the post-
experimental dataset. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
